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Thesis Abstract
This study analyses the foreign relations of South Yemen (since 1970 
the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) from independence in 1967 
until 1982. It covers the first four Presidencies of the post- 
independence period, with their attendant policy changes, and ends 
with the resolution of two of the more pressing foreign policy 
conflicts with which South Yemen was concerned, its support for the 
guerrillas in North Yemen, who were defeated in the spring of 1982, 
and its conflict with the Sultanate of Oman, with whom diplomatic 
relations were concluded in October 1982.
Chapter One provides an outline of the background to South Yemen's 
foreign policy: the outcome of the independence movement itself and 
the resultant foreign policy orientations of the new government; the 
independence negotiations with Britain; and the manner in which, in 
the post-independence period, the ruling National Front sought to 
determine and develop its foreign policy.
The remaining four chapters focus upon specific aspects of South 
Yemen's foreign policy that are, it is argued, of central importance. 
Chapter Two discusses relations with the West - with Britain, France, 
West Germany and the USA. It charts the pattern of continued economic 
ties with western European states, and the several political disputes 
which South Yemen had with them. Chapter Three discusses the issue of 
'Yemeni Unity' - the reasons for the continued commitment to this 
goal, the policy of simultaneously supporting opposition in North 
Yemen and negotiating with the government there, and the course of 
policy on creating a unified Yemeni state. Chapter Four considers the 
attempt to promote revolution in Oman, relations with other states in 
the Arabian Peninsula and the gradual lessening of tensions between
2them and South Yemen. Chapter Five discusses relations with the 
USSR and China - the growth of military and economic links with 
Russia, the large but not complete area of PDRY-USSR political 
agreement, and the continued if sometimes tense relationship with 
China.
The study ends with a brief Conclusion, suggesting some broader 
implications of South Yemen's foreign policy in this period.
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Note on Nomenclature
The area referred to in this study as 'South Yemen 1 has been known 
in English by several names in the twentieth century. In earlier 
decades it was conventionally known as 'Aden 1 or 'Aden and the Protec- 
torates', as well as by the broader geographic name 'South Arabia', 
and, after 1959, as the Federation of South Arabia. The official 
title of the state was, from 1967 to 1970, the People's Republic of 
South (or Southern) Yemen, and, from 1970 onwards, the People's Demo- 
cratic Republic of Yemen. The terra 'South Yemen' is a geographic 
term that came into English usage after independence. In this work, 
the term 'South Yemen' is used, irrespective of historical period, 
to cover the geographic area, and the 'People's Democratic Republic 
of Yemen' to denote the post-independence state, except where the 
term People's Republic of South Yemen is specifically appropriate. 
The political organisation now ruling South Yemen has undergone 
several changes of title since its establishment in 1963. It was 
known from 1963 to 1967 as the 'National Liberation Front of Occupied 
South Yemen', from 1967 to 1972 as the 'National Front 1 , from 1972 to 
1975 as the 'Political Organisation, the National Front', from 1975 
to 1978 as the 'United Political Organisation, the National Front', 
and, from 1978 onwards, as the 'Yemeni Socialist Party'. I have tried 
to use whichever term is appropriate for the period under discussion, 
but for the post-1967 years have used the terms 'ruling organisation' 
and 'ruling party' interchangeably.
Note on Transliteration
The main system of transliteration from Arabic used here is that of 
the Encyclopaedia of Islam. However, where names of places or people 
are conventionally rendered into English in other forms, these latter 
have been retained (e.g. Aden, Bahrain, Imam, Nasser, Saudi Arabia, 
Yemen).
Introduction
The purpose of the following study is to analyse the foreign relations 
of South Yemen during the first decade and a half since its indepen- 
dence, from November 1967 until the end of 1982. Such an analysis 
will involve discussion of some central components of the PDRY's 
foreign policy, the more important positions on foreign policy adopted 
by South Yemen's government and, where relevant, the corresponding 
policies of other states and political groups with which it has had 
contact. This work is intended to be a contribution of relevance to 
three separate areas of study - the modern history of Arabia, the 
analysis of the foreign policies of third world states, and the com- 
parative study of the external relations of post-revolutionary regimes.
Rather than attempting the establishment of a comprehensive, 
empirical, record, the analysis aims, within the constraints of the 
available information and space, to elicit some themes in South Yemeni 
foreign policy that are both significant in themselves and of broader, 
comparative, interest. It is this selective approach which has guided 
the choice and ordering of the different chapters. Chapter One 
establishes the domestic context of South Yemen's foreign relations-. 
It charts the transfer of power from Britain and the determination of 
the regime's foreign policy in the years after independence by 
successive governments and congresses. The four chapters that follow 
each focus upon a major theme in South Yemen's foreign policy. These 
chapters analyse both the reasons for this policy being a central one 
and the manner in which policy on this issue has developed.
Chapter Two discusses South Yemen's policy towards political and 
economic ties with the west. While all transitions from colonial rule 
to independence involve an element of discontinuity, the degree of
8discontinuity, even rupture, attendant upon decolonisation in South 
Yemen was greater than in many other post-1945 instances. The 
question arises of to what point such a radical or revolutionary 
decolonisation was taken, not only internally but also internationally, 
and what the costs of this kind of decolonisation were. This issue 
is posed with especial force in regard to two aspects of South Yemen's 
foreign policy: its diplomatic relations with the west, and its ties 
to western economies, upon which its prosperity had hitherto relied.
The second theme in South Yemen's foreign policy to be analysed is 
the claim that the PDRY was only part of a divided country, a 'greater 1 
Yemen encompassing the two states of North and South Yemen, as well 
as, on occasion, parts of Saudi Arabia. This comprises the material 
of Chapter Three. The problem of national unity has arisen in many 
other parts of the contemporary world. This has been the case in 
Germany and Korea, where since 1945 two distinct states have come into 
existence. It has also been so in, among other places, Mongolia, 
Bengal, Somalia, and Ireland: in these latter cases independent and 
distinct states have claimed that part of their national territory 
remains under the control of another state. In many of these 3 'unity 1
and territorial claims persist even where realisation of "unity 1 seems
2 
remote. It is not necessary to believe that unity of the two Yemeni
states was feasible to see that the issue of 'unity 1 , and of the 
conflictual but persistently intimate relations between the two states, 
was an important factor in South Yemen's foreign policy, not least 
because here the issue of national unity intersected with that of 
promoting change in another state. The history of policy on Yemeni 
'unity' provides an example of interaction between two states of 
similar national but divergent social characters that is pertinent to 
some of the other instances.
9South Yemen's foreign relations with neighbouring states are of 
interest for a further reason, namely the intention which they 
embodied of encouraging revolution in other states of the region apart 
from North Yemen. This topic forms the subject-matter of Chapter Four. 
As much as any state in this century that has issued from a revolution, 
South Yemen sought to conduct its foreign relations at two, often 
contradictory, levels - that of inter-governmental relations, with 
other states, and that of relations with revolutionary forces within 
other states, ones that were seeking to overthrow the existing govern- 
ments. This commitment to opposition groups was true of South Yemen's 
relations towards all three of its land neighbours - Saudi Arabia and 
Oman as well as North Yemen - and towards other remoter states in the 
region - Ethiopia, Iran and Israel. Despite its lack of many of the 
resources that make for a strong or resilient foreign policy, South 
Yemen persisted in such support to radical groups beyond its frontiers 
for many years. Chapter Four seeks to chart the extent of this 
support, to analyse the factors maintaining it, and to see under what 
conditions it abated.
Chapter Five analyses this quest for allies, how this orientation 
in favour of revolution in the region was accompanied by the develop- 
ment of a multifaceted relationship with the USSR, the state which, 
from the late 1960s, was the main supporter of South Yemen in the 
international arena. While this alliance with the USSR was more far- 
reaching than that of any other Middle Eastern state with Moscow 
during this period, in a comparative third world perspective South 
Yemen's record was not so exceptional. The PDRY was one of over a 
dozen third world non-communist countries that developed close rela- 
tions with the Soviet Union in the postwar years. South Yemen 
therefore provides a case study of such relations: of the impact of
10
Soviet policies upon an already radicalised third world state, of the 
manner in which the relationship developed, of the problems that arose, 
of the constraints involved on both sides in such an alliance, and of 
what factors sustained it. Relations with China, subordinate to those 
with the USSR but nonetheless continuous, are also discussed in this 
chapter.
These four factors - renegotiated relations with the west, the 
vicissitudes of the Yemeni unity question, the pursuit of a revolution- 
ary foreign policy in the region, and the pattern of ties to the 
communist bloc - indicate dimensions in which the PDRY sought to 
conduct its foreign policy and in which, beyond its particular, Middle 
Eastern, interest, the foreign policy of South Yemen may repay closer, 
and more systematic, examination.
There are, however, two substantive objections which a proposal of 
this kind may occasion. The one is that there is, as yet, insuffi- 
cient empirical material available upon which to base a study of South 
Yemen's foreign policy. The country has been independent for less 
than two decades, and the events which are being described and 
analysed may therefore be too recent to permit of serious study. 
Moreover, South Yemen has conducted its foreign policy amidst condi- 
tions that are unfavourable to academic investigation: its decision- 
making bodies are secretive, its press is confined to endorsing 
official policies, foreign policy has already become an issue of too 
much dispute within the ruling party to permit of accurate discussion 
inside the country, and there is little independent access to much of 
the material relevant to a study of its foreign policy. Secondly, it 
can be argued, South Yemen is, as a state, too insignificant to merit 
analysis of its foreign policy: a country of less than two million 
people, amongst the poorest in the world, with little economic,
11
political or military weight in international affairs, and geographi- 
cally on the margin of the Middle East, the PDRY might be said, in 
only the more limited senses, to have a foreign policy at all, if by 
this is meant the capacity to influence other states or autonomously 
to determine its relations with the rest of the world.
Both of these objections pose valid questions. There is much that 
we do not know about South Yemen's foreign relations and which, given 
the reticence of its government and the probable lack of written 
documentation on many issues, we shall, in all likelihood, never know. 
In the context of world affairs as a whole, South Yemen is certainly 
one of the weaker states, without even the power or influence of many 
of the other countries in the Middle East. Yet these two constraints 
do not entail that investigation of South Yemen's foreign relations 
is impossible, or without justification. In addition they need to be 
offset against the ways in which the topic is of interest both as a 
study of an Arab state's foreign policy and in a comparative dimension.
The sources used in the following study fall into three categories. 
There are, in the first place, official statements of the South Yemeni 
state and ruling organisation. Texts of South Yemeni policy can be 
found printed in the South Yemen press, in transcripts of its radio 
broadcasts, and in special publications issued in Aden and by 
embassies abroad. Complementing these are official materials from 
other interested parties - governments, international organisations, 
non-governmental groups - with whom South Yemen has had relations 
and/or been in conflict. Secondly, there are publications of an 
unofficial kind containing relevant information on the PDRY - news- 
papers, journals, books and compilations of specialist data. Whilst 
frequently inaccurate and unreliable, these nonetheless perform an 
important function in outlining the course of events and of policy:
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they can be used with appropriate caution. Thirdly, there are my own 
first-hand observations of South Yemeni foreign policy based on four 
research visits to the country - in 1970, 1973, 1977, and 1984 - and 
on numerous interviews, on and off the record, conducted with South 
Yemeni officials since 1969. These interviews have themselves been 
accompanied by discussions with officials of many other states and 
organisations that have been in dealings with South Yemen over the 
same period. Amongst those whom I have interviewed are officials of 
Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, the USA, Cuba, the USSR, 
China, Israel, Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, North Yemen, Iran, 
Somalia, and Ethiopia, as well as representatives of several guerrilla 
groups supported, at one point or another, by South Yemen. Taken 
together these three categories of material provide a definite, albeit 
limited, basis for establishing and analysing the record of South 
Yemen's foreign policy in the period under discussion.
The argument of insignificance is equally debatable. No state is 
so powerful that it can operate without constraint, internal and 
external, and impose its influence beyond its frontiers as it might 
like. No state is so weak that it cannot be said to have a foreign 
policy, in the sense of being able in some measure to determine its 
external relations - be they political, economic, military or cultural 
- and to have some impact upon those of others. The argument of 
insignificance might exclude study of the foreign relations of many 
states in the world, and overstate the degree to which a meaningful 
foreign policy can only be conducted by states with a measure of power 
that was above a-certain supposedly definable level. It might, above 
all underplay the extent to which smaller states can indeed play a 
role of some influence in international affairs, autonomous of, if not 
independent from, the stronger powers of the region and world in which
13 
they find themselves.
While placing greatest emphasis upon relations between states, 
this study does, at appropriate points, go beyond the confines of 
state-to-state relations, predominant as these have been in the course 
of South Yemen's foreign relations. There are four respects, at least, 
in which the analysis of state relations is here supplemented by addi- 
tional considerations. In the first place, a part of South Yemen's 
relationship with the outside world involved not states but inter- 
national organisations: the UN, the IMF, the Arab League, Comecon, the 
Non-Aligned Movement, the Islamic League, and others. South Yemen 
sought to play a part in these and to receive support from their 
membership. Secondly, South Yemen devoted considerable attention and, 
at times, resources to relations with non-governmental organisations, 
most evidently guerrilla groups seeking to overthrow established 
governments in different countries of the area. The most obvious 
cases of these were guerrilla movements in Oman, North Yemen, and 
Eritrea, and among the Palestinian resistance. Thirdly, as a country 
of exiguous material resources and historically reliant, as it has 
been, for much of its prosperity upon foreign economic contacts, South 
Yemen had to pay particular attention to its economic links with other 
countries, whether through trade, aid or investment, or through the 
remittances of its emigrants. This salience of economic relations 
was important in its own right and as a factor shaping more general 
foreign policy decisions. Finally, as in the analysis of other 
countries, the study of South Yemeni foreign policy necessitates 
examination of the domestic forces shaping that policy and of the 
institutions and constitutional stipulations affecting it. Analysis 
of the internal context of foreign policy determination involves both 
the internal arrangements made for foreign policy to be conducted,
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and the manner in which South Yemen's foreign policy intersected with 
the course, the orientations and conflicts, of internal politics.
The premiss of what follows is that there was something distinctive 
and significant about the foreign policy pursued by South Yemen after 
independence. It was distinctive because of the internal changes 
preceding and accompanying the execution of this foreign policy, 
changes that merit the term 'revolutionary'; as a result of these, the 
country's foreign policy differed from that of other states in the 
region with more continuous and traditional internal arrangements. 
It was significant in that it shows how, with all the limitations upon 
it, even a small and economically weak state such as South Yemen could 
nevertheless pursue a foreign policy that was to some degree of its 
own choosing. There was certainly much that was rhetoric and not 
capable of realisation, and there were commitments to change that were, 
over time, reduced and then terminated. But this was itself an inter- 
esting process, of the shifting reconciliation of programme and 
reality. It can be fruitfully examined in smaller states as it can 
in large.
This study covers what is a discrete period in South Yemeni foreign 
policy, in that the public commitment to revolutionary change in two 
neighbouring states, North Yemen and Oman, was modified in 1982 by 
agreements with the government of these two countries. This partial 
reconciliation apparently marked the end of a phase of upheaval in the 
South Arabian region that had begun twenty years before, with the 
North Yemeni revolution of 1962, and which had included the conflict 
in South Yemen in which the National Front had come to power. 1982 
therefore provides a convenient point at which to end this analysis 
of South Yemen's post-independence foreign policy. If the longer-run 
direction of South Yemen's foreign policy must await the passage of
15
more years, it is nonetheless possible, on the basis of the record 
as so far available, to establish in some degree the initial contours 
of this unusual experience of post-independence diplomacy.
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Chapter One
The Development of Foreign Policy
A Revolutionary Outcome
On 30 November 1967 British rule in South Arabia ended, and a new 
independent state, the People's Republic of South Yemen, came into 
existence. The termination of British authority had been preceded by 
negotiations between the United Kingdom and the guerrilla group that 
now assumed power, the National Liberation Front, and, at the moment 
of independence, Britain recognised the new state and offered it some 
economic aid. Nevertheless, the transition from colonial rule to 
independence in South Arabia was, by the norms of decolonisation in 
most British colonies, an exceptional one. It had been preceded by 
a four year period of guerrilla war against British rule and that of 
the British-supported Federation of South Arabia, as well as by fight- 
ing between the rival nationalist groups, the NLF and FLOSY. It had 
culminated in a revolutionary uprising against the established rulers
of the hinterland. Public contact between the Front and the UK
2 
authorities had begun only three weeks before independence itself.
In condensed form, it can be said that four major factors had con- 
tributed to this outcome in the South Arabian arena. First, British 
colonial policy had, during the late nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, created a new administrative entity, South Arabia, and had
later sought to establish there a governmental structure, the Federa-
2 tion of South Arabia. The tensions involved in building this state,
and the several changes in British policy, had occasioned uncertainty 
and considerable opposition amongst the local population. The British 
decision of 1966 to withdraw entirely both reflected and encouraged 
this opposition. Secondly, in the post-1945 period, there had been
19
substantial economic expansion in the port of Aden, the capital of 
South Arabia, during which a trades union movement of nationalist 
affiliation had emerged. Meanwhile, in the countryside, the gradual 
intrusion of money relations, and emigration, were in some measure 
undermining the traditional loyalty of the population to their rulers, 
Sultans, Amirs and Sheikhs. The political tensions of the 1960s were 
in part a response to such social and economic change. Thirdly, from 
the 1950s onwards, the rise of Arab nationalism, epitomised in 
Nasser's Egypt, exercised a strong influence over the population of 
South Arabia and its political organisations. Fourthly, the revolu- 
tion of September 1962 in North Yemen, in which the Imam was over- 
thrown and a Republic proclaimed, provided a new and proximate focus 
for nationalists in what they saw as 'South Yemen 1 . The nationalists 
in South Arabia quickly became involved in support of the Republic, 
as Britain and some of its associate rulers in the South did in sup-
o
port of the Republic's opponents in the North. In 1963 a guerrilla 
group, the National Liberation Front for the Liberation of Occupied
South Yemen, usually known in English as the NLF, was created with
9 North Yemeni assistance. The combination of these four factors -
colonial policy and its changes, socio-economic development, the 
growth of Arab nationalism, and the 1962 revolution in North Yemen - 
led to a situation whereby, in 1967, Britain was compelled to hand 
over authority to a recently established guerrilla force that it had 
until just prior to independence been seeking to defeat. 
The Independence Negotiations
A British commitment to the independence of South Arabia had been made 
first in 1964, when a decision to withdraw in 1968 was announced, and 
then, in 1966, in an announcement that Britain would not only withdraw 
but also evacuate the base by January 1968: from February 1966 onwards,
20
therefore, British policy was that the UK intended to hand over to 
the Federal government and would do what it could to ensure that the 
Federation remained in existence until independence. 10 In 1966 and 
1967 this support involved a security guarantee, not only against 
guerrilla forces inside South Arabia itself, but also against a feared 
invasion of South Arabia by the Egyptian forces still present in the 
YAR. By the early months of 1967, some British officials recognised 
that any viable post-independence government would have to include 
representatives of the guerrillas, and in May 1967 British representa- 
tives began to appeal for talks with the NLF and FLOSY. On 19 June
1967 the British High Commissioner, Sir Humphry Trevelyan, announced/ ^
that he was lifting the ban on the NLF imposed in 1965. He appealed
to the opposition political parties for open discussions with a view
12 
to forming a caretaker government. The NLF, however, refused at
this point to enter into negotiations with the British authorities. 
In May they had laid down three conditions before this could happen: 
the evacuation of British forces, the liquidation of the 'colonialist
presence' and the rule of 'reactionary sultans', and surrender of
13 
authority to the NLF. In June these had still not been met.
At this point, British policy continued to be one of supporting 
the Federal government while seeking to broaden its base. In a state- 
ment in the House of Commons on 19 June 1967 the Foreign and Colonial 
Secretary, George Brown, outlined British policy in the following 
terms: independence would be on 9 January 1968; for six months after 
that date a strong naval force, including an aircraft carrier, would 
operate in South Arabian waters; a force of V-bombers would be 
stationed on the RAF base on the Omani island of Masira for the same 
period or as long as the South Arabian government wanted; and, in 
addition to the £50 million in civilian and military aid promised
21
over the three years after independence, an additional £10 million in 
military support costs would be provided. This announcement was 
followed by a reading of the Aden, Perim and Kuria Muria Islands Bill 
in the House of Commons, an enabling act that relinquished British 
sovereignty over those parts of South Arabia under direct British 
rule. In the course of the debate on this Bill, Mr Brown also 
stated that he favoured the internationalisation of the Red Sea island 
of Perim and its transfer to some kind of UN control.
The June 1967 commitment to backing the future independent govern- 
ment with military force reflected a shift from the 1966 position, 
which had precluded such a commitment. But the assumptions upon which 
this new British policy was formulated were soon undermined. On the 
one hand, the defeat of Egypt by Israel in the June 1967 war led to 
the process by which Egypt agreed to withdraw its forces from North 
Yemen, and so removed the British and Saudi fear of an Egyptian take- 
over in the South. In August 1967 Nasser committed himself at the 
Khartoum conference of Arab states to withdraw his forces by December. 
They had in fact left by the end of October. On the other hand, the 
NLF had continued to refuse negotiations with Britain and as British 
forces withdrew in the summer of 1967 it pressed on with its seizure 
of power in the hinterland. Attempts by the UN to meet with Federal 
ministers and arrange a compromise were attacked by the NLF. A state- 
men-t on 8 August stated: 'We have no alternative but to strike harder 
blows at the enemy until Britain actually recognises the revolution 
and negotiates with it directly for the surrender of power.' On 2
September NLF Secretary-General Kahtan al-^ha'abi gave a press confer- 
" ...
ence in the town of Zindjibar, east of Aden. He stated that the 
Federal government had collapsed and he demanded the immediate with- 
drawal of British troops. He added: 'We are not against the South
22
Arabian Army, so long as the army is not against us.' 18 The High 
Commissioner then made a statement on 5 September that the Federal 
government could no longer expect to replace British rule. He recog- 
nised the 'nationalist forces' as representatives of the people and
1 Q 
called on them to negotiate with him.
Yet despite these developments it took another two months for 
official contact between the NLF and the British authorities to be 
established. The intervening period was taken up by the NLF in con- 
solidating its position in the hinterland and in defeating the forces 
of its rival FLOSY, as well as in resisting pressure from the Egyp- 
tians and the UN to form a coalition with FLOSY. It was also neces- 
sary for the Labour government in London, to a degree influenced by 
pro-FLOSY sentiments, to accept the NLF.
The final round of policy-making on the British withdrawal began on
21 2 November with a statement from George Brown in the House of Commons.
He announced that the date for withdrawal had been brought forward to 
the latter half of November 1967, that all British forces would be 
withdrawn by the end of that month, and that in the light of the 
Egyptian withdrawal from North Yemen it was no longer necessary to 
station V-bombers on Masira. He also announced that the offer of 
financial support made in his 19 June statement would be left 'for 
decision rather later, when the future may be clearer 1 . The proposal 
of internationalising Perim had not found support at the UN; the 
island would therefore remain part of the new state. On 6 November, 
when the NLF had inflicted a decisive defeat on FLOSY in fighting in 
Aden, the South Arabian Army (SAA) declared its support for the NLF 
and its officers asked the British authorities to negotiate with the 
NLF.^ In talks with the British authorities between 7 and 10 Novem- 
ber SAA officers told the British authorities that they supported the
23
NLF. A statement in the Sheikh Othman district of Aden by NLF leader 
Sayf al-Dali'i on 8 November claimed full NLF control of the whole
   
country, and said that this constituted a formal request to Britain
23 to negotiate with it. But it was only on 11 November that the NLF
took the initiative of sending a telegram to George Brown stating 
their claim to be the legitimate authority in South Arabia and asking 
him to negotiate on the transition of independence. The British High 
Commissioner had, apparently, wanted to contact the NLF but he had
been overruled by officials in London, who insisted that the guerril-
24 las had to come to them. The British authorities had, therefore,
no formal contact with the NLF until but a few days before South 
Arabia became independent. Yet, once the NLF approach of 11 November 
was made, it was possible for the UK government to enter into the 
independence negotiations. In a statement on 14 November George Brown 
announced that negotiations with the NLF would now take place, and 
that South Arabia would become independent on 30 November.
Negotiations were held in Geneva from 21 to 29 November. Because 
of the NLF's previous refusal to negotiate with FLOSY under UN 
auspices, the UN authorities in Geneva declined to provide facilities 
for the negotiations and they had to be held in the local branch of
n s
the Young Women's Christian Association. The NLF delegation
included Kahtan al-Sha'abi, Faysal 'Abd al-Latif al-Sha'abi, Sayf al- 
. .   ~""~      
Dal-i'i, 'All 'Antar, 'Ali al-Bid, 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il and Muhammad
 
Ahmad al-Bishi. According to one British source:
 
It was evident at the Geneva conference that they had prepared 
very carefully for the moment when they would take power. They 
were well-documented on all the issues and greatly surprised the 
British delegates, who expected them to be revolutionary fighters 
rather than politicians, by their grasp of the issues at stake. 
Lord Shackleton himself thought they were men of high calibre. 27
Yet only Kahtan al-Sha'abi, the oldest of the NLF leaders, was
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personally known to the British authorities, from his days as an 
agricultural engineer in Lahej. The others were young men from the 
hinterland and North Yemen, who had remained underground during the 
guerrilla campaigns. The British delegation, on the other hand, 
included several of the FCO's most experienced and well-known experts
on South Arabia. It was headed by Lord Shackleton, the FCO Minister
^ 
who had been handling South Arabian affairs, Sir Humphry Trevelyan,
the High Commissioner in Aden, Sir Harold Beeley, the former ambassa- 
dor to Cairo, John McCarthy, former Counsellor to the High Commission 
in Aden and now Head of the Aden Department of the FO, John Wilton, 
Deputy High Commissioner in Aden, and Oliver Miles, Private Secretary
to the High Commissioner, who did much of the translation between
28 Arabic and English.
The main requests of the NLF were: that they be recognised as the 
government of South Arabia; that Britain provide aid at twice the 
level offered in June to the Federation; and that the islands attached 
to South Arabia under British rule remain as part of the new republic. 
The British requests were that there be an 'orderly' handover, that 
the new republic should observe 'previous external obligations', by 
which was meant that it should not interfere in the internal affairs 
of other Peninsular states, that it should continue to serve two 
public debts incurred by the Aden government and the Federation, and 
that it agree to pay public service pensions incurred during colonial
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rule.
Some issues were settled without great difficulty. The British 
agreed to recognise the NLF, and to exchange diplomatic relations at 
ambassadorial levels. The NLF agreed upon an 'orderly' handover, and 
attacks upon British personnel had ceased by the end of the first week 
in November. The prospect of a fighting departure by Britain was
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thereby removed. The NLF also accepted the two inherited debts, the 
Aden government one more rapidly than that of the Federation. The 
issue of 'respecting previous external obligations' was not dwelt upon 
at length but, according to one British delegate, the leader of the 
NLF delegation, Kahtan al-Sha'abi, stated: 'We won't make trouble for
  »    miJL
anyone, not even the Sultan 1 , an apparent reference to the Sultan of 
Oman. 30
Disagreement centred on three other questions: the Kuria Muria 
Islands, the amount of British aid and the issue of pensions. The 
British agreed that Perim and Kamaran should be part of the new 
republic: the local inhabitants had opted for adhesion to the republic. 
The NLF insisted that since the Kuria Muria Islands had been offici- 
ally attached to Aden colony they too should be part of the new state. 
But the British argued that this had only been a temporary arrangement. 
The few dozen inhabitants had, it was reported, opted for the Sultan 
of Oman and the islands, off the southern coast of Oman, would accord- 
ingly be returned to him. George Brown announced on 30 November that, 
under a Treaty signed on 15 November, the islands were being retro- 
ceded to the Sultan on that day. The NLF protested but made no 
practical attempt to claim them.
The issue of aid was even more controversial. The British view was 
that the June 1967 offer had been made to the Federation government 
and that it included sums disbursed between that date and the date of 
independence. There was also strong pressure on the British govern- 
ment within the UK not to give aid to the NLF because of the latter's 
killing of British soldiers, and in particular because of the slaying 
of twenty-three British soldiers in Crater on 20 June by pro-NLF SAA 
forces. The financial difficulties of the British government in the 
latter part of 1967, following upon the closure of the Suez Canal in
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June and the devaluation of sterling by early November, added to this 
argument for stringency and made it easier for the British representa- 
tives to resist an aid commitment that was already unpopular at home 
on political grounds. 32 For its part, the NLF had political objec- 
tions to its paying public service pensions. The conventional British 
position on pensions was that post-independence governments became 
liable for all those citizens of their countries who were liable, or 
who would become liable, for pensions as a result of service with the 
colonial government in the territory concerned. The NLF objected to 
this, both on the grounds of the expense involved and because of the 
ideological implications of committing themselves to paying the
<j O
pensions of people against whom they had spent four years fighting.
Such was the disagreement on these three questions that at one 
point it appeared that no overall agreement between the two sides 
could be reached. In Geneva, Lord Shackleton felt that such obstacles 
had been encountered that he flew back to London to discuss matters 
with the British government. In Aden, the colonial authorities sent 
home all the British civil servants still working with the Federation 
and the Aden government, as well as most of those scheduled to serve 
in the new British embassy. In the end, on 29 November, a joint text 
was agreed upon entitled Memorandum of Agreed Points Relating to
Independence for South Arabia (The People's Republic of Southern
34 Yemen). This stated that independence would be on 30 November, and
that on that day the People's Republic of South Yemen would be estab- 
lished by the NLF, whom the text recognised as 'representatives of the 
peoples of the territory of the Republic'. The two parties agreed to 
exchange diplomatic recognition at ambassadorial levels, and the UK 
offered to sponsor the PRSY's application to the UN. All pre-existing 
treaties and agreements between the UK and 'other governments, rulers
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or any other authorities of the various parts of the territory of the 
PRSY 1 would lapse on 30 November, but all laws in force before indepen- 
dence would continue afterwards, unless they were inconsistent with 
the arrangements established by the Republic. Point 16 stated that 
the issue of public service and pensions would be discussed at an 
early date after independence, as would that of public debt.
A Financial Note, in three points, elaborated on the vexed issue 
of aid. The two sides agreed to continue negotiations on civilian 
and military aid and, in the meantime, the British agreed to provide 
£12 millions for six months beginning on 1 December, this being more 
or less the amount promised to the Federation. It was 'noted 1 that 
the NLF requested that this be paid in a lump sum as soon as possible. 
But it was also 'noted* in the third point of the Note that this offer 
was made 'on the assumption that the Government of the People's 
Republic of Southern Yemen would continue to discharge certain exist- 
ing financial commitments mentioned during negotiations'. This 
presumably related both to pensions and to the debts of the former 
Aden and Federal governments.
With the negotiations completed, it only remained for the British 
to complete their withdrawal from their last redoubts in Aden, and for
the NLF delegation to return home to participate in the independence
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celebrations. The NLF was now in control of nearly the whole
country and was functioning as the effective government. The British 
were able to point to some positive aspects of this final settlement: 
the final withdrawal had taken place forty days earlier than the 9 
January date announced by George Brown in June, and the final pullout 
took place in an 'orderly' manner. Despite fears in the UK that 
Britain might simply abandon the country to anarchy, the Geneva nego- 
tiations had produced a government that Britain could hand over to and
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which appeared to have the ability to administer the country. As the 
High Commissioner later wrote: 'We were lucky in at last finding some- 
one to whom we might be able to hand over in peace. 1 The judgement 
of the High Commissioner summed up the British position:
So we left without glory but without disaster....Nor was it 
humiliation. For our withdrawal was the result not of military 
or political pressure but of our decision, right or wrong, to 
leave, and if we failed to hand over our colony in the manner 
which we should have wished, it was principally because the South 
Arabians were unable to produce in time a responsible political 
party having the support of the majority of the people and pre- 
pared to negotiate a more civilised approach to independence.... 
All we could say at the time was that it might have been much 
worse. And, in the end, another little independent Arab country 
came into being, desperately poor and probably destined to go 
through periods of violence and revolt. The mark of the British 
on it was light and will soon have disappeared save for the great 
barracks, the airport, the disused churches and a few half- 
obliterated signs to the NAAFI or the sergeants* mess. Our period 
of occupation did the country little permanent good, for all the 
selfless work of many devoted Englishmen and so many good inten- 
tions. Whatever the rights or wrongs of the way we left, whatever 
was to come after us, the time for us to be there was over. And 
if we were to go, it was better not to linger on.37
By the standards of other British withdrawals, that from South 
Arabia was certainly exceptional. No British representatives attended 
the independence celebrations, the new state made no gesture of 
joining the Commonwealth. Few states had been granted independence 
by Britain amidst conditions of such ill-will, and in the whole 
history of British colonial rule only one other case of withdrawal was 
marked by such a degree of conflict between Britain and the local 
representatives, namely that from the USA in 1783. Trevelyan was 
accurate in saying that the decision to withdraw had not been forced 
on Britain by the NLF: the date for independence had been fixed in 
1964 the decision to abandon the base had been taken in 1966, before 
the NLF emerged as the predominant force. But one factor in acceler- 
ating both those decisions was the perception on Britain's part that 
governing or maintaining a position in South Arabia would become
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increasingly costly, because of the opposition of local forces, 
whether that cost was measured in terms of loss of life, security 
expenditures, or diplomatic complications. 38
Moreover, if the decision to withdraw itself was not the result of 
NLF activity, the political conditions under which it occurred were, 
and it was over these conditions that the last two years of conflict 
had raged. For Britain had hoped to leave behind a government that 
would be favourable to the interests of the west. These were not 
primarily economic: the importance of Aden as a port was declining, 
and this process was greatly accelerated by the closure of the Suez 
Canal some five months before independence. Rather, the interests of 
Britain and its allies lay in the regional context of the Arabian 
Peninsula and the Persian Gulf as a whole. A contested withdrawal 
and a defeat of Britain's local allies would, it was believed, un- 
settle rulers in the Persian Gulf. This was evident from the fact
that King Feisal of Saudi Arabia tried in May 1967 to have Britain
39 postpone its withdrawal. It was already realised that a hostile
state in South Arabia, particularly if it later became allied with the 
USSR and assisted rebels elsewhere in the Peninsula, might constitute 
some threat to the interests of the west. It was to prevent these 
two eventualities that Britain sought to ensure a transition to rule 
by the Federal government. It was in the failure to guarantee the 
political conditions that would have ensured such a handover that the 
failure of British policy consisted, as did the victory of the NLF.
The triumph of the NLF was at one level a result not of the impact 
of external factors upon South Arabia, but of the opposite - the 
failure of external actors to maintain the influence which they had 
and to bring about the kind of post-independence regime they desired. 
Britain had intended to hand over power to the Federation, a coalition
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of Adeni politicians and hinterland rulers. In the last few months 
of British rule, when the Federation was no longer credible, the 
authorities had hoped to encourage some coalition of other forces to 
emerge - combining the Federal rulers, FLOSY and the NLF, or, from 
September onwards, merely a coalition of the last two. All these 
policies had failed, and, in the end, the British government agreed 
to hand over power to, to recognise, and to extend some aid to a 
single force, the one that had been opposing Britain most intransi- 
gently since 1963. The argument has been made, both by some Arab and 
by British writers, that in some way Britain encouraged the NLF or 
favoured it in the final period: it was advanced by Arab rivals of the 
NLF in 1967 to discredit their opponents, and it is used by critics
of the British withdrawal as a way of emphasising what is seen as a
41 loss of political nerve on London's part. On the basis of evidence
so far available, the British government had no understanding with the 
NLF until 11 November 1967. The decision to recognise it as the 
successor government was taken not out of political preference but in 
the light of the practical consideration that it was the NLF which
exercised power in all regions of the country not remaining under
42 British rule.
If British hopes were confounded by the victory of the NLF, so were 
those of another external power, the Egyptians. Egypt had played an 
important part in stimulating the nationalist movement in Aden in the 
1950s, and in bringing the NLF into being in early 1963. The fact of 
Egypt's presence in North Yemen and its military commitment both to 
the YAR and to the guerrillas in the South was of immense importance 
for the NLF. The fear of a straightforward conventional military 
advance by Egypt's forces into South Yemen once Britain withdrew was 
a factor in shaping British policy, right up to the June 1967
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statement by George Brown guaranteeing naval and air support to the
independent state after the then scheduled independence date of
44January 1968. But, in the end, the Egyptians were unable to main- 
tain their influence in the South Arabian arena either. The with- 
drawal of their troops from the YAR in the latter part of 1967 removed 
their main instrument of influence, and the main threat they posed to 
the South. The coup in Sanafe of 5 November 1967, that ousted Presi- 
dent Sallal, marked the end of the Egyptians' control of events in 
the YAR at the very time that their ally FLOSY was being definitively 
defeated in the South. But even before that withdrawal the growth of 
conflict between -the NLF and the Egyptian authorities had created 
tensions that meant that any South Arabian government run by the NLF 
would, in some degree, be independent of Egyptian intentions. The 
NLF therefore triumphed at the expense of the two major external 
powers in the region, and came to power in the vacuum created by their 
simultaneous withdrawal in the latter part of 1967.
At the moment of independence the NLF, henceforward known as the 
National Front or NF, was faced with an economic crisis at home, and 
with unsatisfactory and inconclusive negotiations on aid with Britain; 
but it was not entirely without guidelines as to the foreign policy 
it would later pursue. For in the four years since its establishment 
the Front had evolved a set of policies that were either practised by 
it,, in its capacity as a guerrilla organisation, or which were pro- 
claimed as intentions to be implemented once it came to power. These 
were most clearly laid out in the National Charter of June 1965. In 
the first place, the Front was committed to substantial changes in 
the local economy: land reform, which would expropriate many of the 
former rulers, nationalisation of foreign-owned components of the 
Adeni economy, and an ending of the free port status upon which Aden
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had relied since the middle of the nineteenth century. While these 
were measures to be implemented in the domestic economy, they nonethe- 
less entailed alterations in the relations that South Yemen had with 
the outside world. The NF also came to power with two particular 
external commitments. One concerned North Yemen. In its 1965 charter 
the NF had proclaimed itself to be the Front for the liberation of the 
'Yemeni South', and throughout its campaign it had insisted on the 
belief that Yemen was one country. In his press conference of 8 
November in Sheikh Othman, Sayf al-Dali'i had stated: 'We have always
  #
made it clear that we believe all thes.e areas - the Yemen Arab Repub- 
lic and the areas which have been under British control - are all 
Yemen and that Yemeni unity should be maintained.' At the time that 
the PRSY acquired independence, the YAR was going through a period of 
turmoil attendant upon the withdrawal of Egyptian troops, and royalist
tribesmen, supported by Saudi Arabia, were besieging the YAR capital,
49 Sana'a. The NF's commitment to Yemeni unity was therefore construed
by the Front as a commitment to support for the YAR, to the government 
and the political forces in the North fighting the royalist tribes in 
defence of the Republic proclaimed in 1962. It involved not just a 
commitment to eventual unification of the two countries, but to sup- 
port by the NLF for the more radical forces in the North. Ever 
since the days of the Imam, the question of unity between North and 
South had been made conditional by many in South Yemen upon the emer- 
gence of a regime in the North which they favoured. During the period 
from 1963 to 1967 it had been the YAR which had provided backing to 
the guerrillas fighting the British, i.e. which had implemented its 
commitment to unity and sought to bring a comparable regime into power 
in the South. But from November 1967 onwards the process was reversed: 
now it was the government in the South which sought to back like-
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minded forces in the North in order to clear the way for a later 
unity.
The second commitment which the NF brought over from the pre- 
independence period was its membership of the pan-Arab grouping known 
as the Movement of Arab Nationalists. 5 Although this movement had 
ceased to exist as a coherent organisation in 1967, the different 
groups that comprised the MAN remained in contact with each other, 
and the NF, even after independence, remained under the intellectual 
influence of the MAN's Palestinian and Lebanese founders. The events 
of 1967 had, if anything, strengthened the distinctive political out- 
look of the MAN left: on the one hand, the 'petty-bourgeois 1 character 
of Egypt had, it was argued, been revealed by the defeat in the June
1967 war; on the other, the triumph of the radical MAN in Aden had
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demonstrated the possibilities of victory through guerrilla struggle.
Now that it was in power the NF felt itself able to maintain relations
with other factions of the MAN. These included: the MAN branch in
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North Yemen, which had been in conflict with Egypt since 1964; the
MAN branch in the Sultanate of Oman, where since 1965 guerrillas had 
been fighting in the Dhofar province of the Sultanate, bordering the 
PRSY; and the radical groupings that emerged within the Palestinian 
movement after the June 1967 war, the People's Front for the Libera- 
tion of Palestine, led by George Habba_sh and founded in December 1967,
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and the People's Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, led 
by Nayyif Hawatma and established as a distinct group in February 1969.
 
Habbash and Hawatma had been among the founders of the MAN, and had
. ~~  
been involved in Yemeni affairs, of both North and South, prior to 
independence. 5^ The radical wing of the NF drew intellectual inspira- 
tion from them, and support for other members of the MAN was to remain 
an important part of the Front's programme for years to come.
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This association with the MAN had, inevitably, a double implica- 
tion. On the one hand, it gave the NF a set of commitments to causes 
elsewhere in the Arab world, and most evidently to the guerrillas of 
the Palestinian resistance. But it at the same time drew the Front 
into the factional disputes that were dividing the Palestinians at 
that time, which was one of particularly bitter conflict between the
ex-MAN groups, led by Habbash and Hawattna, and the PLO and Al-Fath.
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As a result, independent South Yemen was for several years committed 
to supporting the Palestinians in general, while having strained 
relations with the main force within the Palestinian resistance move- 
ment, Al-Fath. It was only in November 1974, when the Arab League
 
officially recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate representative 
of the Palestinians, that the PDRY agreed to do likewise.
In general, foreign and domestic policy were closely interrelated 
in the post-independence period. The course of South Yemeni foreign 
policy was to a considerable extent affected by the course of politics 
within the country, by the evolution of the policies of ruling organi- 
sation and state, and by the conflicts within the leadership that 
continued throughout the first decade and a half. At the same time, 
internal political processes were themselves continuously influenced 
by foreign factors - by the economic pressures bearing upon the 
Republic, by the international conflicts in which the PRSY became 
embroiled, and by the relationships established between external 
powers and specific factions within the ruling organisation itself. 
Moreover, the transformations of front, state, economy and society 
were, despite the acquisition of independence, to a considerable 
degree guided by foreign models. Despite the apparent desire of the 
country's leadership to make South Yemen politically independent and 
economically more self-sufficient, the country remained open to a
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variety of external influences, and to pressures to which the govern- 
ment was forced to respond with the limited resources available to it.
The post-1967 history of the ruling organisation in South Yemen is 
of the gradual evolution of a radical Arab nationalist grouping into 
a more formally structured party modelled on the ruling parties of 
the USSR and eastern Europe. This history can be analysed at two 
levels: the formal level of party congresses, official declarations, 
and personnel changes, and the informal, unofficial, level of muffled 
inner-party conflicts, sudden depositions of leaders, and unantici- 
pated revisions of policy. Neither level of analysis is in itself 
sufficient. Formal development masks important events and tensions 
within the organisation. The informal history has to be matched by 
attention to the congresses and other official events that establish 
the development or confirmation of the organisation's policy and set 
the stage for each further, informal, conflict that follows. Both 
levels have a foreign policy dimension: the congresses of the front 
and party established what the guidelines of foreign policy were to 
be, and foreign policy issues played an important part in the con- 
flicts within the front and party that constituted the informal level. 
The National Front and Foreign Policy
At the moment of independence the NF was a loosely organised group- 
ing of a few thousand members. Founded in 1963, its general guide- 
lines had been given in the National Charter of the First Congress of 
June 1965, and had been modified in the Jibla and Khamir Congresses, 
the Second and Third, of 1966. Throughout much of 1967 the more 
radical faction of the Front had been calling for a Fourth Congress, 
to fix the policies the Front would pursue after independence. But 
this had been resisted by Kahtan al-Sha'abi and his associates. Thus,
  »  
as it assumed power, the NF had apparently defeated its main rivals 
within South Yemen, but it was itself divided by a continuation of
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that conflict that had been developing between Kahtan and his more
  
   
radical opponents in the 'secondary leadership' of the Front. 58
The first official statement on foreign policy by the new govern- 
ment was made by President al-Sh_a'abi when he returned to Aden from
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Geneva. He said that the Front would pursue a policy based on
'positive neutralism', and that it would protect foreign nationals 
and communities within the Republic. The latter had been a major 
concern of the UK during the Geneva negotiations. The broad lines of 
the future policy were also specified: consultations with North Yemen 
aimed at furthering 'natural Yemen unity', support for 'the liberation 
of Palestine' and 'the liberation of Arab lands still under foreign 
rule 1 , an implicit reference to the British-protected states of the 
Persian Gulf. In mentioning the Geneva talks with Britain, al-Sha'abi 
said that the NF had rejected the suggestion that a British mission be 
appointed to the South Yemeni armed forces, and he referred to 
'attempts to put aside a part of our country 1 , by which he presumably 
meant the Kuria Muria Islands and Perim. One of Kahtan al-Sha'abi's    * ~~"
first acts upon assuming office as President was to appoint a governor 
for Perim, Kamaran and the Kuria Muria Islands, and in his address to 
the UN General Assembly the new Foreign Minister, Sayf al-Dali'i,
  
 
repeated that the Kuria Muria Islands were an 'integral part' of the
60 
new state.
With the end of British rule and of the Federal government, South 
Yemen ceased to have an operating constitutional system, and one of 
the NF's first actions upon taking office was to appoint its own 
leadership or General Command as the legislature until a constitution 
had been drafted. The National Front would henceforward be the 
ruling body in the new one-party system. The affairs of Front and 
state were, for the time being at least, merged. The determination
37
of foreign policy, as well as regulation of the conflicts attendant 
upon it, were therefore to be the responsibility of the leading bodies 
of the Front.
The Fourth Congress of the Front was finally held on 2-8 March 1968
*" ft 7
in Zindj^ibar, and attended by 167 delegates. At this Congress, the 
general dispute between the two main wings of the Front came into the 
open. The Programme of National Democratic Popular Liberation, 
drafted by <Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, Minister of Culture, National
 
Guidance and Yemeni Unity Affairs in the first post-independence
f O
government, argued for a 'national democratic revolution 1 . In this 
regime, power would be vested in the workers, peasants, soldiers and 
revolutionary intellectuals. It called for the establishment of a 
supreme people's council, drawn from a nationwide network of local 
popular councils, to act as the legislative authority in the country, 
and for the construction of a people's militia of between 100,000 and 
150,000 members. The policy advocated by this Programme in South 
Yemen was frequently contrasted with what were termed the 'petty- 
bourgeois 1 policies of other Arab countries - Egypt, Algeria, Syria
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and Iraq were all mentioned by name. It also called for a series
of economic measures to enable the 'national democratic revolution* 
to continue - nationalisation of foreign banks and foreign trade, and 
the ending of Aden's free port status except for tourism and goods in 
transit. Only in this way could South Yemen avoid the fate of other 
third world countries which had gone from colonialism to neo- 
colonialism. The proposal to establish a popular militia was placed 
in the context of the overall conflict in the Arabian Peninsula:
The presence of counter-revolutionary forces surrounding our 
country, combined with the ferocity of the counter-revolution in 
the Arabian Peninsula, where the oil fields are located, prevents 
our country from remaining as a revolutionary democratic island 
in the middle of a reactionary imperialist sea. In addition there
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is the viciousness of the counter-revolution in the Arabian 
Peninsula because of oil resources. The mass arming of supporters 
of the revolution constitutes the only means of ensuring the 
security of the revolution and defeating the counter-revolution 
within and on our frontiers. It is in this way that our country 
will be able to play an effective role in the propagation of the 
revolutionary fire throughout the Arabian Peninsula without fear- 
ing the hostile reactions of the imperialist-reactionary coalition 
which will find itself facing a people that is armed, fighting 
with deeds and not words, inch by inch to defend its land, its 
factories and its revolutionary democracy.^5
(dnna kuwa al-_thawra al-mudada al-muhayta bi-biladina tarfud dnna
— * * * * *
takuyv biladuna djaziratun dimukratiyyatun fi bahri radii 'i
- - _ • • • ~~"^ 
imbiriyyali muhdik biha. mudafan ila hidha sharasat al-thawra. • . *—" —"—
al-mudada fi al-dj_azira al-'arabiyya hay_thu munabi' al-bitrul... 
wa taslih ashab al-_thawra al-wasi' huwa al-tarik al-awhad li-ta*
• • • — —— ^ ^ ^
ziz amu al-_thawra wa dahr al-_thawra al-mudada fi al-dakhil wa
""-'"" B L « """"
'ala al-hudud. wa bihi tatamakun biladuna rain al-isham al-fa*
•
<al fi nashr al-harik al-watani al-taharruri fi £umum al-djazira
~~~ . . ~*^
bikul salaba dun dnna nakhsha rudud al-fa'l al-mudada min al-
  HHHMI, ,______ ^
tahaluf al-tabaki al-imbiriyyali alladhi sidjid sha'abna. • "™~" "^
musalahhan yukatil fa'lan la fulan 'an ard al-fillah wa musani'
• * • •
wa mu' assassat aL-*umraal.,»difa*an *an al-dimukratiyya aL-•
thawriyya)
A Political Declaration issued by the General Command of forty-one 
members elected at the Fourth Congress outlined the foreign policy of 
the new regime in terms reflecting the apparent victory of the left. 
It began by analysing the contemporary international context, as one 
of the conflict between capitalism and colonialism on one side, and 
socialism and the national liberation movement on the other. It 
stated that: 'The existence and growth of the socialist camp consti­ 
tute a firm ground, a rear support to the liberation movements to 
enable them to steer towards socialism in favour of the oppressed 
masses. 1 (dnna ma'askar al-i_shtiraki wa namuhu yus_hakkil 'arida 
wasikha wa khalifa musanida li-harakat al-tahrir al-watani wa tamkinu 
-ha wa al-tawdj_ih ishtirakiyyan li-salih al-dj_amahir al-mashuka) 
But while it did mention the USSR by name, it also mentioned China;
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it did not fully espouse the Soviet viewpoint, and the final resolu­ 
tions asserted the need for 'interaction and opening to all socialist
experiences and regimes in the world 1 . 68 (al-tafa'ul wa al-infitah•
'ala kaffat tadj_arub wa al-unzumat al-ishtirakiyya fi al-'alim) In• ^^"^
analysing the Arab world the Political Declaration attributed the 
Israeli victory of June 1967 to the 'lack within the national libera­ 
tion movement of its vanguard revolutionary instrument, the non- 
existence of a clear and progressive social consciousness, and the
f Q _
non-participation of the broad toiling masses'. (li «adara aksab
harakat al-tahrir al-watani idatiha al-thawra al-tali 'iyya wa dun » • . •— .
aksabiha mazmunan ic3j_tima 'iyyan takaddumiyyan wa adham li 'adam• • . •
idtilah al-djamahir al- 'arida al-kadihin) It went on to stress that. .
the revolution in South Yemen would only be completed with the victory 
of revolution in North Yemen and the realisation of Yemeni unity. The 
final resolutions adopted by the Congress on 8 March restated the 
general approach of the Declaration, and gave a list of six foreign 
policy positions: support for the revolution in North Yemen and for 
Yemeni unity, extension of support to the liberation movements against 
imperialism and reaction in the Arabian Gulf and Peninsula, support 
for the Palestinian resistance, support for anti-imperialist movements 
in the third world, solidarity with the socialist regimes, and condem­ 
nation of imperialism and colonialism, particularly in South Africa
70 
and Vietnam.
The dispute between the two NF factions involved both domestic and 
foreign policy: al-Sha'abi and his supporters wanted a more cautious 
policy on both fronts, and they disliked the criticism of such coun­ 
tries as Egypt and the emphasis upon the revolutionary groups else­ 
where in the Peninsula, as much as they opposed the call for a purge 
of the armed forces and a radical land reform. Soon after the
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Fourth Congress matters came to a head over the armed forces. On 20 
March, following the arrest by the army of some leading members of the 
left, al-Sha'abi, while criticising the army's actions, was able to
dismiss most of the left-wing representatives from the government and
72 the party leadership.
Kahtan al-Sha'abi was now apparently in a stronger position within
the NF and he successfully defeated attempts by the forces of the left
73 to stage armed uprisings in the hinterland in May 1968. But in June
1969 he was forced to resign after a clash with the Minister of the 
Interior, Muhammad 'All Haytham. He dismissed Haytham on 16 June 1969,t ^ «..... ^ ""•"
but Hajrtham had built up good connections in the armed forces and, in• ~™~
alliance with Muhammad Salih 'Awlaki, the Minister of Defence, and • • .
with the regrouped forces of the left, organised a bloodless coup on 
22 June 1969, in which the President and his supporters were removed
from government and replaced by a coalition of the left and other
- 74 opponents of Kahtan al-j>ha'abi. A five-man Presidential Council
• • *
was appointed, consisting of the new President, Salim Rubiyya' 'Ali, 
the Defence Minister, Muhammad Salih 'Awlaki, 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il,
• • • •
'Ali Ahmad 'Antar and Haytham, now prime minister. The new govern-• •
ment adopted a more radical line in foreign policy: while it committed 
itself to building ties to Arab countries, headed by Egypt, it also 
stressed its support for the Palestinians and for PFLOAG, fighting in 
Oman. Most significantly, perhaps, the new government committed 
itself to improving relations with the 'socialist* countries, and in
particular with the USSR: this would, it was stated, be a 'guiding
• * i • 77 principle 1 of the new government's foreign policy.
Once in power again, the new leadership of the NF proceeded to 
implement some of their plans. Relations with the USA were broken in 
October. Foreign banks and insurance companies were nationalised
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in November 1969. In 1970 a new land reform law was passed, and in 
November 1970 a constitution was introduced. 80 The latter changed 
the name of the country to People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and 
under it legislative power was to be transferred to a Supreme People's 
Council. However, although it was initially stated that this body 
would be elected, it was, when established in August 1971, a Provi­ 
sional Supreme People's Council, a body of one hundred and one members,
81 all of whom were nominated. The evolution of the Front continued,
parallel to these economic and constitutional changes. In December 
1969, when the Presidential Council was reduced from five to three 
members (Salim Rubiyya' 'Ali, Muhammad 'Ali Haytham, 'Abd al-Fattah
* • "" •
Isma'il), the government was reorganised to include representatives 
of two other political groupings, the pro-Soviet People's Democratic 
Union (PDU) and a local Ba'thist faction the People's Vanguard Party 
(PVP): the secretary-general of the former, 'Abd Allah Badhib, became 
Minister of Education, the secretary-general of the latter, Anis Hassan
• 
— OT
Yahya, Minister of the Economy. This broadening of the government•
was interpreted by some as signalling a desire for better relations 
with, respectively, the USSR and Syria, but it was at least equally 
motivated by a desire to promote greater collaboration between opposi­ 
tion tendencies in the YAR, and to encourage the formation of a single
party there. In 1970 a small affiliate of the PDU, the Shabiba or
83 Youth Organisation, merged with the NF. A further change in the
composition of the government occurred in August 1971, when, after a 
conflict between the prime minister Muhammad 'Ali Haytham and the
• * ""
leaders of the left-wing faction, Haytham resigned and went into exile.• _-nr-
A new three-person Presidential Council, of Salim Rubiyya' 'Ali, 'Abd
al-Fattah Isma'il and the new prime minister, 'Ali Nasir Muhammad,•
was then created.
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The incorporation of the two smaller allied parties into the 
government, and the removal of the uncertain allies with whom Kahtan
• • t
al-Sha'abi had been ousted in June 1969, then prepared the way for the
Fifth Congress at which 171 delegates met in Madinat al-Sha«ab, out-
85 side Aden, on 2-6 March 1972. This Congress marked an important
step in the reorganisation of the Front away from its Arab nationalist, 
MAN, form to one of a more orthodox pro-Soviet kind. Thus the name of 
the organisation was now no longer what it had been in the immediate 
post-independence period, the National Front, but the Political Organ­ 
isation, the National Front (Al-Tanzim Al-Siasi, Al-£j_abha Al-Kawm-
• • •
iyya), the concept Political Organisation suggesting a transitional 
phase between the loose Front and a future centralised Party. A new 
set of internal statutes were adopted, incorporating Soviet norms,
QS
and stressing the primacy of "democratic centralism*. The old system 
of leadership by a General Command (Kiada *Ama) was now replaced by
• •
a Central Committee and a Politburo (Maktab Siasi). In one sense, 
this Fifth Congress took the decisions of the Fourth further, in 
deciding on the immediate establishment of a Popular Militia and of 
Popular Defence Committees (Lidj_an al-Difa «al-£ha<abiyya), the 
latter being designed to combine educational and social welfare func­ 
tions at the neighbourhood level with security duties. But, in 
another respect, the Fifth Congress introduced an element of caution: 
it adopted a more moderate tone, avoiding the attacks on the 'petty
bourgeoisie 1 in the Arab world, and stressing the limits of what could
87 be achieved in the 'national democratic* phase of the revolution.
The Congress Programme repeated the NF's general support for Yemeni 
unity, and the bonds between the revolutions of 26th September and 
14th October, but it made no specific recommendations on how this was 
to be achieved. 88 In Chapter Seven of the Political Programme adopted
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by the Congress, some foreign policy guidelines were clarified. After 
hailing the contemporary era as that of the 'victory of socialist revo­ 
lution 1 , the report analysed the 'international revolutionary movement 1 
as consisting of three parts: the socialist camp, the international
workers' movement, and the movement of Arab and international libera-
89 
tion. It called for a common struggle in the Arab world against
colonialism, neo-colonialism, Arab reaction, and Zionism, and against 
foreign bases and monopolies. In specifying policy for the Arab world 
the Programme pledged support for: (1) 'the revolutionary armed 
struggle in the occupied Arab Gulf (al-_thawra al-sha'abiyya al- 
musallaha fi al-khalidj_ al-'arabi al-muhtall) under the leadership of 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Occupied Arab 
Gulf; (2) 'The national liberation movement in the Arabian Peninsula 
against imperialist military bases and the control of the monopolies, 
and for the liquidation of the royalist agent Saudi regime 1 (harakat
•
al-taharrur al-watani fi sabil al-istiklal al-watani fi al-djazira . . « • —*^
al-'arabiyya dud al-kuwa'id al 'askariyya al-imbiriyyaliyya wa saytara . » •
al-ihtikarat wa al-kaza <ala al-nizam al sa'udi al-malaki al <amil); 
. • • •
(3) the Palestine resistance movement; (4) 'Liberationist*
(taharruriyya) Arab countries in their struggle against Zionism and
•
world imperialism; (5) National and democratic detachments (fisa'il)
in their struggle against reactionary Arab regimes and for the estab-
90 lishment of national democratic regimes. It also called for the
setting up of 'an Arab progressive democratic front 1 (dj_abha 'arabiyya 
takaddumiyya dimukratiyya) to unify the common struggle against
91 imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction. In the listing of tasks on
the international level the Programme then went on to identify the 
major tasks of the Political Organisation on the international, i.e. 
non-Arab, plane, stressing that the Yemeni revolution was part cf the
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world-wide national liberation movement. It mentioned in particular: 
(1) support for the people of Indo-china; (2) support for the Korean 
struggle against American occupation of the south and for national 
unity; (3) support for the peoples of Latin America, and in particular
that of Cuba; (4) condemnation of the 'racist policy 1 (siasa 'unsuria)
•
92of governments in Africa. A third section of the chapter on foreign
policy discussed relations with the socialist countries. It began by 
stating that the unity of the socialist camp was a necessity not only 
because of the need to build socialism, but also to support the
Q O
workers' and national liberation movements. The Programme appealed 
for the unity of the socialist countries, because, it said, the 
imperialists could exploit divisions within the socialist camp; and
it called for the development of relations between Yemen and the
94 socialist countries 'without exception' (bidun istithna').
Certain features of this Programme are of particular interest. On
issues relating to the Arabian Peninsula, the Programme adopted a
markedly radical note, backing the guerrillas in Oman, calling for the
overthrow of the Saudi monarch, and denouncing, though not by name,
95 the smaller Arab states in the Gulf for their ties to 'imperialism'.
This was a more explicit commitment than that of the Fourth Congress. 
On the other hand, the Programme laid great stress on the need for 
unity among the 'progressive forces' in the Arab world - it appealed 
for unity in the 'Arabian Gulf, stressed the need for Palestinian 
unity and proposed the establishment of a common Arab front. Neither 
the Fifth nor the Fourth Congresses mentioned the PLO by name. The 
Programme avoided attacks on the 'petty-bourgeois 1 Arab governments 
denounced at the Fourth Congress, and it made no mention of Ethiopia, 
a country where South Yemen was supporting Eritrean guerrillas even 
as it had diplomatic relations with Haile Selassie. A mention of
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'self-determination for national minorities' (hakk-i takrir al-masir
• • • •
lilakalliat al-kawmiyya) in the section on the Arab world could have
• •
been seen as relating to Eritrea, but it might also have related to
Qft 
the Kurds in Iraq. The sections on the 'socialist camp 1 were
studied in their caution. The theoretical terms used in the report 
are very much those of Soviet theory. But no mention is made in the 
Programme of either the USSR (mentioned in the Fourth Congress docu­ 
ments) or China. Of the communist countries only Vietnam, Korea and 
Cuba receive mention, and this is under the section dealing with 
international relations not the 'socialist camp'. The call for the 
unity of the 'camp 1 , and the stress on South Yemen's desire to have 
relations with all socialist countries 'without exception' could be 
taken as an appeal to China and the USSR if not to unite, then at 
least not to force the PDRY to side with one overtly against the other. 
Although the Fifth Congress was held after the removal of both
Kahtan al-Sha'abi and Muhammad 'Ali Hayjiham, it did not mark the term- • .. """™" • • "^
ination of factional disputes within the Front. Rather, as after the 
Fourth Congress, the apparently decisive convening of a Congress to 
settle disagreements within the Front was the occasion for a further 
outbreak of factionalism within the leadership that affected the 
conduct of foreign policy, as it did that of domestic. This time the 
division was within the left itself, with a faction under the 
Secretary-General, 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, opposed to that under the 
President, Salim Rubiyya* «Ali. This conflict involved three kinds of 
broad issue - party, economy, and foreign affairs. «Abd al-Fattah 
favoured the construction of a 'democratic centralist' party on the 
Soviet model, and he wanted the PDRY to align itself clearly with the 
USSR. He was also the advocate of a much more orderly, formalised, 
conduct of economic affairs by state bodies. Salim Rubiyya* relied
46
much more on personal contacts, and appointments, both in party and 
state matters, and he stressed the revolutionary potential of the 
'masses' more than the construction of the 'vanguard party'. In 
October 1970 he had begun to organise a process of 'tremors'
(intifadat) or uprisings by peasants as a means of implementing land
98 
reform. While not opposed in foreign policy to the alliance with
the USSR, he also wanted to maintain good relations with other counter­ 
vailing countries - with China and, later, with Saudi Arabia and the 
west.
The conflict between the two groups became evident soon after the 
Fifth Congress when in July 1972 Salim Rubiyya* 'All launched a week 
of mass demonstrations in Aden known as the 'Seven Glorious Days' (al- 
saba'a ayyam al-madj_ida), with workers and peasants brought into the
town and being marched through the streets campaigning against
99 'bureaucracy 1 and for lower wages. Apparently influenced by the
Cultural Revolution in China, this event was also a means by which the 
President could use his popular following against the officials in 
place in the Front and government offices. It constituted a clear 
alternative to the procedures of the Fifth Congress. Yet, although 
it persisted, this conflict was, for some time, contained, and it 
appeared as if the transformation of the NF was continuing without 
major opposition. In the mid-1970s, a somewhat more cautious policy 
towards the monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula became evident: Aden's 
relations with the Amirates improved and the guerrillas in Dhofar 
abandoned their claim to represent the whole of the 'occupied Arab 
Gulf, and instead confined themselves at their July 1974 Congress to 
being the People's Front for the Liberation of Oman. In early 1976, 
with the defeat of the Oman guerrillas, a de facto ceasefire came into 
operation on the Oman-PDRY border. Relations with North Yemen
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improved, and Salim Rubiyya* 'All developed a good personal relation­ 
ship with the North Yemeni President, Ibrahim al-Hatndi, who came to 
power in a coup in June 1974. In March 1976, after more than six 
years of hostilities, the PDRY and Saudi Arabia established diplomatic 
relations with each other.
Parallel to this evolution of policy in the Peninsula, the evolu­ 
tion of the Front was taken a step further in 1975 with the estab­ 
lishment of the United Political Organisation, the National Front
102 — —— -
(UPONF) - al-Tanzim al-Siasi al-Mawhid al-Djabha al-Kawmiyya.• . ~"^ » .
Following an agreement between the central committees of the three 
parties on 5 February, the Sixth Congress of the PONF had met in March 
1975, the Second Congress of the PDU in July, and the Third Congress 
of the PVP in August to ratify the unification agreement. The Unifi­ 
cation Congress, held on 11-13 October in Aden, completed a process 
that had been in train since the incorporation into the government of 
members of the two smaller parties, the PDU and the Ba'thists, in 
December 1969, by merging the PONF with these two organisations. This 
Congress was considered necessary as a prelude to the conversion of 
the PONF into a new party, but it also occasioned a reaffirmation of 
those foreign policy orientations which the 1969 alliance at govern­ 
ment level had embodied, vis-a-vis the USSR and North Yemen.
The foreign policy resolutions of the Unification Congress followed, 
in -their main points, the lines laid down at the Fifth Congress three 
years earlier. There was a slight shift in the characterisation of 
'our contemporary epoch 1 (asrna al-rahin) with which the section began, 
the 1975 Congress describing it as the era of the 'transition of 
peoples from capitalism to socialism' (intikal al-shu'ub min al- 
ra'smaliyya ila al-ishtirakiyya), whereas the 1972 one had character­ 
ised the epoch as one of 'socialist revolution 1 : the new formulation
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appeared to allow implicitly for peaceful non-revolutionary transi-
103 
tions to socialism. Yemeni unity was again endorsed but the
Congress now called for the establishment of a Unified Yemeni Vanguard 
Party, i.e. one in both the YAR and the PDRY. L°4 While the specific 
stipulations followed the same general themes and order, there were 
also some modifications. Point one supported the PFLO, thus limiting 
the guerrilla struggle to Oman, and excluding the Amirates and other 
smaller states. It added the need to fight 'Iranian intervention 1 
(al-tadakhkhul al-irani); substantial Iranian intervention into Oman 
had taken place in 1973, after the last Congress. Point two, which 
had in 1972 called for the overthrow of the Saudi monarch, now con­ 
fined itself to supporting 'the national liberation movement in the 
Arabian Peninsula against imperialist military bases and the control 
of the monopolies'. Point three supported the Palestinian resis­ 
tance, but in addition to repeating the call for unity it specified 
for the first time that this should be within the framework of the 
PLO. It repeated its general call for the support of the liberation- 
ist' states confronting Israel, and for the constitution of 'an Arab 
Progressive and Democratic Front'. The section on international poli­ 
tics contained no new elements, but repeated the lines of the Fifth 
Congress: support for Vietnam, Cuba and North Korea, for the movement 
against nuclear weapons, and for the international workers' move­ 
ment. 107 Similarly, the section on the 'socialist camp' repeated the 
statement that it was 'the revolutionary ally 1 (al-halif al-thawri) 
of the PDRY; but it made no specific mention of the USSR and it 
appealed for unity of all components of the camp in the face of
„ . .. , 108 'imperialism".
The Yemeni Socialist Party
The Unification Congress and the initiatives in the Arabian Peninsula
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appeared to indicate that a more careful new foreign policy was 
emerging - consolidation of relations with the USSR without wholly 
alienating China on the one side, reduction of tensions with conser­ 
vative neighbours on the other. But, as external relations appeared 
to be entering a calmer phase, the conflict was developing within the 
PDRY which was to culminate in the events of June 1978, when President 
Salim Rubiyya' 'All was executed. As the campaign developed to con­ 
struct Hizb Min Tiraz Djadid, the Arabic version of Lenin's call for
a 'Party of the New Type', so Salim Rubiyya' <Ali sought to resist
109 
this new organisation by constructing his own network of appointees.
He resisted the growth of the centralised planning apparatus begun 
under the Three Year Plan of 1971-4, but taken much further with the 
first Five Year Plan of 1974-9, and he used his personal funds and 
his contacts to appoint 'radical' but often unqualified personnel to 
important positions. He also sought to ensure that he maintained 
persons loyal to him in the army. Yet, while the gradual establish­ 
ment of more orderly structures of party and state did meet with his 
opposition, foreign policy pressures also combined to lessen his room 
for manoeuvre: relations with Saudi Arabia deteriorated again in late 
1977, with the crises in the Horn of Africa and in North Yemen.
On 26 June 1978 President Salim Rubiyya' 'Ali attempted to stage 
a coup. After several hours of fighting, he was defeated. The 
President and two of his closer associates, 'Ali Salim La'war, Secre­ 
tary of the Presidential Office, and Dj_a'am Salih, NLF Secretary in
the Third Governorate and a leader of the peasants' movement, were
113 
executed on the same day. Some hundreds of other people were also
killed or wounded, and a significant minority of the Front leadership
were removed from office: two members of the Politburo and eight out
114 
of some seventy members of the Central Committee. Four out of six
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party secretaries in the Governorates were dismissed, an index of the 
President's influence in the UPONF outside the party offices of Aden 
itself. As a result of the June 1978 crisis the top organs and person­ 
nel of the state were altered. A new five-person Presidential Council 
was set up and 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, prime minister since 1969, was
• •
appointed President ad interim. Then, at a meeting of a newly 
elected Supreme People's Council on 27 December, Abd al-Fattah
c
Isma'il became head of state, while 'All Nasir remained as prime
•
minister. The Presidential Council, established in 1969 after the 
'Corrective Move 1 and later used by Salim Rubiyya' as an instrument 
of influence, was abolished in favour of a Presidium of the SPC and, 
with <Abd al-Fattah both president and secretary-general, the organs
•
of state were integrated even more closely with the party. A
revised constitution, introduced in October 1978, had prepared the
. ... , 117 way for these changes.
Foreign policy played an important, but not exclusive, part in the 
crisis surrounding the fall of Salim Rubiyya' 'Ali. The former Presi­ 
dent had to some degree opposed the orientation of foreign relations 
that had developed in the 1970s: on available evidence he was not 
'pro-western* but his position was more a matter of wanting to main­ 
tain a diversity of relations - with the President of North Yemen, 
al-Hamdi, and with Saudi Arabia - rather than of his opposing close 
ties with the USSR or the PDRY's new regional ally, Ethiopia. Salim 
Rubiyya' 'Ali, however, suffered from the deterioration of the situa­ 
tion in the Red Sea area following the development of the Somali- 
Ethiopian war in the latter part of 1977 and the assassination of 
al-Hamdi in October 1977: these developments deprived him of his ally 
in the North and led to a cessation of the Saudi connection which he 
had wanted to use to maintain foreign policy flexibility. He was not,
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however, willing to accept the policies of his opponents and in his 
speech on the tenth anniversary of independence, in November 1977, 
he did not mention the USSR by name. 118 Salim Rubiyya' 'All's coup 
attempt on 26 June had been preceded two days earlier by the death of 
the then North Yemeni President, Ahmad Husayn al-Ghashmi, and it is
• • • ——— _-- -
widely believed that the bomb that killed al-Ghashmi had been sent by 
Salim Rubiyya' as a means of detonating a crisis in the North in which 
forces more sympathetic to him could once again come to power. While 
it can never be established with certainty what his motives or involve­ 
ment were, it seems that Salim Rubiyya' 'All, with a reduced room for 
manoeuvre at home, may have sought as a last resort to provoke a
crisis in the North that might provide him with an opportunity to hit
119 at his opponents at home.
The fall of Salim Rubiyya' 'Ali also had important foreign policy
consequences. Many Arab states asserted that the events of 26 June
120 had been organised or encouraged by the USSR and Cuba. China also
121 adopted a more hostile position than hitherto to the PDRY. In the
list of cases where Soviet policy had, it was argued by western com­ 
mentators, been aggressive in the latter part of the 1970s, South 
Yemen came to have a place alongside Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia and
199Afghanistan. Henry Kissinger talked of a 'communist coup 1 as
having occurred in June 1978. Saudi Arabia encouraged the PDRY's
124 suspension from the Arab League. North Yemen broke off diplomatic
relations after al-Gha^mi's death. An American diplomatic mission 
in Saudi Arabia on its way to both Yemens to discuss relations turned
back, and attempts to encourage talks between Washington and Aden, in
125 train for some time, then ceased. At home, the fall of Salim
Rubiyya' 'All marked the end of the conflict that had been dividing 
party and state for some years and so opened the way for the final
52
transformation of the Front, from NF, through PONF and UPONF, into 
the Yemeni Socialist Party. Salim Rubiyya' was denounced in official 
statements for his erratic activities at home and was also accused of 
having had links with 'imperialist 1 governments, an apparent attempt 
to blame him for the US mission that had been en route to Aden. 126 
In fact, the policy of opening talks with the USA in 1978 was one that
had been generally accepted: the Aden government later repeated its
127 invitations to the US to send a mission, albeit without success.
The organisational completion of this restructuring came when the
First Congress of the Yemeni Socialist Party was held in Aden on 11-12
128October 1978. This marked the apparent consolidation of the pro­ 
cess under way since the early 1970s and now made easier by the fall 
of Salim Rubiyya' 'Ali and the purge of his supporters that had fol­ 
lowed. The Political Programme of the YSP Congress covered many of 
the same points as those of the preceding NF Congresses, but in a 
number of significant respects it marked a shift in emphasis. In the 
first place, the Programme stressed the relationship with the USSR, 
both in praising the October revolution and the role of the Soviet 
Union in defeating fascism, and in calling for strengthening of rela­ 
tions with the 'socialist regimes and, in the first instance, with 
the Soviet Union' (al-unzumat al-ishtirakiyya wa fi mukaddimatiha
* " —" •
- - 129 al-ittihad al-sufiyyati). This mentioning of the USSR had not been
*
done since the Fourth Congress of 1968 and it was now phrased in more 
specific terms than a decade earlier, omitting as it did any reference 
to China. The Programme repeated Soviet positions in its call for 
'peaceful coexistence1 between countries of different socialist systems,
a cautious note rather remote from the revolutionary appeals of the
130 Fourth and Fifth Congresses. It also underlined the need to learn
from the experience of the 'socialist bloc' in party building and
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ideological work. This learning was, it was stated, needed to wage 
the struggle within the YSP itself against what it terms 'splittist 
attempts' (al-rauhawalat al-inkisamiyya), 'rightist and "leftist"
• •
revisionist tendencies' (al-ittidjahat al-tahrifiyya al-yaminiyya wa
•
al "yasariyya") and 'ideological deformation' (al-taswih al-
•
*idiyyuludj.i). Such phrases appeared to mean that the example of 
the CPSU, in ideological line and organisational practice, could be 
applied to the struggle against groups such as those of Salim Rubiyya*
'Ali and Kahtan al-Sha'abi. There are a number of separate points at • .. —~
which the leading role of the USSR in the 'socialist bloc' is expli-
132 citly mentioned. The call for the unity of the socialist countries,
and the assertion of the right of the PDRY to have relations with all 
socialist countries without exception, reiterated in all previous 
Congresses, are no longer present. Instead, the Programme gives 
particular emphasis to a policy of 'strengthening our relations of
solidarity with the world socialist order' (tatawwur 'ilakat al-• .
- 133 tazamun ma'a al-nizam al-i^htiraki al-'alimi), a periphrasis for• • "~""
stronger relations with the USSR, and of the need to 'learn from the 
experience 1 of the socialist states in all spheres.
In outlining specific policy guidelines for the Arab world, two 
major modifications of positions adopted at previous Congresses can 
be noted. First, the struggle in the Arabian Peninsula is played down, 
by comparison with previous Congresses: it now comes after discussion 
of the Palestinian issue; and, whereas previously the guerrilla 
organisation in Dhofar was mentioned by name, and in the YSP Secretary- 
General's Political Report the PFLO is given support, the Programme
talks only of the 'peoples' of the Arabian Gulf and the Arabian
134 Peninsula and their national movement. Neither Oman, nor Saudi
Arabia, nor any other Peninsula state are mentioned. On the other
54
hand, the issue of Palestine is given much greater prominence and is 
placed at the head of the list of Arab world causes supported. 135 
Stress is laid on the need for Palestinian unity, yet in a return to 
the general stance characteristic of the Fourth and Fifth Congresses 
the PLO is not mentioned by name. This is not, however, necessarily 
an indication of a return to the general radical positions of those 
two post-independence Congresses on the Palestine issue, since the 
sections on Palestine also adopt a clear limiting of what the YSP 
demands - Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and the 
establishment of an independent Palestinian state. While no recogni­ 
tion is given to Israel's right to exist, there is no call for the 
liquidation of Israel, or for the establishment of a single 'secular 
and democratic* Palestine as the PLO charter demanded. Israel is men­ 
tioned by name, being described as 'the political incarnation' 
(tadjsid siasi) of Zionism.
In addition to what it lays down as YSP policy, the Programme of 
the October 1978 Congress is significant in certain other respects. 
As on previous occasions, it makes no mention of what had by then 
become a major factor in the PDRY's foreign policy, namely the emer­ 
gence of an allied regime in Ethiopia. The earlier reference to 
rights for ethnic minorities in the Arab world, perhaps a veiled 
reference to Eritrea, is no longer present, but there is no, even 
implicit, recognition of the Ethiopian revolution, a rather signifi­ 
cant development on the other side of the Red Sea, in which the PDRY 
had become involved. The issue of Yemeni unity is certainly mentioned, 
but it is treated in far less specific terms than might be expected, 
given its overall place in the PDRY's foreign policy and the intense 
conflict then raging in the YAR between the allies of Aden and the
i *57
YAR government. No particular analysis or policy guidelines are
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provided in the individual chapters, and it is only in the most 
general terms that the aim of a 'United Democratic Yemen 1 (al-yaman 
al-dimukrati al-mawhid), bringing together the revolutions of 26 
September and 1A October, is evoked. 138 An overall impression is that 
the specifically regional and Arab issues, with the exception of 
Palestine, are played down in favour of stress on the YSP's participa­ 
tion in the international communist movement. In particular, the 
October 1978 Founding Congress appears to have been intended to con­ 
firm the consolidation of relations between the PDRY and the USSR, and 
the YSP and the CPSU, and so to complete that process of transforma­ 
tion which went back to the inter-NLF conflicts of the pre-indepen- 
dence period.
At first, this process of strengthening USSR-PDRY links seemed to 
be continuing successfully in the period after the YSP Congress. In
June 1979 the PDRY acquired observer status with Comecon and in Sep-
139 
tember 1979 Soviet premier Kosygin visited Aden. In October
President 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il visited Moscow and signed a Twenty-
»
Year Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with the USSR, as well as 
new agreements on economic and technical co-operation and on CPSU-YSP 
relations. Yet divisions inside the PDRY government and the YSP 
continued and within a year of the Founding Congress tensions had 
again come into the open. At a meeting of the Supreme People's 
Council on 11 August 1979 the reassignment of five top ministers and 
Politburo members was ratified: one, the Interior Minister Salih 
Muslih Kasiffl, was later, in October 1980, reappointed to an influen-
• • •
tial post, but the four others were all demoted or sent into exile. 
These were Foreign Minister Muhammad Salih Mutiyya?, Minister of State
^ c . . e-
Security Muhammad Sa'id 'Abd Allah, Industry and Planning Minister
•
'Abd al-'Aziz 'Abd al-Wali, and Fisheries Minister Muhammad Salim
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'Akkush. These four included three of the nine members of the
Politburo. Both Mutiyya' and 'Akkus£ were believed to be critical of 
the Soviet Union in some respects and their dismissal could be seen 
as in part an attempt to remove individuals who might create difficul­ 
ties for the new relationship with Moscow. But Muhammad Sa'id 'Abd
•
Allah and 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Abd al-Wali were reportedly sympathetic to 
the USSR and close to 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il: their fall seemed to
•
represent a threat to him, both because of their pro-Soviet sympathies 
and because they were, like the President, from North Yemen. There 
had, reportedly, been a growth of hostility to the North Yemeni influ­ 
ence in the PDRY after the death of Salim Rubiyya' <Ali, a Southerner, 
and this issue became intertwined with that of the close relations
with the USSR so that both were used against the President and his
. _ 142 associates.
In 1980 President 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il himself left office. In
•
April, after a meeting of the Central Committee, he resigned from his 
positions as President and Secretary-General of the YSP and went into 
exile in Moscow. The official reason given was ill-health, but the
real grounds were believed to involve two other questions: his adminis-
143 
trative abilities and the degree of his reliance on the USSR. A
theoretician, 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il lacked competence in economic
*
matters, as he lacked the personal appeal which had marked Salim 
Rub-iyya* 'All. He was widely known as al-faklh, literally the person 
learned in Islamic jurisprudence, a term meant to denote his distance 
from practical matters. But his unpopularity was linked to the issue 
of relations with the USSR; 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il had apparently
•
argued that once the YSP placed itself firmly on a pro-Soviet orienta­ 
tion then greater economic aid would be forthcoming. The inability 
of 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il to provide that economic improvement which
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he had hoped would follow from the clear pro-Soviet policies of the 
Founding Congress thereby provided a situation in which a majority of 
the Central Committee voted for his departure.
His place as President and Secretary General was taken by 'All 
Nasir Muhammad and an Extraordinary YSP Congress in October 1980 con­ 
firmed this change. The Resolutions of this Congress indicated that 
there had been no change in the YSP c s general orientation. They 
reaffirmed that the USSR was the "vanguard* (tali'a) of the socialist
»
countries, and the 'firm support' (al-sanad al-amin) for the Arab
144 countries. They condemned the Camp David agreement, signed by
Israel, Egypt and the USA in the previous year, and singled out Syria 
and Ethiopia as two countries to which the PDRY pledged support. In
discussing the Gulf the Resolutions condemned the installation of
145 American bases in Oman, but did not mention the PFLO by name. The
section on the YAR praised the 'democratic discussion between the 
leaderships of the two parts of the homeland* (al-hiwar al-dimukrati
• • •
bayn kiadati shatri al-watan). While it called for the creation of. ~"• »
a 'free, democratic, united and happy homeland* (watan hurr dimukrati
. » o «
mawhid wa sa'id), it also indicated that there were intermediate steps,
of 'joint work 1 ('amal mus_htarak) and 'brotherly co-operation 1 (al-ta'
- - 146 awun al-'akhawi) which could precede this.
'All Nasir sought to maintain relations with the USSR, but at the
•
same time to improve those with Arab countries and to build alliances 
with the more radical states in the region. In 1981 the PDRY signed 
a Tripartite Treaty with Libya and Ethiopia, while it maintained a 
Rejection Front, first set up in 1977, with Libya, Syria, Algeria and 
the PLO. Slowly, relations with North Yemen improved and in early 
1982 the completion of a draft constitution for a united state was 
announced. Later in the year diplomatic relations were established
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with Oman, thus marking the end of the commitment to revolution in 
the 'Arabian Gulf which had been so central in the early years. 
Relations with Saudi Arabia also thawed again. As a result of the 
more moderate image of the new leadership, aid from Arab countries 
increased, and the economic situation within the PDRY eased 
considerably.
Yet that bonding of internal factional disputes and foreign policy 
that had characterised so much of South Yemen's post-independence 
history continued even after the accession of 'All Nasir to power.
•
In January 1981 a YSP Politburo member, 'All al-Bid, was dismissed
•
from the Central Committee and from his post as Minister of Local 
Government: while one reason given was that he had committed a moral
offence, his dismissal was also believed to be connected with his
148 opposition to improved relations with Saudi Arabia. In February
1981, it was reported that the former Foreign Minister and later Party 
Secretary for External Relations, Muhammad Salih Mutiyya', had been
• * • •
149 imprisoned and executed. While no official announcement was ever
made, Mutiyya' was accused of illegal dealings with Saudi Arabia,
•
during a visit by President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad to the Kingdom in
• •
June 1980. In the summer of 1982 there was a further conflict, invol­ 
ving a meeting in eastern Europe of three pro-Soviet personalities 
now in exile there: 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, who was officially "study-
•
ing 1 in Moscow, 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Abd al-Wali, who was 'studying' in east 
Germany, and Muhammad Sa'id 'Abd Allah, who was Ambassador to Hungary.
•
The precise purpose of their meeting is not known, although press 
reports talked of their having prepared a pro-Soviet coup. But, 
following the meeting, Muhammad Sa'id 'Abd Allah was recalled to Aden, 
where he was imprisoned for a time and then released. 'Abd al- 
'Aziz 'Abd al-Wali remained in the GDR, and died there of natural
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causes in May 1983. <Abd al-Fattah Isma'il remained in Moscow,
•
but without the full endorsement of the USSR which he had initially 
enjoyed upon his arrival there in I960. 15 
Domestic Determinations, International Limits
The disputes within the Yemeni state had many causes: they involved 
personal, tribal and domestic policy issues distinct from foreign 
policy. But it is noteworthy that at each major change in the post- 
1967 history of the PDRY and of its ruling institution issues of 
foreign policy did play a role. The evolution of the ruling organisa­ 
tion, from NLF to YSP, was therefore marked at each stage by an inter­ 
section of internal and external forces. If this was in some measure 
due to the factionalism within the Front, it was also due to the 
forces acting on it from without. The process of restructuring the 
Front itself was to a considerable degree one marked by the influence
of the Soviet Union, and by a series of agreements on co-operation
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between the NF and the CPSU. Since 1972 Soviet instructors had
been teaching at the High School for Party Studies and Soviet advisers 
were present in the rest of the state apparatus. Yet this increase 
in Soviet influence was offset by other tendencies which either 
opposed or sought to modify the alignment of state and party with the
USSR - by the resistances of Kahtan al-Sha'abi and Salim Rubiyya*... "~~
'Ali, both of whom ultimately lost their positions as President, and 
by the more diffuse, critical, climate within the YSP which brought 
about the fall of 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il in 1980. The vicissitudes
•
of events in neighbouring states, especially the YAR and Oman, also 
had an impact on the PDRY, in enlarging and then reducing its room for 
manoeuvre, and its search for allies.
Yet this intersection of foreign and domestic issues also points 
to another central feature of the process of policy determination,
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namely the centrality of the ruling organisation in foreign policy 
making. The reason why foreign policy disputes were reflected in 
party conflicts was that it was in the latter that power remained 
concentrated: the NF had taken power in the latter half of 1967 and, 
through its various transformations, it remained the ruling institu­ 
tion in South Yemen, with all bodies of the state, civilian and mili­ 
tary, subordinated to it. As the Internal Statute of the UPONF stated 
in 1975, the Central Committee of the Front 'appoints its representa­ 
tives to the supreme bodies of state and economy, and approves the 
nomination of its representatives as Candidates of the Supreme 
People's Council' (tantudub muma_thjthilin liha 1'ala adjhizat al-dawla
wa al-iktisad wa tasaduk 'ala tarshih mandubiha li-madjlis al-sha'ab• « • . -~~ —""^ ~~~
al-'ala). There was a duality of power - of the formal and the 
informal - but this split was sited in the Front itself.
This dominance of the Front was evident in the manner by which 
foreign policy was actually implemented. The official leading 
decision-making body in the country was always the Front leadership 
or the Congress: it was from here, not from the periodic meetings of 
the Supreme People's Council, that the guidelines on foreign policy 
emanated. Moreover, the everyday determination and conduct of foreign 
policy reflected the domination of the party. Some influential minis­ 
terial positions were given to people who were not leading NF personal­ 
ities - either junior officials, but with technical qualifications, or 
members of the PDU and PVP, or non-party officials. This was not so 
in foreign policy, where the first six foreign ministers between 1967 
and 1979 were all senior Front personalities, with the ability to take 
and enforce decisions within the NLF as a whole. Sayf al-Dali'i
• •
(November 1967 to February 1969) was a leader of the NLF in the 
pre-independent period. Faysal 'Abd al-Latif al-Sha'abi (February to
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June 1969) was the cousin of the President, prime minister from 
April to June and the leading theoretician of the NF moderates. 'All 
al-Bid (June 1969 to January 1971) 158 had been a major guerrilla 
leader in Aden and the first Minister of Defence. Muhammad 'All
•
HayjAam (January to August 1971) was simultaneously prime minister 
and had been Minister of the Interior under Kahtan al-Sha'abi.
• • * "
Muhammad Salih 'Awlaki (August 1971 to May 1973) was a military • ... '
commander before independence and the Minister of Defence who, through 
his contacts with the officer corps, helped the left to come back to 
power in June 1969. Muhammad Salih Mutiyya* (May 1973 to August
• * • •
1979) was a former military commander in Radfan and Minister of the
Interior. Later appointees were a little less prominent. Salim
— 1 fi 7 Salih Muhammad (August 1979 to August 1982) , Mutiyya«'s cousin,
• • • *
had been Party Secretary in charge of external relations. 'Abd 
al-'Aziz al-Dali (appointed September 1982) was a former Minister 
of Health and Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Thus for almost the 
first twelve years, up to late 1979, the Foreign Ministry was in the 
hands of a senior member of the NF. All six were members of the top 
body of the organisation (General Command to 1972, thereafter Polit­ 
buro). Only from 1979 was the Foreign Ministry assigned to persons 
with previously less prominent careers in the Front, and who did not 
already have membership in the Politburo. Yet even then the practice 
of conferring the Foreign Ministry upon a technician or older profes­ 
sional, a Chicherin or Maisky, was not followed, since both Salim
Salih and al-Dali were long-established members of the NF, who later
• •
became Politburo members.
Despite the importance of the Foreign Ministers, however, the con­ 
duct of foreign policy was never confined solely to them. For at 
least two other sections of the ruling apparatus came to play a
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significant role in the formulation and implementation of foreign 
policy, and so to be elements in the conflicts that revolved around 
foreign policy, and as a result of changes within it. One alternative 
centre was the Central Committee of the Front/Party itself, with its 
Section for External Relations and its Secretary. According to the 
1975 Statutes of the Party, the Central Committee was charged with 
conducting relations 'with communist, socialist and workers' parties,
and with progressive movements' (al-ahzab al-shiyyu'iyya wa al-. •—"
i£h_tirakiyya wa al- 'ummaliyya wa al-harakat al-takaddumiyya). This
* •
body grew in importance from 1972 onwards, as the PONF itself came 
more and more to act as a Soviet-style ruling party. As the Statutes 
indicated, the External Relations Section was, in the first instance, 
designed for relations with other parties - ruling parties in the 
countries of the eastern bloc, and communist and left-wing parties in 
the Arab world and elsewhere which had relations with Aden. It was 
also responsible for dealing with the international organisations of 
the communist movement - the World Peace Council, the World Federation 
of Democratic Youth, the International Union of Students and several 
others. Since the Arab world had its comparable organisations, the 
Secretary also took responsibility for dealing with them. In common 
with other communist and left-wing countries, a considerable amount 
of attention, time and money was devoted to the activities of rela­ 
tions with such bodies involving conferences, seminars, visiting 
delegations, exchanges of messages, congratulations on anniversaries 
and related 'solidarity 1 activities.
A third centre of foreign policy conduct was the Presidency. Both 
Constitutions, of 1970 and 1978, gave the President the task of 
'representating 1 the state externally, while they assigned to the 
Council of Ministers the task of 'proposing the broad outlines of
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foreign policy'. Moreover, as chief executive, the President was 
involved in discussions on and carrying out of foreign policy deci­ 
sions. But the Presidential role also reflected the particular place 
which certain issues had in South Yemeni foreign policy, both because 
of their intrinsic importance and because of the absence of conven­ 
tional diplomatic channels for dealing with them. One was North 
Yemen, the other the Palestinian resistance. Although North Yemen 
was a separate state, it had no conventional diplomatic relations 
with South Yemen: neither state accepted the legitimacy of the dis­ 
tinction between them, and there were no embassies in each other's 
capital. Rather, relations were conducted bilaterally, between the 
Presidents of each country, and the appropriate delegates and sub­ 
committees attached to the Presidencies. The most frequent 
publicised form of contact between the two countries was by means of 
the message, verbal or written, conveyed by a personal envoy of one 
President to the other. Considerable importance attached, therefore, 
not only to the individual wishes of each President, but also on the 
state of personal relations between the two heads of state. The 
collaborations of al-Hamdi and Salim Rubiyya' 'Ali (1974-7) or of
•
'Ali Nasir Muhammad and 'Ali 'Abd Allah Salih (1980 onwards) there- 
. • • •
fore represented significant foreign policy developments. Relations 
with the Palestinian resistance were also centred in the Presidency, 
and the various Palestinian groups had missions in Aden, for both 
diplomatic and military assistance purposes. After initially cool 
PLO-South Yemeni relations, the PLO established a diplomatic mission 
in Aden, and its representative, Ahmad Zaki, was accredited as an 
ambassador and had become, by 1977, the doyen of the diplomatic 
corps. ^ ^ In the case of both North Yemen and the Palestinians, the 
President derived political benefit from being seen as the person who
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represented South Yemen in dealings on what were two important and 
domestically sensitive foreign policy issues.
The ruling party was also responsible for dealings with another 
kind of foreign organisation, namely the guerrillas whom the PDRY 
aided. The two most important of these were those operating in North 
Yemen and Oman. The former included parts of the MAN, and the process 
of unification in the South was explicitly seen as encouraging a 
process of convergence in the North, first into one single North 
Yemeni party, a unified party as in the South, and then, at some later 
stage, to the creation of the single Yemeni party envisaged by later 
Congresses. Some Northern officials served in the Southern party, and 
several leading officials in the South were by origin from the North. 
Given the fact that the PDRY claimed from 1970 to be the state of the 
whole Yemen, this claim to a pan-Yemeni party identity was therefore 
central to the whole policy of the PDRY towards the North. The Omani 
guerrillas were, similarly, a former MAN branch, and were also 
strongly supported for many years by the South Yemeni party: only in 
November 1982 were the PFLO's radio facilities in Aden ended.
The President's special position in foreign relations was, however, 
confirmed by a quite different tendency, namely his position in deal­ 
ings with some foreign governments. Some of the latter, and in 
particular the oil-producing Arab states, seemed to view and conduct 
state-to-state relations in predominantly personal terms. They 
believed in dealing with individuals they trusted, and in giving aid 
to that individual rather than to a government or ministry in the 
recipient state. In the case of Saudi Arabia, this meant that 
after Salim Rubiyya* 'All's visit to Riyadh in 1977 some Saudi gifts 
were given directly to the President. This may have encouraged 
Saudi Arabia to believe that it had greater influence over the PDRY
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government as a whole than it was warranted to believe, and it may 
also have encouraged Salim Rubiyya' 'All to imagine that he could use 
Saudi aid to consolidate his own domestic position by using Saudi 
donations. A similar mistake, of undue reliance on one individual, 
may have been made by the USSR in the period 1978-80, when <Abd al- 
Fattah Isma'il was President. Yet in both cases the apparent monopoly 
by the President of dealings with another state from which aid was 
expected was followed by an adverse reaction within the PDRY.
Beyond the course of internal political development and factional 
conflict, there were other major influences upon the course of foreign 
policy-making. The independence won by South Yemen in 1967 and the 
accompanying revolution initiated a course of political and economic 
development within that country very different from that which had 
previously existed there. The government committed itself to estab­ 
lishing state control of domestic politics and of the economy, and, 
under the policy of 'anti-imperialism', to preventing foreign states, 
individuals and economic forces opposed to these changes from exerting 
influence upon the country. Given the revolutionary origins of the 
leadership and their willingness to maintain the urban economy at 
levels of austerity in contrast to pre-independence days and in 
increasing contrast with the other states of the Peninsula, it was 
possible for the PDRY to pursue this radically different path in the 
post-independence years. Yet the ability of the leadership to imple­ 
ment and sustain such a course was also limited in a number of impor­ 
tant respects and these limits compelled it to modify or compensate 
for its programme as the years went by.
In the first place, the leading party was itself restricted in what 
it could define as policy. Divisions within its members persisted 
from the pre-independence period right through to the early 1980s,
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and of the two dozen or so leading personalities of 1967 only five 
were left in positions of influence by 1982. I72 The political leader­ 
ship also lacked the education or experience to conduct the trans­ 
formation of the country, and was to some extent forced to rely on 
technical experts from inside the country, or from abroad, to formu­ 
late and implement its policies. Secondly, while the Front leadership 
did not submit its decisions to the population for assent, it could 
not simply ignore the wishes of the population on all major issues. 
If this was true of such political issues as Yemeni unity or Palestine, 
it was even more so in the matter of living standards. The urban 
population remembered the prosperity of the British days; the popula­ 
tion as a whole was aware of the increased wealth of the oil states, 
and of the consumer goods which this made available. Coupled to the 
widespread pressure for emigration, in order to earn higher wages in 
the oil states, was the desire for higher standards at home and for 
more consumer goods. The demonstration effect of Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait, even of North Yemen, induced the government to go some way to 
meet expectations, to open relations with the states of the Arabian
Peninsula and to lessen restrictions on migration and domestic busi-
173 
ness in the latter part of the 1970s. A third internal limit was
the meagre economic base of the country: the PDRY had a small popula­ 
tion, of under two millions, but even that was too large for the 
country's agricultural resources to meet. A combination of a limited
area of cultivable land, low productivity, bad administration and
11U 
natural disasters kept agricultural output down. Despite hopes of
finding oil or other minerals, no major source of primary product 
exports was found up to the end of 1982. And, although the port 
revived somewhat in the mid-1970s, it could never regain its former 
prosperity because of changes in the international economy that would
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have affected Aden whatever the political regime in power there.
These internal limitations were compounded by the external situ­ 
ation in which the PDRY found itself and by the policies which it 
sought to pursue. By posing as the champion of revolution in the 
region, it placed itself at odds with the neighbouring states and 
with much of the Arab world. This led to a series of wars and border 
clashes and to a constant preoccupation with security. While military 
expenditures remained low - at around 25 per cent of the total budget 
compared to over 40 per cent in the days of the Federation - the 
concern with security necessitated South Yemen finding an ally for 
military aid, training and strategic guarantees. It soon did so, in 
the USSR. The requirements of the post-independence PDRY went, how­ 
ever, further than military needs, since the crisis of the economy 
and the development aims of the new government necessitated that it 
find economic assistance from abroad: Russia, China and the GDR were 
willing to provide some aid, but increasing amounts were also acquired 
from international agencies and from the Arab states. At the end of 
1982 total foreign debt stood at $817 million of which 48 per cent 
was owed to the USSR and eastern Europe. Even apart from state- 
to-state aid, the economy of South Yemen relied on external funds 
from migrants for the balance of payments and this reliance on 
workers' remittances was double-edged: if it provided foreign currency 
that could be used as the state wished, it forced it to pay more 
attention to the wishes of the emigrant population, and it also 
deprived the country of up to a third of its able-bodied men. In 
addition, the remittances created a reliance that could not be sus­ 
tained: the oil states would not employ such numbers of Yemeni men 
for ever, since their own expenditures would fall, and as they aged 
the migrants' ability to earn would decline. This latter trend forced
68
the PDRY government to make a choice - to accept a drop in foreign 
currency earnings, or to permit more men to emigrate to reproduce 
the emigrant labour force.
There was a further factor that led the PDRY leadership to estab­ 
lish new links with the external world, namely its pursuit of models 
according to which to reorganise policy, society and economy. The 
divisions within the PDRY leadership and the NF's lack of government 
experience meant that in the initial period a variety of goals and 
models were proposed for the post-independence course. These ranged 
from adaptations of radical Arab states' policies - as in Egypt, Syria 
or Algeria - to proposals for implementing Soviet or Chinese strate­ 
gies. In the end, it was the Soviet model that was to prevail, both 
because of the growth of the special foreign policy alliance with the 
USSR and because the Soviet model accorded in certain respects with 
the requirements felt by the leadership to be present in South Yemen. 
This was evident in the political institutions of the country - in the 
YSP and the legislative system - in the economic development around 
the five-year plan, and in social policy, on such matters as education, 
women and the press. It was not a matter of simply reproducing the 
model applied in the USSR so much as adopting that modified version 
of the Soviet model developed by Soviet theorists and administrators
for third world countries classified as 'states of socialist
. , 178 orientation .
Ultimately, and most importantly, the PDRY's post-independence 
course in foreign policy relied upon developments in the region sur­ 
rounding it - on the attitude of existing governments, and on the 
fate of the revolutionary movements to which the PDRY oriented itself. 
Events in North Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Oman and the Horn of Africa had 
a bearing on the foreign policy of the new Republic and on its ability
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to find allies in a conflictual environment. The search for an 
independent political and economic path had, therefore, to be balanced 
by these other preoccupations, which produced new constraints upon 
the country, and limited its opportunities. Distinct as they were 
from the constraints of colonial rule, they were nonetheless major 
factors in South Yemen's development from 1967 onwards.
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Chapter Two
Relations with the West
At the moment of independence in November 1967 South Yemen was granted 
diplomatic recognition by the major industrialised countries of the 
west - Britain, the USA, France, West Germany and Japan. Its entry 
into the UN on 14 December 1967 was unopposed and was welcomed by, 
among others, the representatives of the UK and the USA, and it later 
joined the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, in October 
1969. Yet from the beginning its relations with the OECD states had 
an ambivalent character: while South Yemen continued to conduct the 
majority of its trade with these countries, and to maintain diplomatic 
relations with most of them, it was in sustained conflict with them 
on political issues. This was not so much due to the legacy of the 
pre-independence years: though some issues of conflict with Britain 
inherited from this period remained, they gradually subsided and were 
not prominent features of South Yemen's post-1967 foreign policy. Nor 
was it due to conflicts over developments internal to South Yemen 
itself: the country remained, as it had been before independence, of 
limited intrinsic interest to the developed countries of the west and 
there were few disputes over investment, citizens of these countries, 
or the political character of the regime. Conflict centred, rather, 
on issues of another character, namely those pertaining to the inter­ 
national role of South Yemen, in particular its policies in the region 
of the Red Sea and Arabian Peninsula, and to the manner in which South 
Arabia as a whole was involved in the east-west conflict.
It was above all, South Yemen's support for rebellion in neighbour­ 
ing states and the development of its military alliance with the USSR 
that antagonised the west. It was the west's support for conservative
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regimes in the region and the development of an enhanced western 
military presence on land and sea that constituted the main point of 
grievance in Aden. In this sense there was a certain continuity with 
the pre-independence period: the conflict between conservative and 
radical forces had been in train in the Peninsula since the overthrow 
of the Imam in North Yemen in September 1962, and was to continue to 
take a military form right through to the signing of the PDRY-Oman 
recognition agreement in 1982. The independence of South Yemen there­ 
fore represented a major punctuation, a point of transition, but not 
a beginning or an end, in this twenty-year South Arabian conflict 
between local insurgents and external powers. At the same time, east 
and west had been in conflict in the Arabian Peninsula and its flank­ 
ing waters for some time before 1967: the Soviet presence in Egypt, 
Iraq and North Yemen had been seen as threatening to the west, just 
as the western presence in Saudi Arabia, Iran and the British protec­ 
ted states of the Peninsula had been seen as unwelcome by the USSR. 
What the independence of the PDRY did was to introduce a strikingly 
new chapter in this drawn-out conflict, by transferring South Yemen 
from one side of the east-west conflict to the other, and by linking 
this transfer to the increased support for rebel movements in Oman 
and North Yemen that now came from the PDRY. Coming as this transi­ 
tion did in conjunction with two other major developments, the defeat 
of Egypt in June 1967 by Israel and its withdrawal from North Yemen 
soon afterwards on the one hand, and the British decision to withdraw 
from the Persian Gulf by 1971 on the other, the independence of South 
Yemen therefore formed part of a reorganisation of the terms of the 
east-west conflict as they were posed in the west Asian arena as a 
whole. While the British and Egyptian withdrawals removed one major 
factor of conflict, on the western side of the Arabian Peninsula, they
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coincided with the emergence of a new and major element of uncertainty 
on the eastern side, the Gulf: in the late 1960s the centre of western 
strategic concern therefore shifted from Red Sea to Persian Gulf. But 
if the major protagonist of the radical movement in Arabia, Egypt, was 
thereby removed and found no comparable replacement, the departure of 
Britain, Egypt's opponent, was compensated for by the growth in influ­ 
ence of other powers that had till then played a secondary role in 
determining the affairs of Arabia, namely Iran and the United States. 
Thus, while the pattern of east-west conflict in Arabia had, up to 
1967, been dominated by the Egyptian-British clash in the south-west 
corner of the Peninsula, the post-1967 independent regime in Aden now 
found itself increasingly confronting not Britain but the major power 
that replaced it in Arabia, namely the USA.
In the years immediately after independence, South Yemen's rela­ 
tions with the industrialised western countries consequently developed 
in a controversial manner. Aid talks with Britain were terminated in 
May 1968. Relations with West Germany were suspended, by the latter, 
in July 1969, and broken with the USA, by Aden, in October 1969. All 
foreign-owned businesses in the Republic, with the exception of the
BP refinery and the Cable and Wireless facility, were nationalised in
n 
November 1969. But by the early 1970s a different note had entered
into South Yemen's policy. While maintaining its militant stand on 
issues in the Arabian Peninsula and the third world generally, and 
while consolidating its relations with the socialist countries, parti­ 
cularly the USSR, the PDRY sought simultaneously to work towards 
improving those with the west. This process of consolidation was 
reflected in the Fifth Congress of 1972. Then, according to Foreign 
Minister Mutiyya', the NF 'took the decision to diversify our rela-
*
tions, to co-operate with all western countries which were prepared to
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respect our sovereignty and which were disposed to contribute to the 
economic development of our country.
For the PDRY, the motives behind this revised policy were evident. 
First, having established state control of the economy, it no longer 
needed to lay as much stress as before on the campaign against foreign 
capital and new laws on foreign investment were later introduced. 
Conversely, as development plans were initiated from 1971 onwards, the 
PDRY experienced a shortage of foreign aid and technical assistance. 
The reluctance up to 1975 of Arab states to provide aid and the limits 
on that offered by the socialist countries reinforced the sense that 
aid from the west was worthwhile. South Yemen continued to conduct 
most of its trade with the industrialised western countries and its 
economic experts realised that the country could benefit both from the 
financing and from the expertise of these developed economies. Calcu­ 
lations of diplomatic balance may also have played some role: while 
Aden's foreign policy was clearly directed against these western 
powers, the PDRY leaders could see that a complete rupture, in the
manner of China or North Korea, would be politically as well as
4 economically harmful. They also believed, as many other Arab and
socialist states did, that a degree of 'inter-imperialist contradic­ 
tion 1 existed, between Americans and Europeans, particularly France, 
as well as between America and Japan, from which smaller states of the 
third world could benefit. A general policy of seeking improved 
relations with these states simultaneously involved a belief in the 
possibilities of such a differentiation.
From the perspective of the developed western states, however, the 
attractions of improved relations with the PDRY were more limited. 
Some contact was obviously beneficial, as the UK calculated. Two 
western European governments, France and Sweden, did provide some
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limited economic aid. But there were major reasons why such relations 
were, from the point of view of the western states, restricted. First, 
the PDRY was a small and poor country: there were few benefits to be 
gained from improved political or trading relations with it. Secondly, 
the PDRY remained committed to a course of revolution in Arabia, a 
'rejectionist' stance on the Arab-Israeli question, and alliance with 
the USSR, all policies that alarmed the west, particularly as the 
issue of Arabian oil grew in importance during the 1970s. Thirdly, 
the PDRY was in conflict with more powerful states in the region, in 
particular Saudi Arabia and Iran, and western states did not want to 
take initiatives vis-a-vis Aden that would antagonise these countries. 
Fourthly, unlike Egypt and Somalia, the PDRY seemed unwilling to 
modify its foreign policy in return for substantial aid, Arab or 
western. South Yemen's interest in improved relations with the west 
was not therefore reciprocated to the extent Aden desired, or, at 
least, not on the conditions Aden was willing to accept. 
Relations with the United Kingdom
The period immediately following the accession of the PRSY to indepen­ 
dence in November 1967 was one of continued tension between Britain 
and its former Arabian colony. Fearful of attacks upon its embassy 
staff and upon British nationals still in Aden, the UK maintained a 
commando force on an aircraft carrier near South Yemen for some time 
after independence. The PRSY authorities continued, on their side, 
to denounce the British retrocession of the Kuria Muria Islands to 
Oman, and the new Foreign Minister drew attention to this when he 
spoke at the UN following the PRSY's admission to the United Nations 
on 14 December 1967.
It was not these concerns, however, which led to the first dis­ 
agreements between the UK and the PRSY. There was no outbreak of
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violence against British nationals in Aden and there was nothing in 
practice that Aden could do about the Kuria Muria Islands. However, 
in keeping with its hostility to the years of British rule and to 
those who co-operated with it, and perhaps in part to impress upon 
the population that a new era had begun, the PRSY authorities began 
in early 1968 to organise a series of trials of former Federation 
officials accused of collaboration with Britain. 8 Those present in 
court were sentenced to long prison sentences, while those sentenced 
in absentia were condemned to death. They included former members of 
the Federal Supreme Council, the assembly of the Federation, and both 
Adeni and Protectorate political leaders. Among the specific charges 
were inciting tribalism in the armed forces in collaboration with 
Britain, preparing political projects in collaboration with British 
advisers, and conspiring with the British to bomb guerrilla forces. 
They were condemned as 'colonialist stooges' and 'rubber stamps,
mercenaries and collusionists'. In British eyes such measures were
9 regarded as hostile acts.
These trials were accompanied by a dispute over British military 
experts serving with the PRSY armed forces. At the independence 
negotiations in Geneva, the NLF had rejected a British suggestion 
that a training mission be attached to the Republic's armed forces, 
something the UK had offered to the earlier Federation. But the 
Federal array had received supplies of new British equipment in the 
last months before independence, including coastal patrol boats and 
an air force of twenty-four planes. To service and fly these, a total 
of twenty-eight British personnel remained with the new armed forces: 
eighteen with the air force, seven with the navy, and three with the 
army. 11 In early 1968, tension grew on the PRSY's borders, with the 
YAR and Saudi Arabia, and the British government delivered a warning
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to the Aden authorities saying that they demanded that British
nationals would not be employed in actions outside the PRSY's terri-
12 
tory. The response of the PRSY government on 27 February 1968 was
to dismiss all the British experts on service with the PRSY's forces 
and expel them from the country. 13 Official British sources let it 
be known that they were happy with the result, since they wished to 
be no longer involved in assisting the PRSY government. Presumably, 
the radical intent of the new government was now clear, and proven. 
The PRSY government, for its part, had just sent a military mission 
to the USSR and it may already have received a commitment to some 
alternative aid. According to the Minister of Defence, 'All Salim 
al-Bid, who dismissed the British personnel: 'They were more in con-•
tact with the British Embassy than with the Defence Ministry. We 
therefore had to get rid of them since they formed a government within 
a government and posed a constant threat to us.' He referred to the 
British note about use of personnel outside the PRSY's frontiers as 
'a provocation, meddling with our independence and interference in 
our internal affairs'. A subsequent Foreign Ministry statement 
declared that
it was within the rights of the Government of the People's Repub­ 
lic of Southern Yemen to order those Britons working in the armed 
forces...to carry out any operations against any state committing 
an act of aggression against the People's Republic of Southern 
Yemen. 16
The next issue that arose between Britain and South Yemen was the 
matter of the financial aid which had been left inconclusive at Geneva. 
There, the British had promised £12 millions for the first six months 
after independence and had agreed to discuss further aid with the PRSY 
at a later date. In April 1968 a delegation headed by Sir Richard 
Beaumont, the British Ambassador in Cairo and former Head of the 
Foreign Office's Arabian Department, arrived in Aden, but on 10 May
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the talks ceased without the two sides reaching agreement. The 
British government's offer of £1.8 millions was not acceptable to the 
PRSY, and was thereby rejected. The South Yemeni request was for £60 
millions, and the PRSY also declared that it would not meet the other 
payments which the British government argued should be paid by it:
these were the pensions for former employees of the colonial power and
18 compensation for the Britons dismissed in February. The British
response to this was to deduct these payments from the £12 million 
initially promised at Geneva, and so reduce the net amount that had 
been negotiated as a compromise there. No definite figures are avail­ 
able from either the British or PRSY sides on the net amount actually 
paid by Britain after independence; the figure is the more difficult 
to arrive at because some of the items, such as planes, included by 
Britain in the £12 million, were capital goods already in the pipeline 
at the time of independence and were not, by the PRSY's calculations, 
part of post-independence aid. As one British official later put it,
there were 'conflicting philosophies of what was meant' by the £12
19 millions. Unofficial British estimates of the net amount finally
paid after independence range from a high of £3.25 millions to a low 
of £250,000. The PRSY argued in May that £5.4 millions was still out­ 
standing. Whatever the precise amount, however, all British aid to 
the PRSY had ceased by the summer of 1968 and, in a further mark of
disassociation, at the end of August the PRSY broke the link between
20 sterling and the Yemeni Dinar.
A statement by the British Minister of Overseas Development, Reg 
Prentice, on 12 May 1969, confirmed that the UK had 'no plans to 
resume* aid negotiations with the PRSY. According to Prentice the
question of pensions 'is one which would have to be considered if
21 there were a resumption of aid 1 . In retrospect, while each put the
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blame on the other, it would seem that both sides had calculated that 
it was not worth continuing such talks. On the British side, any 
hopes initially entertained after 30 November 1967 that the NF would 
become more accommodating to British intentions in the Peninsula as 
a whole must have been dissipated by the spring of 1968, and even 
though Kahtan al-Sha'abi had expelled the NF left from the government 
this was not apparently sufficient to allay British anxieties or those 
of the UK's allies. On the PRSY side, the calculation seems to have 
been made that the aid offered was not only far short of what the Aden 
government regarded itself entitled to as 'compensation 1 from the 
British government for the years of colonial rule, but also that the
aid would entail a South Yemeni commitment to continue paying the
22 
pensions and debt incurred from the Federation. As Lord Shackleton,
the British Minister involved, later stated, the British offer 'was
23 
scarcely adequate to meet the requirements of debt or pensions'.
On purely economic grounds, the British offer was therefore of ques­ 
tionable value to Aden. In more general political terms, moreover, 
the advantages to the PRSY of repudiating the British connection, both 
domestically and internationally, may have been deemed greater than 
the benefit of the aid itself.
Within one year, therefore, of the British departure from Aden, the 
substantive links still remaining between the United Kingdom and the 
colony it had ruled for over a century had been broken. With the 
departure of Sir Richard Beaumont's mission in May 1968, meaningful 
meetings between British and South Yemeni government officials all but 
ceased. In February 1970 the diplomatic staff of the British embassy 
in Aden was reduced from seventeen to eleven. In 1978 the then Labour 
government declined to cancel South Yemen's debts and in 1979 the 
Foreign Secretary, David Owen, stated that he had 'no plans' to meet
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his South Yemeni counterpart. This Lack of high-level contact
appears to have lasted until 1982, when the Foreign Minister 'Abd 
al-'Aziz al-Dali was received at the Foreign Office in London by the 
Minister of State responsible for the Middle East, Douglas Hurd. 25 
South Yemen, usually still referred to in Britain as 'Aden 1 , thereby 
came to occupy an insignificant part in British foreign policy, and 
in the British public's memory of empire. For its part, South Yemen 
became preoccupied with other issues, and with other enemies, and the 
protracted campaign for independence seemed to loom no larger in the 
state's account of its origins than the struggle against the Royalists 
in the North, against the monarchs of the Peninsula, or against fac­ 
tional enemies within the Front. In the official calendar 22 June
1969, the anniversary of the ousting of Kahtan al-Sha'abi, became as. •. ~~"~
important a date as 30 November, independence day. The USA soon 
replaced Britain as the major international foe.
Yet, on both sides there were issues that persisted in reminding 
the respective governments of the situation prior to November 1967. 
On the British side, there was the sensitive issue of colonial pen­ 
sions. The South Yemenis had been particularly decisive in doing so, 
but they were not the only post-colonial state to challenge the 
British policy according to which pensions were a responsibility of 
the successor state. After Aden repudiated responsibility, a lobby 
in favour of former British employees in South Arabia formed in the 
UK and supporters of pensioners in other overseas colonies formed an 
Overseas Service Association to change government policy. As a 
result, the British government in March 1970 introduced temporary
measures, paying what were seen as loans to former civil servants in
27 South Yemen whose pensions were not being paid by the Aden government.
But the UK refused to see the loans as substitutes for the pensions
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themselves, since they wished to maintain the legal position that it 
was the successor states who were liable, and the 1970 loans also 
excluded former military personnel. The figure so committed for the 
financial year 1970-1 was £430,000. 28 Pressure then arose in the 
British Parliament in favour of Britain formally taking responsibility 
for the South Arabian and other pensions, and extending these to mili­ 
tary personnel, and in 1973 the Overseas Pensions Bill was introduced, 
under which Britain did take responsibility for pensions and undertook 
to obtain repayment of the amount from the foreign governments. This 
bill, however, still covered only civilian employees and there was 
considerable resistance when an attempt was made by a group of Lords
formerly associated with South Arabia to extend this bill to covering
29 former members of the Federal army and other military bodies. Some
of the latter were stated to have participated in the killing of 
British troops during the Crater uprising of June 1967. In the end 
the bill covered only civilian employees, but the British government 
agreed to pay money as loans to about 300 former military employees 
from South Yemen, at an annual cost of £100,000-£200,000.
On the South Yemeni side, the NF government remained committed to 
the 'struggle 1 against what it saw as the 'vestiges' of British colo­ 
nialism inside South Yemen and, while waging many other political 
campaigns, continued to pay some attention to this issue. Political 
statements and analyses reminded the population of the history of 
resistance to British rule and the date of 14 October 1963, the offi­ 
cial beginning of the NLF's guerrilla campaign in the mountains of 
Radfan, continued to be celebrated. 14 October was also the name of 
the only daily paper. Speaking at the tenth anniversary of indepen­ 
dence in November 1977, President Salim Rubiyya* 'Aii described 14 
October 1963 as
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a reply in deeds to the presence of colonialism and to the system 
of Sultan rule, and to all the submissive practices associated 
with them. The 14th October was the correct path which enabled 
our people to force colonialism to evict our country. The language 
of revolutionary armed struggle was the main language through which 
our people addressed the colonial invaders. 31
The colonial past was evoked in Law No. 17 of 1970 which created the 
Ministry of the Interior: this described one of the functions of the 
Ministry as 'enthusiastic support of all measures taken or being taken
to eliminate the residues of the British colonialist and Sultanic
32 
regime and its agents'. Yet these statements, even when denouncing
the British role in the past, had two meanings: one an attack on the 
British policies of the past, the other a use of this attack and of 
the NLF's guerrilla resistance in order to discredit other forces in 
the South Yemeni arena - the Sultans and sheikhs associated with 
Britain in the Federation, and FLOSY and other forces to whom 14 Octo­ 
ber was also a challenge. Thus, even when the years of struggle 
against Britain were evoked, this had an internal intra-Yemeni politi­ 
cal function as much as an external foreign policy one.
Indeed, once the disputes of the 1967-8 period were over relations 
with Britain continued at a relatively low level. Both countries 
maintained embassies in the other's capital, although throughout much 
of the 1970s there were no ambassadors resident in either country. 
While South Yemeni Foreign Ministers and other officials frequently 
passed through London on their way across the Atlantic - to the UN or 
other destinations - they did not usually meet British representatives. 
Yet trade continued at substantial levels, with Britain accounting for 
between 6 and 12 per cent of South Yemen's imports during the 1970s, 
more or less equal to the pre-1967 proportion. Moreover, despite 
calls for 'liquidating' the residues of British colonialism, the major 
British assets in the PDRY were not immediately nationalised: BP owned
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the refinery till 1977, and continued to run it under a service con­ 
tract thereafter, and the Cable and Wireless station was not national-
*J /
ised until 1978. While compensation for some of the firms national­ 
ised in 1969 was not agreed upon, the issue of nationalised property 
did not constitute a major issue of disagreement between the PRSY and 
the UK.
Ties were also maintained in two other areas. One was education. 
While the independent South Yemeni state gradually reorganised its 
curricula and course content under the influence of Egyptian and later 
East German models, some links from the pre-independence period were 
maintained. A number of students were still sent to the UK for post­ 
graduate work: the Minister of Trade, Muhammad Midhi, had studied at
» • •
the LSE after independence, and one of the President's closest 
advisers, Ahmad Kutayb, had studied at Birmingham University in 1975.
* •
The Technical Institute at Ma'ala, founded in 1951 to train techni­ 
cians for the port and related facilities, continued as late as 1977 
to set its courses and examinations according to the British GCE 
system, and to have its examination papers marked in English. The 
other area of continued contact was through emigration. No accurate 
figures on the number of Yemeni migrants in Britain are available, but 
it would seem that several thousand people from both North and South 
had settled in the UK by the early 1960s when British legislation 
prevented further flows. Many Yemenis believed that the real reason 
for the blocking of migration was the British fear of Yemenis radical­ 
ised by the September 1962 revolution in the North visiting the UK. 
But the 1962 Nationality Bill was for all colonial citizens and, 
although some Yemenis living in the UK did face difficulties during 
the last years of British rule in Aden, this was never a major issue. 
After independence, the migrants continued to work in the UK and to
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return home for visits once every few years. By 1975 the PDRY 
authorities had established a branch in the UK of the General Union 
of Yemeni Workers, the comprehensive trades union operating at home. 
Its roughly 1,800 members organised literacy and political education 
classes, collected money to send home for particular development pro­ 
jects, and participated in political activities in the UK relevant to
them, such as demonstrations on Palestine or marches against racial
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discrimination. The numerical decline of the community, more than
a decade after independence, was not a result of political factors, 
but of the recession in the light engineering industry of the British 
Midlands and North where these migrants were particularly concentrated. 
This led many to return home, or to seek work in the oil-producing 
states.
The course of UK-PDRY relations after 1967 was, however, dominated 
by a quite distinct issue which arose not from the past, but from the 
emergence of a new situation, this time in the Persian Gulf. For if 
the NLF had, in its view, defeated 'British colonialism 1 in South 
Yemen, the Front, now that it was in power, saw itself as encouraging 
an analogous resistance in those areas of the Arabian Peninsula still 
considered by it to be under British influence, in what was termed 
'the occupied Arab Gulf. At the time of independence in 1967 this 
comprised three kinds of entity: Kuwait, an independent state since 
1961, but backed by a British guarantee against Iraq; Bahrain, Qatar 
and the Trucial Oman states, all under British Protection, in a manner 
analogous to the hinterlands of South Arabia before 1967; and the 
Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, a formally independent state which was 
under considerable British influence and which was, in most important 
practical respects, another British Protectorate. Although at the 
Geneva negotiations Kahtan al-^Sha'abi had, according to British
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sources, committed himself not to support resistance in other states 
in the Peninsula, including, explicitly, the Sultanate, the policy of 
the PRSY was from the beginning one of opposition, verbal and material, 
to Britain's presence in the Peninsula and to the arrangements made 
for British withdrawal when this came in 1971. The commitment to 
combatting 'colonialism' and 'imperialist bases' was stated quite 
clearly in the documents of the Fourth, Fifth and Unification Con­ 
gresses, and, albeit in a toned-down form, in the documents of the 
YSP Founding Congress of 1978. 39
This conflict between UK and South Yemeni policies had effects in 
two arenas. One was Oman itself, where, from 1967 until 1975, there 
was a substantial guerrilla movement in the Sultanate's Dhofar pro­ 
vince, adjoining South Yemen. As analysed in Chapter Four, Aden 
provided logistical support, financial aid, arms, training facilities 
and radio facilities to the guerrillas. South Yemen's regular forces 
took up position on the frontier and on a number of occasions were 
involved in direct clashes with Omani forces. Since Britain was bound 
to Oman by a defence treaty and since British officers, both seconded 
and contract, served with the Sultan's armed forces, Britain was there­ 
fore directly involved in military conflict with South Yemen long after 
independence. Although cross-border military movement ended more or 
less in 1976 and the British withdrew from their last base in Oman in 
1977, border tensions continued until 1981, as the British support for
the Omanis was maintained, albeit at lower levels. PDRY condemnations
40of Britain's role in Oman continued until 1981. Only with the sign­ 
ing of the South Yemen-Oman agreement of 1982 was this major issue of 
dispute between the PDRY and the UK in some degree resolved.
The other issue of dispute related to 'the occupied Arab Gulf con­ 
cerned the British withdrawal from the Gulf Protectorates in 1971.
95
When the announcement of Britain's intention to withdraw was made in 
January 1968, British policy was to encourage the entities under 
Protection - Bahrain, Qatar, the seven Trucial States - to form a 
single federation. Previous British experiences in encouraging 
federations under such conditions had not been successful - in the 
West Indies, Central Africa and South-east Asia - but in the case of 
the Persian Gulf the UK's endeavours met with some greater success. 
Bahrain and Qatar chose to become independent as separate states, but 
the seven Trucial Oman states did agree to form the United Arab 
Amirates. The example of what had happened in Aden weighed on both 
sides. The British and some local rulers feared a repetition of the 
South Arabian scenario, with a British announcement of intended with­ 
drawal precipitating a political upheaval. It would seem that the
radical forces in the Peninsula expected something similar, especially
41 given the success of the guerrillas already established in Dhofar.
In this context, the PRSY's policy was one of hostility to the British 
plan, since they regarded it as illegitimate for power to be handed 
at independence to potentates who appeared to them to be as tradi­ 
tional and pro-western as the leaders of the South Arabian Federation
42 had been. In the South Yemeni media, criticism of Britain ran high
43 to the end of 1971. The PDRY also believed that there was 'British
connivance* in the Iranian seizure of three Gulf islands in November 
1971. It was only later in the 1970s that the PDRY achieved some 
accommodation with these smaller Persian Gulf states and, thereby, 
with the UK on this issue.
The PDRY did not break diplomatic relations with Britain as it did 
with the USA, despite the much higher level of direct conflict between 
London and Aden. Britain for its part did not follow the example of 
West Germany in suspending relations, even if it did leave the post
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of ambassador empty from 1970 to 1980. General FCO policy was not to 
break diplomatic relations with states except in extreme cases, and 
the embassy in Aden, although cut off from most forms of contact with 
the surrounding society, served, it was argued by British officials, 
two low-key functions: as a means of exerting some influence on the 
Aden government and as a means of communication, the latter being 
enhanced by the fact that after October 1969 the UK represented the 
USA in Aden as well. Aden also served as a useful information-gather­ 
ing post and Britain was known to share her expertise on the country 
with Washington. Since in the early 1970s no Arabian Peninsula state 
apart from Kuwait had diplomatic representation in Aden either, it was 
believed by the UK that its small embassy there was, however isolated, 
in some degree useful, even if it was a markedly reduced remnant of 
what had, but a few years before, been one of Britain's largest 
official presences overseas.
For the first fifteen years after independence, DK-PDRY relations 
were therefore at a restricted level mainly for the reasons that 
impaired relations between South Yemen and the developed western 
states as a whole. One reason was the conflict between UK and South 
Yemeni policies in the Arabian Peninsula, a tension that was a conti­ 
nuation not just of the immediate pre-independence dispute in South 
Yemen but of that internationalised conflict that had begun with the 
fall of the Imam in North Yemen in 1962. A second factor was Britain's 
concern not to antagonise or alarm other states in the region, which 
were themselves hostile to South Yemen and with which Britain had 
degrees of alliance. Oman was one direct case, but of equal impor­ 
tance were Saudi Arabia and Iran. As one British official put it in 
an interview in 1981: 'One could not maintain more than a correct 
relationship with South Yemen given our relations with other states
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45 in the area.' If these two factors were the most important, there
were, however, two further considerations that weighed upon British 
policy-makers. One was a specific Anglo-Yemeni issue - the weight of 
history: the fact that South Yemen had been the site of major conflict 
between British forces and the local population before independence 
and that there was therefore reluctance in London to offering substan­ 
tial aid to the new Republic. As Aden saw it, British conduct in the 
months after independence, both in occasioning the February 1968 dis­ 
pute over the contract officers and in precipitating the breakdown in 
the May 1968 negotiations on aid, was at least in part designed to
break whatever remaining links the PRSY had inherited from the Federa-
46 tion. But British policy towards South Yemen was also influenced
by that obvious negative fact evident to all the western states, that 
the PDRY was a small and poor state unable to offer any major economic 
benefit to Britain, whatever the political regime. South Yemen could 
not be an Algeria or Iraq - a significant trading partner despite dis­ 
agreement on political issues. It did not therefore make sense to 
prejudice relations with Arabian oil-producers in favour of what 
remained, under independence as under British rule, an impoverished 
country.
Secondary Actors; France and West Germany
France had, historically, little influence or presence in the Arabian 
Peninsula, although in the 1970s it sought to gain access to markets 
there, military and civilian, at the expense of other more established 
competitors. However, France did have a colony at the mouth of the 
Red Sea, opposite South Yemen, at Jibuti, officially entitled, until 
it became independent in 1977, the Territoire Francaise des Afars et 
Issas. Aden had an interest in this colony: it was a rival port, 
a substantial minority of Yemenis lived there, as merchants and
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labourers, and, with the departure of Britain in 1967, the TFAI con­ 
stituted the only permanent western military presence in the Red Sea 
area. Yet, throughout the independence period, Aden maintained a 
cautious posture on the issue of Jibuti. The PDRY did not direct at 
the French presence in the TFAI anything comparable to the criticism
directed at the British presence and later that of the Americans in
49 
the Persian Gulf. Indeed, while aid was given to the Eritrean
guerrillas and while some Jibuti opponents of France were for a time 
resident in Aden, the official National Front and government policy 
on the Horn of Africa was one of caution and silence.
After the initial establishment of diplomatic relations between 
France and the PDRY in 1967, Aden indeed tried to develop closer rela­ 
tions with France and some low-level aid was later promised. An 
incident in March 1972, when PDRY artillery on the island of Perim 
bombarded a French warship that had entered South Yemeni territorial 
waters, did not lead to a deterioration in relations. The French 
decision, announced in 1976, to give independence to the TFAI involved 
a shift in political power within the colony, away from the Afars to 
the Issas. The latter were of Somali origin and the PDRY was at that 
time allied to Somalia; French policy did not arouse the hostility 
with which South Yemen had regarded the transition to independence in 
the British Protectorates of the Gulf in 1971. Moreover, while many 
had feared that the conflict developing between Ethiopia and Somalia 
would affect Jibuti as it neared independence and that one or other 
would invade, the opposite happened: while Ethiopia and Somalia went 
to war in the latter part of 1977 with each other both accepted the 
independence and neutrality of Jibuti, and this acceptance by the 
states of the Horn seemed to guide the PDRY in the same direction. 
The result was that neither the manner of the French granting of
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independence nor the French decision to maintain a garrison of some 
three thousand men there after independence were criticised by Aden. 
This policy was enunciated during a visit of the South Yemeni
Foreign Minister, Muhammad Salih Mutiyya', to Paris on 8-10 December
• » • •
1976, where he met high-ranking members of the French government, 
including President Giscard d'Estaing. Mutiyya' stated that Aden
•
wished to preserve 'security, stability and peace 1 in the region and 
that it supported the French policy in the TFAI. In March 1977 the 
Ta'iz Summit of North Yemen, South Yemen, Sudan and Somalia also 
endorsed French policy. The PDRY was .at times critical of French 
policy elsewhere in the Indian Ocean. One particular case was French 
support for the separation of Mayotte from the Comoro Islands in 1976,
and a pro-French coup in the latter in 1978. The PDRY also criticised
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French participation in the multinational Sinai peace-keeping force.
But PDRY attitudes to France were in general characterised by consi­ 
derations of a positive kind, namely the fact that France was the 
major western state with which Aden had the best relations. Seeking 
for an alternative to Britain, Aden developed relations with France, 
as well as using its delegation at UNESCO, based in Paris, to promote 
cultural and educational programmes. According to Mutiyya*, France
constituted the PDRY's 'window on the whole of western Europe' 
France was the only major western country to engage in some aid to 
South Yemen's economic development programmes. From the later 1970s 
onwards a number of French co-operants, volunteer teachers and doctors, 
worked in South Yemen on limited-term contracts, and, although France 
was not a major source of South Yemen's imports, it provided economic 
assistance through a limited loan programme, which was used to develop 
infrastructural projects.
The PDRY's relations with the German Federal Republic were in
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contrast to those with France, and more analogous to those of the UK, 
despite the lack of a pre-independence link between the two countries. 
This was because, as in dealings with the UK, West German and South 
Yemeni foreign policies clashed directly, on the issues of Bonn's 
German policy and on 'terrorism 1 , and because within the FRG relations 
with South Yemen became an issue of public debate. Diplomatic rela­ 
tions between the FRG and the PRSY were established after the latter 
became independent, but soon came up against the then prevailing FRG 
policy of the Hallstein Doctrine. According to this, the FRG would 
not have diplomatic relations with a state that had recognised the 
German Democratic Republic. One of the first acts of the PRSY govern­ 
ment after the 'Corrective Move' was to establish relations with East
Germany, and on 2 July 1969 the FRG announced that its relations with
58 South Yemen had been suspended. The Hallstein Doctrine was, however,
abandoned with the development of Brandt's Ostpolitik in the early 
1970s, and in September 1974 full diplomatic relations between the 
two states were re-established. The PDRY did not maintain an embassy 
in Bonn, conducting relations with the FRG from its Paris embassy.
The FRG maintained an embassy in Aden, but the ambassador himself was
59 resident in Sana'a and made periodic visits to Aden.
The re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Aden and Bonn 
in 1974 did not however open the door to better relations, and the 
vicissitudes of Germany's politics continued to affect Aden's dealings 
with Bonn. Trade between the two countries was considerable, with 
South Yemen's imports running at an annual average of YD 2.0 millions 
in the years 1969-77, compared to an average of imports from the GDR 
of YD 0.7 millions, or a third of the FRG figure, for the same period. 
The PDRY government was, however, also interested in receiving aid 
from West Germany and here the situation proved to be much more
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complicated. In 1968 the FRG had agreed in principle to provide the 
PDRY with aid totalling DM 10 millions, but this had not been granted 
because of South Yemen's refusal to sign what was known as the 'Berlin 
Clause 1 . The FRG maintained that West Berlin was part of the Federal 
Republic and that all treaties or agreements signed with it should 
also apply to West Berlin. Aid to third world countries was made 
conditional upon acceptance of this clause which stated:
Dieser Vertrag (oder: Abkommen) gilt auch fur das Land Berlin, 
sofern nicht die Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
gegenUber der Regierung...innerhalb von drei Monaten nach 
Inkrafttreten des Vertrags (oder Abkommens) eine gegenteilige 
ErklHrung abgibt. 61
The position of the USSR and of the GDR was that West Berlin was not 
part of the FRG, and its allies endorsed this position. The PRSY, 
although it did not at the time have relations with the GDR, refused 
in 1968 to sign the Berlin Clause.
With the re-establishment of diplomatic relations in 1974 the FRG 
offer of aid was repeated, but in March 1975 a new incident occurred 
to trouble relations between the two states. A group of terrorists 
from the Rote Armee Fraktion, or Baader-Meinhof Group, kidnapped a 
West Berlin politician, Peter Lorenz, on the eve of elections in that 
city and released him only after payment of a ransom and permission 
to fly out of West Germany to another country. The RAF members were 
given four or five possible countries to fly to, but none of the 
latter accepted until the West German Interior Minister, a member of
the SPD government, Dieter Genscher, flew to Aden and persuaded the
/• ^ 
PDRY authorities to receive them. The Aden government understood
that the FRG was, in return, to provide the PDRY with the economic 
aid promised, and allowed the plane to land. However, as the date 
for the Berlin elections came nearer, with Lorenz the leading candi­ 
date for the Christian Democrats, the Bonn government made a formal
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application to South Yemen for the extradition of the RAF members. 
The West German press also put pressure on the SPD authorities by 
arguing that South Yemen was 'harbouring terrorists'; as a result, no 
aid was provided, apart from some emergency food aid and some pumps 
for the Aden water supply, totalling DM 3.2 millions. 6 There is no 
evidence that the PDRY had agreed in the negotiations with Genscher
to extradite the terrorists at a later date, and the official PDRY
64position was that Bonn had double-crossed it. But under the pres­ 
sure of domestic politics the SPD government later stated that there 
was such a commitment to extradition and declined to honour what had 
been a commitment on its part to supply the aid.
In 1976 a new agreement was, in principle, reached between the FRG 
and the PDRY, and the latter agreed to sign the Berlin Clause. But, 
because of continued criticism inside the FRG about the failure of 
South Yemen to extradite the RAF members, no agreement was actually 
signed. In 1977 the FRG agreed that, for the year 1978, DM 14 
millions would be provided but soon afterwards a further incident in 
relations between the two countries arose when another Lufthansa jet 
was hijacked by the RAF in an attempt to get the release of leaders 
imprisoned in Germany. Mindful of what had occurred in 1975, the PDRY 
refused to allow the plane to land at Aden and even tried to block the 
runway with tanks. The pilot Schumann did, nonetheless, bring the 
plane down on land next to the runway, but he was then shot by the 
hijackers and his body dumped on the runway, after which the plane 
then flew on to Mogadishu. Far from winning support in West Germany, 
however, by its refusal to give refuge to the plane and its statement 
that it wanted nothing to do with 'terrorists', the PDRY government 
only aroused further criticism. A series of subsequent revelations 
by West Germany and other 'terrorists', who stated that they had been
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trained in the PDRY, added to this hostility within West German 
public opinion.
By 1978 it was evident that Aden was no longer willing to sign the 
Berlin Clause, as it had earlier indicated; however, the SPD govern­ 
ment in Bonn still believed it could overcome these internal difficul­ 
ties, and a body of official German opinion favoured the use of German
£ O
aid precisely in order to counter the influence of the GDR. In 
general, West German aid was distributed widely on a 'watering-can 
principle* to over eighty countries, and only states such as Vietnam 
and Cuba were excluded. Since 1971 a .compromise version of the Berlin 
Clause had been elaborated, which some countries who refused to sign 
the standard clause were allowed to endorse. This stated: 'Entsprech- 
end dem ViermHchte-Abkommen von 3.09.1971 wird dieses Abkommen in
Ubereinstimmung mit den festgelegten Verfahren auf Berlin (West)
69 ausgedehnt.' But it was only countries where the FRG interest in
outbidding the GDR was obvious that were permitted to sign this second 
clause - examples of these being Iraq and Syria. Given the hostility 
to the PDRY in West Germany and the limited economic attractions of 
South Yemen, the Bonn government would not allow the PDRY to sign this 
second version of the Berlin Clause, and the PDRY's role in supporting 
Ethiopia during the Horn of Africa crisis of 1977-8 was cited as a 
further reason for withholding FRG aid. Somalia, with whom Ethiopia 
was at war, had allowed the Lufthansa jet hijacked in October 1977 to 
land and had permitted West German soldiers to storm the plane and 
release the passengers. It was rewarded with FRG aid, and even some 
arms. In 1980 a further obstacle to FRG aid to the PDRY arose when 
the Christian Democratic opposition argued against giving aid to 
governments which had supported the USSR in UN votes on Afghanistan. 
While the amount offered was small by comparison to the aid
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committed to the YAR (DM 45 million in 1981 as against DM 14 million 
for the PDRY), political difficulties in Bonn prevented the commitment 
from being realised. While even under the Presidency of <Abd al- 
Fattah Isma'il the PDRY had stepped up its interest in aid from the 
FRG, the precarious position of the SPD government facing re-election, 
and then the victory of the CDU/CSU in the March 1983 elections, meant 
that an aid commitment first made fifteen years earlier had still not 
been implemented in 1983. It was a curious development that the FRG, 
which had no political presence in Arabia, should have had such 
complex relations with the PDRY and that it was in West Germany, more 
than in any other western country, that the issue of relations with 
Aden should have become an issue of domestic political debate. 
Relations with the USA; Causes of a Rupture
As outlined earlier in this chapter, the independence of South Yemen 
in 1967 coincided with an important shift in the overall strategic 
situation in the west Asian region, and in the Peninsula and Persian 
Gulf in particular. For the British withdrawal from Aden in November 
1967 and the subsequent withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971 opened the 
way for the USA to play a much more important and direct role in the 
affairs of the Arabian Peninsula. US oil companies had long been 
present in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, and the USA's strategic relation­ 
ship with Saudi Arabia, initiated during World War II and confirmed 
by the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957, had been further confirmed by 
Washington's support for Riyadh during the Yemeni civil war and to 
offset the Egyptian presence in North Yemen that followed the fall of 
the Imam. In contrast to Britain, the USA had, at the beginning, 
recognised the Republic in Sana'a, but as the civil war continued and 
Saudi Arabia came to see itself as more and more threatened by the 
Egyptian presence in the YAR, the USA downplayed its relations with
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Sana'a and the YAR broke them in 1967. The British withdrawal from 
the Gulf, however, as much against the USA's wishes as had been that 
from South Yemen, led to increased US interest in the Persian Gulf 
and to the evolution of a new, more forward, US strategy. Under this, 
Washington assumed strategic responsibility for the region as a whole, 
and became a major arms supplier not only to traditional clients, but 
also to what had till then been British-dominated states.
This evolution in western policy had as a consequence the fact that 
for much of the post-independence period it was the USA and not the UK 
against whom South Yemen's foreign policy was primarily directed. 
While Britain remained the dominant power in Oman until at least the 
mid-1970s, the USA was the main partner of the major regional powers 
affecting South Yemen - Saudi Arabia to the north, Iran in the Gulf, 
and Ethiopia across the waters of the Red Sea. As the importance of 
Gulf oil to the USA increased in the 1970s, so the PDRY and the USA 
had further reason to oppose each other's initiatives. From 1972 
onwards, when US-YAR diplomatic relations were re-established, the USA 
therefore came to play a role in North Yemen, as it did increasingly 
in Oman, from 1977 onwards.
The two states therefore opposed each other in Peninsula affairs; 
and, despite the limited range of the PDRY's foreign policy impact, 
there were at least three other areas where the two states' approaches 
were in evident contradiction. One was the Arab-Israeli issue: the 
Rogers Plan of 1970 and the range of US initiatives from the Kissinger 
shuttle of 1974 onwards, through Camp David in 1978 and the Reagan 
initiative in 1982, were all opposed by South Yemen. The PDRY formed 
part of the bloc most critical of the USA, and in 1977 joined the
Front of Steadfastness and Rejection set up to oppose the Egyptian
72 initiatives towards Israel. A second area of disagreement was the
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Indian Ocean which had since 1968 become an area of US-Soviet rivalry
and where the PDRY repeatedly sought to rally opposition to US naval
73 and air deployments. The third region was the Horn of Africa: there,
prior to 1974, the PDRY supported the Eritrean guerrillas and Somalia, 
both rivals of the pro-American Ethiopian monarchy, and after 1974 
Aden increasingly supported the revolutionary military regime in Addis 
Abeba that was in conflict, and for a time at war, with a now pro- 
American Somalia. Consequently, while the issues varied, South
Yemeni-US relations were almost continuously hostile throughout the
74 post-1967 period.
Prior to South Yemen's independence trade between the two countries 
had been slight - 0.4 per cent of the South Arabian total in 1966 - 
but the USA had for many years maintained a consulate in Aden, and on 
7 December 1967 the two countries exchanged diplomatic recognition. 
There were those in the State Department who believed that the NLF's 
anti-Egyptian orientation might provide a basis for a US containment 
of Egypt, but within a short time relations between the two countries 
became acrimonious. One issue was the PRSY belief, first voiced in 
July 1968, that the DSA was arming forces that were active from the 
YAR and Saudi Arabia against the Republic, and which were trying to 
overthrow the new regime. A second issue was economic aid: both 
before and after his eviction of the left, Kahtan al-Sha'abi and his
• • • '"
ministers had asked the USA for economic aid, to offset the grave 
problems caused by the British withdrawal and the closure of the Suez
Canal. Yet throughout 1968 and 1969 they made no progress with these
78 
requests, which the USA declined to meet. A third factor concerned
an incident on 20 March 1968 when a group of army personnel, angered 
by the radicalism of the Fourth Congress, arrested some left-wing 
leaders and apparently tried to stage a kind of coup. Kahtan al-
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Sha'abi quashed this attempt, but a US military attache, Dale Perry, 
was stopped by police while driving his car during the curfew. He 
stated that he had made an innocent mistake, but the PRSY authorities 
claimed he had been conspiring with the rebellious military. Since 
the 20 March coup attempt objectively helped President al-Sha'abi to 
consolidate his power, the left-wing NLF opposition claimed that the 
move against them at that time had been carried out with the support
of the USA. Militants in the rural areas even went so far as to
RO 
allege that 'US imperialism 1 had taken power in Aden.
When the 'Corrective Move* of June 1969 occurred, criticism of the 
USA increased and on 24 October 1969 South Yemen broke off diplomatic 
relations with the USA and ordered the staff to leave within twenty- 
four hours. The official reason given was that the USA was assisting 
Israel by allowing citizens with dual US-Israeli nationality to fight 
in the Israeli army: the moment of diplomatic breaking came after an 
Israeli military incursion into Lebanon, and the Aden statement spoke
of 'the hostile attitude adopted by the US government towards Arab
81 
causes and above all the just cause of the Palestinian people'. But
it could well have been that the issue of soldiers with dual national­ 
ity was more a pretext for the PRSY to do something it had wanted to 
do anyway, namely align itself with the other radical Arab states, who 
had broken relations at the time of the June 1967 war. Thus Algeria, 
Egypt, Iraq, the Sudan, Syria and the YAR had broken diplomatic rela­ 
tions in 1967, and the PRSY's establishment of ties with Washington 
so soon afterwards may have placed it in an anomalous position with 
the other radical states. The problem was, however, that having 
broken relations South Yemen found it much more difficult to re­ 
establish them, in informal or formal terms. Two of the others were 
oil-producing states, where, despite political disagreements, the USA
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had an economic incentive to maintain trade. Thus Algeria continued 
to trade substantially with the USA, as an alternative to France, 
during the period of diplomatic break, and re-established full rela­ 
tions some years later. Iraq allowed a US interest section to operate 
in Baghdad as an embassy and traded substantially with the USA. Syria
became involved in diplomacy around the Arab-Israeli issue and re- 
go 
established relations in June 1974. Egypt and Sudan under new
leaders became strong allies of the USA in the 1970s, and North Yemen,
after allowing a US interests section to operate within the Italian
83 
embassy from 1970, re-established diplomatic relations in 1972. The
PDRY, however, which had broken relations to align itself with these 
countries, now found itself without major assets: it had little econo­ 
mic attraction, it was not a major actor in the diplomatic arena, and 
it pursued policies that antagonised Washington and its more influen­ 
tial regional allies.
The change in orientation towards the industrialised west following 
the Fifth Congress of 1972 did not, therefore, lead to a successful 
rebuilding of links to Washington. Rather, both sides continued to 
see each other as threatening the other's interests. Addressing the 
House of Representatives subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia 
in June 1973, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and 
South Asian Affairs, Joseph Sisco, had drawn attention to what he saw 
as the security threats posed to US allies in the region.
Mr. Chairman, as the states in the gulf and the peninsula have 
taken on more responsibilities for their economic destiny, they, 
too, have become increasingly aware of threats they see to their 
security and of the need to improve their defensive capacity. 
These concerns have intensified as a result of the conflict bet­ 
ween South and North Yemen last September, the continuing 
insurrection in Oman's Dhofar Province which has its base of 
support in South Yemen, and the arrest in recent months in the 
United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman of a number of members 
of the subversive South Yemeni-supported Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG), the increasing
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supply of Soviet arms, equipment, and technicians to South Yemen 
and to Iraq, the March 20 border skirmish between Iraq and Kuwait, 
and the March 22 attack by South Yemeni aircraft on a Saudi border 
outpost....
Saudi concerns have been stimulated by the growing supply of 
Soviet arms into South Yemen and Iraq. In South Yemen the Soviets 
have stepped up their deliveries of sophisticated weapons and 
aircraft.
The Saudis view the radical regime in Aden as representing a 
threat (a) to North Yemen, which is practically defenseless and 
which depends largely on Saudi Arabia for help in maintaining its 
security and (b) Oman because South Yemen continues to provide the 
base for the Communist-led insurgency into Oman's western province 
of Dhofar, and (c) Saudi Arabia itself, which last March was hit 
by South Yemen Migs at a Saudi border post.8^
A number of US observers did point out that the actual capabilities 
of the PDRY were rather low, and for this reason they opposed the 
Administration's invoking of the PDRY as a reason for the large sale 
of US arms to Saudi Arabia and Iran. As the Chairman of the Subcom­ 
mittee wrote:
The Soviet-backed threats to Iran and Saudi Arabia supposedly 
emanating from South Yemen and Iraq may be real, but they are 
small and potential. You do not need a sledge hammer to crack 
a nut. Since 1965, our sales of arms and services to Iran and 
Saudi Arabia are roughly six times estimates of Soviet activity 
in the Persian Gulf area.85
Such reservations did not prevail: neither US arms sales policy to 
the region, nor official attitudes to South Yemen, were altered.
During the October 1973 war, when South Yemen co-operated with 
Egypt in blockading Bab al-Mandeb, the mouth of the Red Sea, for some 
weeks, the USA sent an aircraft carrier, the Hancock, to the sea off
Q £
South Yemen, together with a task force; and a group of ships, 
including an aircraft carrier, was maintained in the area until April 
1974. No actual incidents were reported, but the PDRY authorities 
did denounce the US naval presence in the Indian Ocean and say that
this force violated the Republic's territorial waters around the
87 island of Socotra. US sources speak of it as having been used as
88 
'a visible demonstration of US presence and interest*. Such a
110
'demonstration' activity could have included deterring a continuation 
or repetition of the Bab al-Mandeb blockade. This US naval deploy­ 
ment nearer the coast of South Yemen came soon after the opening of 
the US base on the Indian Ocean atoll of Diego Garcia: leased by 
Britain to the USA for fifty years in December 1966, Diego Garcia 
provided the USA with naval and air facilities from its operational
pQ
beginning in March 1973. These two events, the opening of the Diego 
Garcia base and the 1973 war, marked the beginning of a more forward
naval strategy by the USA in the western Indian Ocean that was to be
90 
developed further in the years to come, and was seen as menacing by
the PDRY.
In early 1974 the PDRY took an initiative in inviting to Aden a
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Republican Congressman, Representative Paul Findley of Illinois.
The official reason for the visit in January 1974 was Findley's desire 
to secure the release of a constituent of his, a US teacher who had 
been arrested for photographing Aden harbour during a transit visit 
some years earlier. The constituent was released and flew home with 
Findley. But the PDRY authorities used the occasion of the first 
official US visitor since 1969 to press their case. Findley came with 
letters to himself from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Assis­ 
tant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 
Alfred Atherton. Kissinger's letter confined itself to stressing that
the USA was 'working actively to achieve a just and durable peace in.
92 the Middle East'. Atherton went further and laid out the USA s
position on diplomatic relations:
Basically, we do not feel that the existence of differences in 
national ideologies or political structure, or divergent views on 
many international issues should necessarily pose an obstacle to 
our having diplomatic relations with a given country....As a 
matter of policy, we are prepared to reestablish diplomatic rela­ 
tions with countries which have broken relations with us when such 
countries wish to do so.93
Ill
In Aden, Findley talked with Foreign Minister Mutiyya' who said that
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the PDRY wished for diplomatic relations with the USA. But there were
conditions: the USA must first cease supporting forces opposing the
PDRY from Saudi Arabia and North Yemen. According to Findley,
He talked at length about diplomatic relations. He said it was 
necessary to view the question in context of the whole Arab world. 
The reason for severance was the Israeli attack on the Beirut air­ 
port. Without US support, he said, the attack could not have 
occurred. Nor could the Israeli occupation of Arab lands and 
denial of Palestinian rights to their lands. He said Palestinians 
are not against the Jews. Instead, they want only a democratic 
Palestine state where they can live where each will have the same 
full rights as others.
Muti 1 repeated the charge that in 1968 a US military attache 
had a hand in resisting an attempted change in the Aden government. 
This led to a feeling of the people against America. Regarding 
border fighting, he said he believed camps were organized with the 
support of the US. 'We have information and proof that the Ameri­ 
can embassy in San'a supports the subversive acts against Demo­ 
cratic Yemen....Still, we are not against diplomatic relations 
with the US. We favour diplomatic relations with all governments 
which respect our sovereignty 1 .
He said Saudi Arabia gives support and encouragement to all ex- 
sultans and ex-sheiks. 'Why should Saudi want US equipment except 
for use against the Republic?'
'While the past is not good', he said, 'the present looks 
better. We are looking ahead. We have diplomatic ties with 
Britain. We hope the US changes its attitude*.
He said economic, trade and cultural relations would help 
towards establishing diplomatic relations in the future....
Before any kind of diplomatic representation can be established, 
he cautioned, the US must cease first support of anti-revolutionary 
movements. 'Our people are fully mobilized against such US poli­ 
cies, and it is not easy or possible to change their attitudes 
quickly. A beginning can occur when the US stops giving any kind 
of assistance for subversions and starts promoting economic rela- 
tions'. 94
Later, in a meeting with President Salim Rubiyya' <Ali, Findley was
told:
Now, the belief is held by the people of my country that all suf­ 
fering, all damage caused by subversives is the work of the US 
government. There is much hostility to the US government. They 
believe all subversive acts are due to US support of subversion. 
All military "equipment we capture is US equipment, and this makes 
the people feel the US is behind the attack.^5
Findley's visit did not lead to any noticeable improvement in US- 
PDRY relations, although clashes along the Saudi-PDRY and Otnan-PDRY
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frontiers ceased when Riyadh and Aden established diplomatic relations 
in 1976. If anything, US-PDRY relations deteriorated further, because 
other issues came to concern both sides. The South Yemenis were con­ 
cerned about the now greater US naval presence in the Indian Ocean 
and the decision taken after the October 1973 war to expand greatly 
the facilities on Diego Garcia. Criticism of the USA was at the 
same time occasioned by developments within the PDRY when in 1974-5
a group of employees of the US firm ITT were put on trial, accused of
97 espionage, and some were given long prison sentences. Aden was also
concerned by the emergence of what US officials termed a 'trilateral 
relationship 1 in North Yemen, where the USA initiated in 1975 a plan 
to re-equip the YAR army with Saudi funds. In justification of this 
policy, a Congressional committee report of 1977 stressed the PDRY 
threat to the YAR, and the presence of Soviet, Cuban and East German 
advisers in South Yemen. According to the report, 'PDRY's superiority 
in numbers of troops is enhanced by an extensive array of Soviet armor,
artillery, aircraft, and other weapons. To offset this impressive
98 PDRY capability a modernized YAR armed force is deemed essential.'
The PDRY blamed the USA for the Iranian military presence in Oman, and
when the USA began using the base on the Omani island of Masira after
99 the British departure in 1977 this too provoked criticism in Aden.
The other regional issues already mentioned now began to loom larger 
in-PDRY foreign policy: first, the shift by Egypt of allegiance to the 
USA from the USSR and the evolution of an active US mediating role in 
the Arab-Israeli dispute, and, secondly, the growing crisis in the 
Horn of Africa that culminated in the Ethiopian-Somali war of 1977-8.
The advent of the Carter administration in January 1977 had, at 
first, appeared to offer some hope of improved relations between Aden 
and Washington. The PDRY was not a significant object of the new
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administration's interest and it was noteworthy that in a major 
speech in June 1977, outlining US willingness to displace the USSR 
in six left-wing third world countries, including Somalia, Algeria 
and Cuba, the President did not include the PDRY. 101 In September 
1977, however, in part due to the continued lobbying of Representative 
Findley and in part as a result of Saudi suggestions to Washington, 
US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance did meet with Foreign Minister 
Mutiyya' at the United Nations and it was agreed that the USA would 
send a mission to Aden to discuss the question of having talks on 
re-establishing diplomatic relations. This mission set off in 
June 1978, under the leadership of Joseph Twinam, the Director of 
Arabian Peninsula Affairs in the State Department, but it had 
travelled no further than Jidda in Saudi Arabia when the crisis in 
both Yemens broke out, and President Salira Rubiyya' 'Ali was killed. 
The Twinara mission then returned home, and the USA refused to resume
the mission, although Aden repeated its invitation to the USA to send
103 
a delegation to discuss holding talks. Indeed, Washington let it
be known a few weeks later that it was not interested in pursuing 
talks. According to one report: 'The State Department has concluded 
that Southern Yemen, which has only about 1.5 million people, does 
not pose a real threat to anyone and hence is not worth larger con­ 
cern. ' 10^ The official view was that the USA 'cannot hope now to 
normalize relations with a country at odds not only with other Western 
powers but also with its Arab neighbors'.
A number of developments appear to have led to this hardening of 
the US position towards the PDRY. One was the widely held US belief 
that the USSR and Cuba had provoked the crisis in Aden. Another was 
the much more critical Saudi attitude following the June 1978 crisis: 
Saudi Arabia led a move to suspend the PDRY's relationship with the
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Arab League, and the reference to the PDRY being 'at odds' with Arab 
neighbours indicates that this was a factor in American thinking. 
(US officials were later to imply that they only agreed to the Twinam 
mission in the first place to gratify Saudi Arabia.) The subsequent 
second North-South Yemen war of February 1979 can only have increased 
Saudi and US apprehension about the course of events in the South. A 
second factor in discouraging US initiative was the South Yemeni role 
in the Horn of Africa: although PDRY military participation in the 
Ethiopian-Somali war preceded the Twinam mission, it must certainly 
have been a major preoccupation of the State Department at this time, 
as it was of Saudi Arabia, and the continuation of tension in the Horn 
was therefore an aggravation in both Aden-Washington and Aden-Riyadh
! „• 106relations.
With the growing deterioration of US-Soviet relations as a whole 
from 1978 onwards, there was little prospect of improvement in the 
PDRY's relations with Washington. Yet some more attention was paid 
to the PDRY in the US political debate. For events in this Arabian 
state now came to symbolise the kind of threat which the USA reported­ 
ly faced in the third world, and the June 1978 crisis was widely 
construed by US politicians and writers as a 'Soviet coup', comparable 
to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan of 1979 or the Cuban interven­ 
tion in Angola of 1975. The change in Washington attitudes to the 
third world, which began in the latter part of 1978, then combined 
with a particular Yemeni crisis, the war of February 1979, to produce 
the most significant conflict yet in US-PDRY relations. As a develop­ 
ment of the 'trilateral' policy begun in 1975, the USA had been plan­ 
ning from the summer of 1978 to sell up to #400 millions worth of 
military equipment to North Yemen. This provision would normally have 
involved Congressional approval, but when the fighting between North
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and South Yemen broke out in February 1979 US officials used this as 
a means of highlighting the 'Soviet threat 1 in the third world. On 
7 March 1979 President Carter himself signed an executive order,
Presidential Determination 79-6, waiving the normal Congressional
1 OR approval for such arms sales. The weapons were to be sent directly
to the YAR as a token of US resolve. Carter is believed to have seen 
the inter-Yemeni war as the opportunity to take a stand after what 
was seen as his weakness during the Iranian revolution. Some US 
officials later argued that Washington had exaggerated the crisis in 
order to appear to make a publicised stand against the USSR and 
reassure both Saudi and US domestic opinion, but the result was that,
for a few weeks in early 1979, US policy saw itself as 'drawing the
109line 1 against communism on the border of the PDRY. In addition to
the decision to supply arms to the YAR on an emergency basis, the USA 
at this time also despatched a naval task force, including an aircraft 
carrier, the Constellation, to the Red Sea region. As during the 1973 
Arab-Israeli war, this US force was never actually used in fighting, 
but its purpose was clearly intended to deter any possible South 
Yemeni advance into the North, should the opportunity for this on the 
ground arise. In the end, the US attempt to consolidate a new 
position in the YAR by the arms supplies of March 1979 was a failure. 
The YAR authorities resented the manner in which Saudi Arabia sought 
to control the supplies, and some months later it was the USSR which 
supplied Sana'a with most of its new equipment. But the February- 
March 1979 crisis did make it all the more difficult for there to be 
an improvement in US-PDRY relations, or to relaunch the Twinara mission. 
The US evaluation of the war itself was clear enough:
The current fighting, which began on February 23, is more serious 
than past incidents. It is clearly a coordinated campaign with 
the apparent intention of seizing and occupying North Yemeni
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territory and destabilizing the North Yemen government.
The timing of the attack may have been related to South Yemen's 
desire to exploit its current superiority in equipment before our 
announced military assistance reaches and is integrated into the 
North Yemen Armed Forces,
A US evaluation later in the year spelt out what Washington believed 
to be the underlying cause of the war:
US intelligence... provided the basis of the belief that the PDRY 
attacks, if pressed, could succeed in gaining radical control over 
the southern parts of the YAR or toppling the government in Sana. 
Thus, the invasion seemed, at the time of the waiver, to pre­ 
sent a threat not only to the YAR but also to the Peninsula as a 
whole. 113
The issue of the North-South war in February-March 1979 was, how­ 
ever, compounded by the emergence of another question that further 
complicated US-PDRY relations at the end of the 1970s, namely the 
issue of 'terrorism*. While this had long been a matter of dispute 
in PDRY-West German relations, and while generic charges against the 
PDRY had been made in the US press and Congress, it was only in the 
latter part of the Carter administration that, under pressure from 
Congress, this matter became central to US foreign policy and legis­ 
lation.
In correspondence between the State Department and Senator Jacob 
Javits of New York released in May 1977, the PDRY was named by the US 
government along with Iraq, Libya and Somalia as having aided terror­ 
ism in recent years. According to the report: "There is some public
evidence that the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen has on occa-
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sion allowed its territory to be used as a sanctuary for terrorists.
Under the 1979 Export Administration Act controls were introduced on 
the sale of equipment with potential military use to countries on the 
terrorism list and, when, in that year, the South Yemenis tried to 
purchase a Boeing jet for their national airline, al-Yamda, this was 
blocked by the US government, A report issued by the CIA's
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National Foreign Assessment Center in June 1981 repeated the US posi­ 
tion:
The government of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen pro­ 
vides camps and other training facilities for a number of inter­ 
national terrorist groups. The PFLP maintains a major training 
camp there, and members of many different terrorist groups have 
all benefited from the PFLP training facilities. 116
The issue of a country being accused of favouring 'terrorism* did not, 
however, directly relate to that of diplomatic relations: the USA did, 
until 1981, maintain diplomatic relations with Libya, and had rela­ 
tions with Syria and Iraq. In hearings on the March 1979 Presidential 
waiver for arms to the YAR Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William 
Crawford was pressed by Congressman Findley on why the US did not send 
a diplomatic mission to Aden. His explanation is worth quoting at 
length as it gives a good overall picture of US thinking.
Mr. FINDLEY. Up to now, up to this decision on the part of the 
administration, I think, our Government has been perceived as weak, 
as unsure, as vacillating in this part of the world. I hope that 
this is the beginning of a new policy, not just a spasm that will 
soon be forgotten and replaced by other signs of weakness.
We have been through a period of reversals, Iran, Afghanistan, 
Ethiopia, and South Yemen. As Mr. Twinam especially knows, for 5 
years now I have been urging the administration - that includes 
the Republican administration before the Democratic administration 
- to recognize the vital importance of the Yemens, and especially 
South Yemen, and to get a diplomatic mission down there.
I happen to be in a position to report directly, with authority, 
that the South Yemeni Government, throughout this 5-year period, 
extended the hand of friendship, seeking a better relationship with 
the Western World, and especially the United States. This was 
ignored month after month by our Government, and now we are kind 
of reaping the results.
My question is, are we seeking to establish a mission in Aden 
at this point, recognizing the importance of the geography, the 
importance of having a listening post, the importance of having a 
point of hopefully some influence?
Mr. CRAWFORD. Congressman, I am deeply and gratefully aware of 
your interest in South Yemen, I have followed with admiration your 
long and ultimately successful efforts to free one of your own 
constituents from a very bad situation in Aden, and I am full of 
admiration.
The answer to your question is, we are not currently seeking to.
Mr. FINDLEY. Can you explain why not? One would think we would 
want to be there with a diplomatic mission, today more than any 
other time, when the fighting is underway.
Mr. CRAWFORD. I think the immediate answer is, our friends
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simply would not understand nor, I think, would the American 
people understand.
We all support the principle of universality in diplomatic 
relationships. President Carter is particularly strong on this 
point as, I think, you know. But it is easier to apply the prin­ 
ciple of universality with some governments than others. The 
government in Aden, unfortunately - and this newest incursion into 
North Yemen is an example - makes it rather more difficult, as 
does its support of terrorism.
Mr. FINDLEY. But, Mr. Ambassador, all of us recall that ter­ 
rible pair of incidents 1 year ago when the President of North 
Yemen was executed - on the eve of Mr. Twinam's arrival in Aden 
to hopefully set up a diplomatic mission. And yet, in the wake 
of that execution, the new government sent word to our Government 
that the door was open. Mr. Twinam was still welcome to come down. 
To the best of my knowledge, even today, our mission would be wel­ 
comed in Aden to take up the question of a diplomatic mission.
Mr. CRAWFORD. On the principle of the matter we are entirely 
in accord with you, but we must judge not only by the words that 
we hear from Aden, but by its deeds; and its current pattern of 
deeds and its previous pattern of deeds make it very difficult to 
respond in the positive way.
Mr. FINDLEY. But, can we not influence deeds better if we have 
diplomats present in the capital of the offending country?
Mr. CRAWFORD. As a general matter I would agree with you. In 
terms of the situation in which foreign diplomats find themselves 
in Aden, the capital of the PDRY, I am doubtful, frankly. The 
experience of our allies, the West Germans, the British, and so on 
who are physically present, who have relations there shows that 
they have very curtailed freedom of movement; strong efforts are 
made to force the diplomatic colony to live in a single, very 
secluded area where it will not have access. I am myself convinced 
that any efforts to have the kind of free access that American 
diplomats like to all strata of society and have a free discourse 
that might influence the policies of the South Yemeni Government 
in exactly the direction you indicate would result in the most 
stringent surveillance and hampering the movements of our diplomats.
Mr. FINDLEY. I am sure of that. The diplomatic movement would 
be hampered, but I would think a little movement would be better 
than nothing at all.
I want to express my deep concern over what I believe to be the 
policy of our Government of letting other states in the region have 
what amounts to a veto over our decisions to establish missions. 
I believe that was true in the case of Aden, and I think it is most 
unfortunate for us, as a world power - undignified for us to let 
other states veto a decision we might take on establishing a 
mission in an important region.
Mr. CRAWFORD. I would quite agree with you if that were the 
case. I said, it is important that we take into account the points 
of our close friends in the area. I would agree our actions, if 
we see it as being in our own interest, should not be subject to 
a veto. It is a fact that the policy positions of the Aden Govern­ 
ment make it very difficult to be responsive in this kind of situ­ 
ation, much as we would wish.H?
Although a more flexible policy in general was evident in Aden when
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'All Nasir became President in April 1980, with the advent of the 
Reagan administration, the prospects for improved relations with the 
PDRY receded further. The US view in 1981 was that there was no 
signal from the PDRY of interest in relations with the USA, and that
a US response would be conditional 'on a more moderate approach on the
118 South Yemeni side 1 . Issues such as the maintenance of 'terrorist
camps' and continued publicity for the PFLO were, according to the 
official, obstacles to improved relations. Other factors were the 
Soviet Union's 'unrestricted access to whatever facilities exist in
South Yemen 1 , and 'worrisome border activities' on the frontier with
119 the YAR. A leading State Department Arabian Peninsula expert
interviewed in 1982 repeated these views, arguing that the USA had no 
interest in resuming relations with the PDRY. 'To resume relations 
just to disagree on everything does not seem to be a very profitable 
course just now,' he stated. He added that the Saudi Arabians were
'not urging us' to resume, a factor which he said was 'a consideration'
120 in the formulation of US policy. In the US media and Congress more
generally, generic hostility to the PDRY continued. One influential 
columnist, Joseph Kraft, argued that the USA should pursue a 'spoiler
strategy' of putting economic pressure on Soviet allies in the third
121 
world, giving as an example South Yemen. Another conservative
strategist talked of the need for the USA to confront what he termed
122 'the Cuba-Yemen-Oman' connection with a show of force. In the
initial days of the Reagan administration, White House officials even 
talked of making a Soviet withdrawal of military forces from South
Yemen a test of Soviet good intentions and interest in improved rela-
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tions. Yet, despite this hostile climate, the Reagan administra­ 
tion did make some slight accommodation, when in March 1982 it eased 
restrictions on the export of civilian aircraft to South Yemen and
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Syria, provided these states committed themselves not to use them for 
military purposes. The fact remained, however, that over a decade 
after the 1969 rupture, the PDRY still had no relations with the USA, 
while all the other Arab states who had broken in 1967 had to some 
degree restored them. The PDRY, along with Iran, Albania, Vietnam, 
Cambodia and North Korea, was one of the only six states in the world 
which neither had a US embassy nor a US diplomatic mission operating 
in some other guise.
From the PDRY side, the late 1970s and early 1980s had also seen 
new problems arising, albeit quite different from those experienced 
by the USA. The US intervention in the 1979 inter-Yemeni war was not 
a serious consideration, since the US arms programme went so wrong, 
and the two Yemeni states proceeded to conduct their relations bi­ 
laterally via the series of unity talks. What worried Aden far more 
than the emergency supplies to the YAR was the increased US presence 
in another neighbouring state, Oman. After acquiring the right to 
land at Masira island in 1977, the USA gradually increased its mili­ 
tary presence in Oman, especially after the establishment of the Rapid
125 
Deployment Force in 1980. Facilities at Masira and Muscat were
used by the USA, but so too were the desert airstrip at Thamrit, in 
Dhofar, fifty miles from the PDRY frontier, and the Dhofari port of 
Raysut. US equipment was positioned there, and on several occasions
from 1981 onwards US troops participated in manoeuvres in Oman which
176 
were criticised by the PDRY. At the same time, official publicity
in the USA reported desert war games in which attacks on states
127 
similar to the PDRY were simulated. To counter these developments,
the PDRY conducted a widespread diplomatic campaign. It signed the 
agreement with Oman in October 1982, in the hope that this might lessen 
the room for conflicts in which the USA could intervene, and, in the
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following December, there were demonstrations and official statements 
denouncing the US manoeuvres in Oman and Somalia. Domestic anxiety 
about the USA was heightened by a publicised court case in 1982, in 
which thirteen people were convicted of trying to blow up oil storage
installations in Aden after receiving training from the CIA in Saudi
129 Arabia; of these ten were subsequently executed. To this was added
PDRY criticism of the US role in the Arab-Israeli dispute, during and 
after the June 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.
Both states therefore regarded the other as a threat to its 
security interests. US officials, from former Secretaries of State 
Kissinger and Haig onwards, presented the PDRY as a threat to Saudi 
Arabia, and to both Oman and the YAR. US officials also stressed the 
role of the USSR in the PDRY, and there was in 1978 and 1979 consider­ 
able speculation about whether Cuban forces based in South Yemen would 
participate in conflicts in the Arabian Peninsula, perhaps repeating 
their roles in Angola and Ethiopia. Both the Carter and Reagan 
administrations emphasised the need to show commitment to the USA's 
major allies in the region, and this necessitated confrontation with 
the PDRY. Both administrations also derived domestic benefit by con­ 
ducting the campaign against 'terrorism 1 in which the PDRY was one, 
if not the most important, object of criticism. Washington therefore 
had no motive to re-establish relations with the PDRY, a state 
regarded as both too resolutely hostile and too insignificant to 
merit US approaches.
On its side, the PDRY felt that the USA was also a threat, its 
menaces ranging from support for the exiles operating in Saudi Arabia 
in the 1960s and early 1970s through to the arming of Oman and Saudi 
Arabia in the late 1970s and early 1980s and military manoeuvres in 
the region. Aden clearly gave priority to maintaining its militant
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stand on regional issues, and to emphasising the US threat to its own 
population. Moreover, while it gave indications, as in discussions 
with Congressman Findley, that it wanted to have diplomatic relations 
with the USA, it is questionable how far this desire ever went, from 
1974 onwards. The official PDRY position was that the resumption of 
diplomatic relations was conditional on a change in US policy, but as 
one issue receded, namely arming the exiles, others came to the fore, 
and in particular the US role in Oman. In private PDRY officials 
were sceptical of the benefits of having a US embassy in Aden, and in 
the 1970s the disunity within the PDRY leadership made it even less 
likely that any initiative would be taken.
The issue of diplomatic relations was therefore a function of a 
much wider conflict between these two states that reflected a set of 
tensions that pervaded the Middle East and the world.
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Chapter Three
The Pursuit of Yemeni 'Unity'
The Aspiration to 'Unity*
A commitment to unification of the two Yemeni states has been upheld 
by much of the nationalist movement in North and South Yemen since the 
1940s. Proposed as an article of central importance during the poli­ 
tical conflicts of the 1950s and 1960s, the call for unity then became 
an enduring component of the PDRY's foreign policy. It was affirmed 
in every congress of the Front and of the Party, in the speeches of 
political leaders, and in both South Yemeni constitutions. It was, 
at the same time, an ideal which appeared to find widespread support 
within the population of South Yemen, as well as from both government 
and population in the North. The 1965 Charter, the basic document of 
the NLF prior to independence, begins by evoking the greatness of the 
ancient pre-Islamic Yemeni civilisations, and the 'natural and integ­ 
ral unity 1 (wahda tabi'iyya rautakamila) of North and South Yemen,
•
which binds the people of these two areas together. As a result,
there is 'unity of the land, unity of language, unity of the daily
efforts of life, unity of interests, and unity of destiny* (wahda al-
•
ard wa wahda al-lugha wa wahda al-mu'anah al-yawmiyya lil-hayya wa 
. . ^~ • •
wahda al-maslaha wa wahda al-masir). The Charter argues that this 
. . . • •
unity was expressed in political form both in the states of the pre- 
Islamic epoch and, during the Islamic period, by the establishment of 
a succession of states on Yemeni territory. In analysing the con­ 
temporary situation, the Charter stressed the contribution which the 
1962 revolution in North Yemen had made to the revolution in the South, 
although it saw political unity in overall Arab, more than specific­ 
ally Yemeni terms. The Resolutions of the 1968 Fourth Congress of the
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NF spelt out the link that ties the revolutions of North and South:
Although we have carried out the expulsion of the colonialist and 
have eliminated the semi-feudal rule of the Sultans in our repub­ 
lic, we should remember that our national freedom will not be 
entirely complete without the victory of our revolution in the 
North and without the realisation of unity of the Yemeni region.
(bilraghm min inna hakakna tard al-musta«mar, wa al-kadha* 'ala
*» * • • • *"™"
al-nizam al-salatini jshibh al-ikta«i fi djumhuriyyatina, ila
• * -iri-u._ ^ ^
innahu yudj[ib ila yughrib 'an balana dnna taharrurna al-watani
* •
lan yutahakak bi-shiklihi al-salim ila bi-intisar thawratna fi
. 1— • ~~ 
al-shimal wa tahkik wahda al-iklim al-yaraani)
* • • • •
The 1970 Constitution stressed that the 'Yemeni people has struggled 
heroically against imperialism and colonialism, and against the reac­ 
tion of local feudalism represented by the Imamic and Sultanic regimes' 
and continued:
Despite the exceptional and unnatural conditions which appeared to 
divide the Yemeni region into two parts, this division was not able 
to stop the unity of joint national struggle in both North and 
South of our Yemeni region.
Thus the Yemeni masses in the South struggled with the Yemeni 
masses in the North shoulder to shoulder in order to bring down the 
Imam's regime and establish the Republican regime.
And similarly the Yemeni masses in the North struggled with the 
Yemeni masses in the South shoulder to shoulder in engaging in 
armed struggle against the British colonialist presence.
This struggle resulted in the revolution of 26 September 1962 
which brought down the reactionary Iraamic regime in the Yemeni 
North and united all national and democratic forces which estab­ 
lished the Republican regime.
The success of the long struggle which our Yemeni people under­ 
took against the colonialist presence was crowned with the detona­ 
tion of the armed struggle against the British occupation and the 
Sultanic regime which began on 14 October 1963 and united all sec­ 
tions of the working people - workers, peasants, intellectuals, 
petty bourgeois and all sections of the noble people - under the 
leadership of the National Front. 3
The 1970 Constitution went on to assert that conditions were now
improving for the complete 'liquidation* of the division into two
4 
Yemens, and the return to the natural unity of the region.
The Fifth Congress of the NF, in 1972, took policy towards the 
North a step further. The 1968 Congress had taken place at a time of 
continued hope of finding a common front with the YAR authorities, and
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of assisting them to defend themselves against the royalists. In 
1970 the YAR government had reached a compromise with the royalists 
and Saudi Arabia and, since 1971, there had been guerrilla war in the 
North by radical republicans supported by the South. Thus, whereas 
the 1968 Congress resolutions had called for the establishment of 
links with the republican forces in the North, as a co-operative step 
towards achieving the unity of the Yemens, the resolutions of the 
1972 Congress proposed the goal of a 'United Democratic Yemen 1 . This 
shift in PONF policy reflected the change of South Yemen's name insti­ 
tuted by the 1970 Constitution: this had signalled an end to the 
limited restrictions of aim of the Aden government which now claimed 
to present not just South Yemen - the state's title from 1967 to 1970 
was People's Republic of South Yemen - but rather the first part of 
a government that would in time encompass the whole of Yemen in one 
united democratic Yemen - the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.
The 1972 Congress left open how this United Yemen was to be 
achieved: it did not specify if this was to be through state-to-state 
or through revolutionary activity. As always, the specific organisa­ 
tions to which the PONF was to extend support in the YAR were not 
named, whereas they were for some other areas towards which the Front 
expressed a commitment, such as Oman. Nonetheless the 1970 Constitu­ 
tion and the 1972 Congress resolutions were clear in so far as they 
indicated a shift away from unity through dealing with the YAR govern­ 
ment and towards unity through alliance with opposition forces in the
North.
The resolutions of the 1975 Unification Congress were even less 
explicit. No mention was made of the aim of a United Democratic Yemen, 
or of the instruments for achieving this goal. The Unification Con­ 
gress's statement simply read:
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As regards issues pertaining to the unity of the Yemeni people 
and ensuring achievement thereof on a democratic basis, and with 
a content ensuring the progress and prosperity of the Yemeni 
people, the UPONF will continue to exert diligent and relentless 
effort for achieving the noblest aims of our Yemeni people. It 
also expresses with satisfaction its conviction in the correctness 
of the policy pursued as regards the cause of Yemeni unity. It 
considers continuation on the same path as being harmonious with 
the aspirations of the Yemeni people who are the ones primarily 
affected by such unity.7
(wa Uidj_ah al-masa'il al-murtabata bi-wahda al-sha'ab al-yamani— — — _ * * """""wa diman tahkikiha *ala asas dimukratiyya wa bi-muhtawa vudmin li- •__ ... _ . . J . J .
dj_amahir al-£ha«ab al-yamani al-takaddum wa al-izdihar, sayuwasil
• •» •• *al-tandMm al-siasi al-mawhid - al djabha al-kawmiyya-badhal al-— "™"~ % 9 ——
djuhud al-mu_thabira wa al-da'uba min adj_li tahkik anbal ahdaf
«« • _ * * "siha'abna al-yamani ka yu'bir biradi 'an kana'atihi bisuwab al-_ • .
siasa allati intaba'at tud^aha kadiyyat al-wahda al-yamaniyya.
• • •
wa yura dnna al-istimrar fi nafs al-tarik yunsudlum ma'a tumuhat. . •
al-j>ha'ab al-yamani sahib al-maslahat al-'ula fi hidh_a al-wahda)
• • ~~"r"LI v
The 1978 YSP Congress reaffirmed these basic guidelines: the linkage 
between the two revolutions, the aim of a United Democratic Yemen, and
the leading role which the YSP itself would play in the movement
gtowards this goal. This orientation was also restated in the pre­ 
amble to the new, second, Constitution of 1978. This reasserted that 
there was a link between the 26 September and 14 October revolutions 
and then went on:
All this affirms that despite the unnatural situations of the false 
division of the Yemeni land and people, its struggle in the two 
parts is dialectically related in its unity, not only against 
imperialist and reactionary conspiracies against the Yemeni home­ 
land, but also for the purpose of finally liquidating the division 
and restoring the natural situation for the democratic unity of 
"Yemen....
The struggle of the Yemeni people will continue until the reali­ 
sation of all the tasks of the national democratic revolutionary 
stage, the strategy of the Yemeni revolution, including the con­ 
struction of the United Democratic Yemen under the leadership of 
our Yemeni Socialist Party - the party of the Yemeni working class, 
its allies and the rest of the groups of the democratic and 
national movement - in our Yemeni homeland.
The 1980 YSP Congress approached the matter rather differently. 
The long-term goal was now said to be a 'free, democratic, united and
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happy homeland' (watan hurr dimukrati mawhid wa sa«id). This was an
• • . .
apparent dilution of the earlier call for a United Democratic Yemen, 
and the Congress declarations stressed that the means through which 
this could be reached was through official, inter-governmental, con­ 
tacts, rather than the increased strength of the YSP or revolution. 
Less stress was laid on the achievement of revolutionary goals inside 
the PDRY, and more on the defence of national sovereignty, the raising 
of living standards, and the guaranteeing of political liberties.
Apart from such proclamations, the reality of relations between 
North and South Yemen was, despite the adherence to the goal of unity, 
far from harmonious; 'unity 1 , in the sense of a fusion of the two 
states, remained a distant aim throughout the post-independence period. 
While on two occasions, in 1972 and 1979, agreements on implementing 
unity were signed by the Presidents of the two states, progress on 
putting such agreements into practice was both slow and limited. More­ 
over, the periods of negotiation and collaboration between the YAR and 
the PDRY were offset by phases of overt conflict between the two 
governments, who waged war against each other in 1972 and 1979. Beyond 
the course of diplomacy as such there have lain deeper domains of 
divergence: in foreign policy, in structure of government and society, 
and in internal socio-economic organisation. The history of relations 
between the two Yemens after 1967 was, therefore, one of both antagon­ 
ism and co-operation, as the forces making for unity and co-operation 
were offset by those stimulating division and antagonism.
These divisions had their origins in the history of the Yemens and, 
more recently, of Yemeni nationalism itself. The idea of Yemen as a 
distinct entity is not recent or simply factitious. Settled civilisa­ 
tions had existed in the South Arabian region for some millennia, and 
the term 'Yaraan* had been used to denote this region since, at the
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latest, the time of early Islam. 11 But this generic 'Yaman' had long 
contained many sub-divisions - religious, economic and political. No 
Yemeni 'nation-state 1 existed, only dynastic realms of greater or 
lesser extent. In the twentieth century, with two states in existence, 
an independent Imamate in the north and a British-ruled entity in the 
south, the fluidity of real divisions was evident in the political 
terms used for the area, which had been remarkably permanent. It was 
only in the 1940s that a nationalist movement active in both states 
had come into existence, and only in the 1960s that the term 'Yemeni 
South' (Djjnub al-Yaman) came into common political parlance. Even 
when such a Yemeni nationalism did emerge, however, it was associated 
with very different processes in the two Yemeni states: a republican 
anti-autocratic revolution in the North, followed by a civil war, and 
an anti-colonial upheaval in the South. If the South had to some 
extent an experience analogous to that of other third world countries 
ruled by colonialism, the North underwent something more comparable 
to the anti-absolutist upheavals of Europe, in which nationalism
postulated an egalitarian unity of all members of the nation, advo-
13 
cated against the hierarchies and divisions of the old order.
While the tensions within Yemeni nationalism in part derived from 
the histories of the two Yemeni states, Yemeni nationalism itself was 
characterised by three major distinctive features. The first of these 
was the dual affiliation of this nationalism - to both Arab and Yemeni 
entities. The second was its social radicalism, and the third the 
emphasis on 'unity*. The dual affiliation can be found in other Arab 
countries - Egypt, for example - and it has also been evident in the 
modern history of the Yemens, where writers and politicians have at 
times emphasised their inclusion in the Arab world, and at other times 
stressed their distinction as Yemenis from other Arab countries.
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The ambiguities raised by this dual affiliation, and & gradual 
shift in the way the duality was handled, were evident not just in 
NF policies, but also in the terminology used to identify South 
Yemen's place in the wider world. The 1965 Charter lays stress upon 
the Arab more than upon the Yemeni context of the NLF's activity. It 
does talk of the geographical unity of North and South, of the revolu­ 
tions in North and South, and of the role of 26 September in stimulat­ 
ing resistance in the South; but it lays greater emphasis upon the 
role of the Egyptian revolution of 23 July 1952 in initiating a new 
phase of the Arab national movement. It refers to 'our Arab people 
in North and South Yemen 1 and when it talks of unity it uses the term 
'Arab unity', and places unification of the Yemeni region within that 
context, presenting 'the unity of our Arab people in North and South 
of the Yemen region as a step towards liberated Arab Unity' (wahda
•
jjha'abna al 'arabi fi iklira al-yaman jshimalihi wa djunubihi siranW^BK. ^
nahu wahda 'arabiyya mutaharrara). It not only talks of the Arab• • •
homeland (watan) but also of an Arab people (sha'ab), and it argues
•
that the 14 October revolution in the South 'is part of the Arab revo­ 
lution in the west and east of the homeland' (djhazu* min al-thawra 
al-'arabiyya fi ma_shrik al-watan wa maghribihi). Where the Charter 
does qualify the term 'unity* this is not by introducing a regional 
or geographic restriction, but a political one, unity being qualified 
as 'socialist 1 and 'revolutionary'.
Discussion of unity in texts of the post-1967 period involves a 
geographical contraction of the terms used, away from the Arab and 
towards the more restricted Yemeni dimension. In thse post-1967 texts 
the term 'people' now refers not to the Arabs as a whole, but to the 
Yemenis, and it is their unity which is called for. The overall 
semantic development of relevant political terms in party and state
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documents after 1967 tends towards such a contraction. Yet the modi­ 
fication of the Arab dimension is not absolute, in that the commitment 
to an Arab identity and politics remains; and if some limitation of 
scope is implied in the shift from the Arab to the Yemeni, a compensat­ 
ing expansion of reference is evident in the transference of loyalty 
from the Egyptian revolution of 1952 to another extra-Yemeni event, 
the Russian revolution of 1917. The 1965 Charter did make some 
mention of the Bolshevik revolution, in acknowledging the importance
of 'the victories of socialist revolution in the world 1 (intisarat al-
•
- - - ig 
_thawra al-ishtirakiyya fi al-'alim): but these were not given the
pride of place later allocated to them in NF statements; in these the 
dual affiliation of 1965 to the Arab world/Yemen is gradually dis­ 
placed by a new couplet, socialist camp/Yemen.
This semantic change can be followed, in some detail, in the offi­ 
cial documents of state and party over the post-independence period. 
In the 1970 PDRY Constitution Article Two states: 'The Yemeni people 
is one people and is part of the Arab nation with one Yemeni citizen-
ummaship 1 (al-sha'ab al-yamani _sha'ab wahid wa huwa ^juz' min al-*
19al-'arabiyya wa al-dj_insiyya al-yamaniyya wahida). The terms used
here and in the Preface refer to the Yemen as a whole district (iklim),
•
a term also used in the Charter, and subdivided into two halves 
(shatrayn). The Yemenis themselves are now stated to be a people
""•--' «
(sha'ab), while the Arabs, the 'people* to whom the Yemenis belonged- 
in earlier documents are now described by the broader term umma; 
umma means 'community' and has a connotation of the Islamic community 
as well as of the wider Arab one. Despite this membership of a wider 
community, the Yemenis have a specific dii^siyya, a word that means 
both citizenship and nationality. The Constitution of the YAR adopted 
in the same year also asserts the commitment to Yemeni unity. Article
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Six states: 'Yemeni unity is a legitimate right of all sons of 
natural Yemen, and it is their shared duty to attain it by legitimate 
means' (al-wahda al-yamaniyya hakk mash.ruh li-kul 'ibna al-yaman al-
~ 01
tabi'iyya wa 'alayhum dj_aml' an tahkikha bil-wasa'il al-mashru'a).
* • » * """"""
But the affiliation is stated differently. Thus Article One states: 
'Yemen is an Arab and Islamic state' and 'the Yemeni people is an Arab 
and Moslem people and part of the Arab and Moslem communities' (al- 
yaman dawla 'arabiyya islamiyya dhat siada tama...wa al-_sha'ab al-
yamani _sha'ab 'arabi muslim, wa huwa dj_uz' min al umma al-'arabiyya
- 22 wa al-islamiyya), where the term used is sha'ab. The Constitution
does not assert membership of an Arab nation, but does claim an Arab 
and Islamic identity, of Arabic language and Islamic religion.
The revised 1978 Constitution of the PDRY introduces further new
terminology. The two Yemeni states are now stated to be each a shatr
24 of a single Yemeni watan. Watan is the conventional term for 'home-V ~""~ •
land* in modern Arabic and is used of the Arab world in the 1965 
Charter: its application to Yemen in 1978 is thus a stronger assertion 
of Yemeni affiliation than that contained in the 1970 Constitution. 
While the 1978 Constitution reaffirms that the Yemeni sha'ab is part 
of the Arab umma, it does not provide a term for what the territorial 
entity in which the Arabs live is to be called. The conventional term 
watan, used in the Charter and in much Arab nationalist discourse, is
M
no longer available. Thus, while in the 1970 PDRY Constitution the 
word watan is avoided altogether, the contrast merely being between
•^~^™~"—"*"•
two categories for the population - Yemeni sha'ab, Arab umma - the 
1978 Constitution now attributes the term watan to the two Yemens,
•
and the less powerful word iklim is dispensed with. The semantic
*
shift in the two Constitutions was such that in the 1970 Constitution 
the term sha'ab was transferred from the Arabs to the Yemenis., and in
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that of 1978 the term watan was similarly reallocated, just as the
•
two documents laid greater overall stress on Yemeni unity as opposed 
to its Arab counterpart, by contrast with the 1965 Charter.
Similar semantic changes can be seen in the documents of the South 
Yemeni party, but here the process is less clear-cut. Thus, if the 
1970 state Constitution talks of an Arab umma, the 1972 PONF Congress 
still talks of an Arab sha'ab. In party documents the term 'national* 
when applied to 'liberation' is used both about Yemeni and about more 
general Arab activities: the implication is that the watan in which
•
this liberation is being aspired to is both the Yemen itself and the
25 whole Arab world. In the same way, the different states of the Arab
world are referred to each as a kutr - a zone, section, or region -
K^^KH^
of a wider entity. This is the term commonly used in Arab national­ 
ist discourse, by, for example, Ba'thists, when the intention is to 
stress that each specific state is but part of the wider Arab world. 
But two quite specific terms often used in Arab nationalist writing 
are applied to South Yemen, or at most the two Yemens, and not to the 
Arab world as a whole: these are bilad or homeland, the normal patri­ 
otic term for a particular state, and kawm/kawmi, nation/national.^™"~~~"" •«"••"™»^~
Whereas watan refers to a territory, kawm refers to the people. So. •
in the South Yemeni party usage the words watan and kawm have distinct 
connotations: the former is applied to both Yemeni and Arab areas, the 
latter only to the population of the Yemens.
The second specific feature of Yemeni nationalism has been that it 
has contained a strong element of social radicalism. In the North, 
this resulted from the origins of the movement in the resistance to
the Imam, and the accession of this opposition to power in the Septem-
28 ber 1962 revolution. The civil war was fought by the republicans
to defend a state that proclaimed a new national and popular identity,
and rejected the forces that sought to restore the monarchy. The 
fact that the latter were supported by Saudi Arabia, a kingdom, while 
the former were backed by Egypt, a republic, not only international­ 
ised the war but also led each side to see its own social and politi­ 
cal cause as a nationalist one as well, i.e. as directed against the
29 external supporter of its internal enemy. It was for this reason
that in 1963 YAR President Sallal opened an office of the Arabian 
Peninsula to promote revolution in Saudi Arabia itself. After the 
end of the civil war in 1970, the lines of division in the North ran 
not so much between republicans and royalists but between more and 
less radical factions of the republican camp, and this was the context 
in which the combination of nationalist with internal political con­ 
flict continued. Once the Egyptians had departed from the YAR in late 
1967, the more moderate republican faction sought a compromise with 
both the royalists and Saudi Arabia, whereas the radicals remained 
partisans of greater militancy on both counts.
In the South, the development of a nationalism of a more conven­ 
tional third world mode, one of hostility to colonial rule, did not 
preclude it from also having a socially radical side. For the very 
pattern of British colonial control, one that maintained the existing 
rulers in place in the hinterland under indirect rule and sought the 
co-operation of the merchants of Aden, encouraged the nationalist 
movement to regard these local Arab allies of the colonial power as 
both social and national enemies. The character of British colonial 
rule in the South, coupled with the identification of Yemeni national­ 
ism with the cause of the republican revolutionaries in the North, 
thereby produced an interrelationship of social radicalism and 
national assertion in South Yemen that was to endure beyond the 
weakening of the radical forces in the North.
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Time and again, official statements of the NF and by its leaders 
qualified the unity they were seeking as 'progressive', 'popular* or 
'revolutionary 1 . Thus during the first major conflict between North 
and South after independence, in February 1969, an official statement 
gave Aden's view of Yemeni unity: 'Yemeni unity...is a unity of the 
toiling people, and must be made by them....This unity must be pro­ 
gressive and must not be racial or regional in character, and must be
31 
hostile to colonialism and reaction.' Speaking a few days later,
Kahtan al-Sha'abi listed what he saw as the basic points underlying. • • *"~—
unity:
(1) 'The unity between North and South must have social progress as 
its aim.'
(2) To 'eradicate colonialism and foreign occupation from our 
countries.'
(3) To 'work in co-ordination for the removal of the colonialist 
wherever he may be.'
(4) To 'strike openly at imperialism in the Arab nation.'
(5) To 'eradicate feudalism, and achieve a socialist society....The
agrarian reforms carried out in the South must also be carried
32 
out in the North.'
The third distinctive feature of Yemeni nationalism was the fact 
that it posed the question of 'unity', of calling for and seeking to 
establish a unification of two separate states. Many modern states 
have acquired independence on territory less than they claim as 
rightly theirs or in other ways, e.g. as a result of war, have found 
themselves in possession of less territory than they feel is legiti­ 
mately theirs. This involves the problem of irredentism. An irreden­ 
tist element does exist in Yemeni nationalism as advocated by the 
South, with regard to the three provinces taken by Saudi Arabia in
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1934. The land boundaries of South Yemen with Saudi Arabia and
Oman also remain contentious apart from the Kuria Muria Islands. 34 
But the focus of Yemeni nationalism has been not on these irredenta, 
so much as on the need to unify two separate and independent Yemeni 
states. Here there are far fewer examples of similar cases: the 
postwar divisions of the two Koreas, and the two Germanys, and, bet­ 
ween 1954 and 1975, the two Vietnams, may provide the nearest recent 
analogues. The issues of Italian and German 'unity' in the nineteenth 
century may also be relevant. In all these cases reunification formed 
a widely upheld if for a long time at least unattainable national goal, 
sustained by forces that were otherwise in disagreement. But in the 
recent cases the original division and its subsequent maintenance were 
twentieth-century creations, the result above all of the impact on 
these countries of the east-west conflict that evolved after 1945. 
In the Yemeni case, the division predated the colonial occupations of 
the nineteenth century: the Imams had not ruled a united North and 
South since the early eighteenth century. The consolidation of the 
division between the two states in the late nineteenth century was a
later development, the result of strategic rivalry between Britain
35 and the Ottoman empire that developed in western Arabia. The post-
1967 division then compounded this by introducing different social and 
political systems, and foreign policy orientations and influences on 
either side of the intra-Yemeni frontier.
As already noted, the history of attempts to produce Yemeni 'unity* 
and the survival of disunity can be attributed to the multiple deter­ 
minations of the division. The result has been that the two Yemens 
have experienced different social evolutions in the past two decades, 
a difference further compounded by the influences of Arab politics 
upon them. These factors - international, regional and internal -
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have reinforced the division of the two states and have made it all 
the more difficult to achieve substantial and lasting progress towards 
'unity 1 . Yet, for all the historical implantation of the division, 
and the divergent characters of the two states, 'unity 1 remained a 
professed goal of both states, with many practical implications. 
Phases of the Relations with the YAR
The pursuit by the South Yemeni state of the policy of unity with 
North Yemen can be analysed as falling into five distinct periods or 
phases in the years 1967-1982. The first phase, beginning in 1967, 
was one of initial enthusiasm for closer co-operation on both sides; 
it ended in 1970 with a confirmation of difference, in the compromise 
peace in the YAR and the proclamation of a 'Democratic Republic 1 in 
the new constitution of the South. The second phase, 1970-1972, was 
one of increasing tension between the two states, leading to the first 
inter-Yemeni war, of September-October 1972, and the subsequent Cairo 
and Tripoli agreements on unity. In the third phase, 1972-1977, 
negotiations between the two states on the subject of unity continued. 
Yet little substantial progress was made, and this phase ended abrupt­ 
ly - with the assassination of YAR President al-Hamdi in October 1977 
and the rapid deterioration of the overall situation in the Southern 
Arabian Peninsula and Red Sea areas at that time. In phase four, 
lasting from 1977 to 1979, there was increased tension between the 
two states, together with worsening relations between Aden and Saudi 
Arabia: this period culminated in the second inter-Yemeni war, that 
of February 1979, and the subsequent signature of the Kuwait agreement 
on unity in March 1979. In phase five, 1979-1982, there was, initi­ 
ally, PDRY support for guerrilla forces operating inside the YAR. But 
these were defeated in 1982, and state-to-state negotiations became 
more important. In December 1981 the two Presidents went a step
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beyond the 1979 Kuwait agreement and signed a new 'Agreement on 
Developing Co-operation and Co-ordination between the two parts of 
Yemen'. The ending of guerrilla activities inside the YAR in 1982 
was accompanied by the establishment of a Supreme Yemeni Council, 
comprised of representatives of the two states (which was to meet for 
the first time in August 1983) and by the proclamation of a draft 
constitution of a united state. 
Phase 1; 1967-1970
When the PRSY became independent, both it and the YAR took a number 
of measures to reflect their commitment to unity. Each set up Minis­ 
tries of Yemeni Unity Affairs (that of the YAR replacing the Ministry 
of Occupied South Yemeni Affairs) and on 7 December 1967 Aden lifted 
pre-existing restrictions on entry of YAR citizens to the PRSY: entry 
was now permitted to all holding a YAR identity card. Initially 
both sides declared themselves in favour of Yemeni unity, and in the 
weeks immediately after independence volunteers from the PRSY went 
north to support the republicans resisting a royalist attempt to 
capture Sana<a. In February 1968 YAR and PRSY forces co-operated in 
operations against royalist troops. President Kahtan al-Sha'abi• * • •—•—
justified this saying: 'North and South are to us one region. Whoevei
interferes in the North is interfering here in the People's Republic
37 of South Yemen. Whoever attacks Sana'a is attacking Aden.' But
new divergences were appearing. The moment of independence of South- 
Yemen had coincided with changes in the YAR: for the British with­ 
drawal from the South on 30 November coincided to the month with the 
Egyptian withdrawal from the North, and a coup on 5 November. The 
former brought the NLF to power in Aden, the latter brought a new 
government under representatives of 'the third force', a grouping 
that lay between republicans and royalists and wanted to encourage a
146
38 
compromise peace. The ending of the Sana'a siege, in February
1968, opened the door for conflicts later in the year within the 
republican camp. As a result, those forces opposed to a compromise 
peace with the royalists and more sympathetic to the PRSY went into 
opposition: these included the militia who had defended Sana «a, known 
as the Popular Revolutionary Forces, and the North Yemeni followers 
of the MAN who in June 1968 formed al-Hizb al-Thawri al-Dimukrati -
* —— r
39 the Revolutionary Democratic Party.
Tensions in the YAR resulted in two intra-republican clashes, one 
in August and the second in December 1968. The result of these was 
that the PRF, the Revolutionary Democratic Party and peasant leagues 
affiliated to them were defeated, and the government in the YAR, under 
General Al-'Amri as prime minister, began to seek a rapprochement with 
Saudi Arabia and with the royalists. This came in March 1970 when 
Premier Muhsin al 'Ayni led a YAR delegation to the Islamic Conference
•
at Jeddah, and there signed, on 28 March 1970, an agreement with Saudi 
Arabia to end the war. A coalition government was created and in July
1970 diplomatic relations between the YAR and Saudi Arabia were
40 re-established.
This settlement of the war in the YAR caused differences between 
the two Yemeni states, particularly as it coincided with the radical- 
isation of the regime in the South itself after June 1969. In 1968 
relations between the two states had initially been cordial: in addi­ 
tion to co-operation on security, the Aden Nationality Law allowed 
citizens of the YAR to acquire PRSY citizenship more speedily than 
other Arabs.^ In May 1968 Kahtan al-Sha'abi reaffirmed the PRSY's
• • •
commitment to 'mass unity between the revolutionaries' of the two 
Yemens. In June 1968 the YAR premier announced that the two states 
would set up a Joint Council of Ministers and the PRSY President made
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a strong statement in support of unity. In July the PRSY Foreign 
Minister visited Sana'a for the first official visit of a PRSY rep­ 
resentative and both sides at that time proclaimed their support for 
the goal of unity. Speaking at the end of July YAR President al- 
Iryani declared:
There can be no doubt that unity of the two parts of our cherished 
Yemen - North and South - is a popular demand in both areas. All 
citizens, here and there, are equally and enthusiastically pressing 
for unity. We consider that unity between the citizens of North 
and South actually exists: there are neither barriers nor limits 
to exercising it. The feeling exists that our soil is one. We 
have the same history, language, religion, traditions, customs and 
blood. We share common principles and a common destiny. The revo­ 
lutions of North and South are being exposed to aggression perpet­ 
rated by the same enemy, and they are facing the same imperialist 
and reactionary forces. All this is our road to unity. All these 
ties - rarely present among peoples ruled by the same State under 
the same flag - make it incumbent on all of us to advance at a 
rapid, yet prudent and measured pace towards formal unity.^
But the clashes in the North during the following month marked a set­ 
back for Aden's YAR allies, and the flow of refugees from the PRSY to 
the YAR created a strong opposition constituency there. In November, 
the YAR and the PRSY signed an agreement on economic co-operation in 
the fields of finance, banking, commerce, customs, and anti-smuggling 
operations, and a Joint Economic Department of the two states was set 
up. But it seems that no practical results followed from this and 'the 
death of the pro-Aden opposition leader 'Abd al-Rakib 'Abd al-Wahhab
• « •
in January 1969 led to two months of polemics between both states.
It was the YAR which first broke the skein of formal fraternity. 
In a statement in early February 1969, the YAR Foreign Minister blamed 
the PRSY for the failure to bring about unity, and listed YAR pro­ 
posals for implementing this: a joint delegation at the UN, and the 
convening of a national conference with representatives from North and 
South. He alleged that the PRSY government had been set up by the 
British, and that it was now pursuing a path of 'rigidity, escapism
148 
and absolute rejection 1 . He also accused the Southern authorities
of carrying out border attacks on the YAR, in which a number of people
45
were killed. Later statements accused the Aden government of send­ 
ing arms, 'plotters' and 'assassins' to the towns of the YAR, an 
apparent reference to the Southern support for the radical republicans 
in the North. Southern replies argued that it was Aden which had
taken the initiative in working for unity, particularly on economic
47 
co-operation, but that the North had rejected this. The underlying
divergence of the two states was alluded to in one PRSY statement 
which stated: 'The regimes in Aden and Sana'a differ, for in Sana'a 
the regime is feudalist and clannish and in Aden there is a national 
progressive regime 1 . But it was interference in each other's 
affairs that constituted the main issue: Southern statements drew 
attention to what they saw as YAR support for opponents of the PRSY
government, while the YAR confirmed its backing for FLOSY, repeating
49 
the charge that the NLF had been put in power by Britain. Three
months later, in May 1969, Kahtan al-jSha'abi recognised the depth of. .. '
the difference between the two states, but expressed the hope that it 
would find a resolution: "The revolution in our Northern Yemen has 
been affected by a reversal that many of us did not expect. But this 
reversal..owill not remain for long, for the revolutionaries are still 
in good health.' Opposition forces in the North were, he said, 
'planning to restore the revolution and set up a national democratic
• <- , t 50 government in Sana'a .
Although relations later improved somewhat, the advent of the left 
to power in June 1969 entailed that the political differences between 
North and South were now, in reality, greater than ever before. Yet 
this underlying polarisation of the two regimes did not at first lead 
to a complete break in joint efforts towards unity. The dispute of
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early 1969 subsided and in March 1970 Ministers from both states 
visited the other to discuss bilateral co-operation. The Presidents 
of the two countries met at Nasser's funeral in September 1970 and in
November Muhammad «Ali Haythara, the PDRY Premier, visited Ta'iz for • • —•—
two days of discussions with the YAR Premier Muhsin al 'Ayni. On this
•
occasion Haytham declared:
• ^™«»
We are one people in one region and must work and struggle as a 
Yemeni people towards achieving the natural Yemeni unity. We have 
come here to lay a foundation, in fact to try and lay a foundation 
of co-operation between the two countries, as the first step 
towards the unity of the people of Yemen and the unity of their 
territories.51
And on his return the PRSY Premier declared: "The realisation of 
Yemeni unity is an historical responsibility borne by the political 
leaderships of both sides of the Yemen*. As a result of this meet­ 
ing new committees were set up to discuss a number of matters of joint 
economic interest: currency and customs standardisation, and indus­ 
trial co-ordination and banking co-operation. In his 1971 new year's
message to Haytham Muhsin al 'Ayni declared that 'unity between the« —"* •
two parts of Yemen would certainly be achieved shortly by means of
52 
development and progress'.
This apparent progress in inter-governmental co-operation was more 
than offset by a growing underlying divergence between the two Yemeni 
states, one evident in at least three respects. First, the political 
and social character of the two regimes, already distinct in November 
1967, had now been rendered even more so by the political changes that 
had subsequently taken place in each. The elimination from government 
of the radical republicans in the North, and the formation of the 
coalition of third force and royalists in 1970 contrasted with the 
eviction of the sultans and sheikhs in the South, the alienation of 
much of the urban commercial class, and the advent of the NF 'Left'
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to power in June 1969, Secondly, the two states had increasingly 
divergent foreign policies: this did not apply to Yemeni unity itself 
- both maintained formal adherence to this as a goal; nor did it apply 
to Arab affairs as a whole. Rather it concerned attitudes to the most 
important neighbour of each, namely Saudi Arabia. For the process of 
reconciliation of the Saudis with the YAR, which reached fruition in 
July 1970, contrasted with growing conflict between Aden and the 
Wahhabi kingdom: Saudi Arabia was from 1968 onwards backing opposition 
to Aden on the frontier, and in November 1969 there came the al-Wadiah 
border clash between the two states. The Yemens were also at logger­ 
heads via the conflict between political forces in the YAR. While 
the YAR sent a delegation to the March 1970 Islamic Conference, South 
Yemen was absent. PRSY Foreign Minister al-Bid gave his country's
•
reasons for this course of action as the fact that the Conference 
represented 'a new form of colonialism condemned and rejected by the
Arab people during the fifties and as a falsification of the real
53 differences of opinion'. In July 1970, when the YAR and Saudi Arabia
exchanged diplomatic recognition, <Ali Nasir Muhammad was reported to• •
have stated that 'the role of Saudi Arabia did not differ from the
54 role of Israel in fighting the liberation movements'. In November
1970, on the third anniversary of independence, President Salim 
Rubiyya' 'All denounced 'the reactionary Saudi regime and its mercen­ 
aries' for creating problems between the two Yemens.
These divergences found expression in a third dimension of disagree­ 
ment between the two states, namely in the constitutions which each 
drew up in 1970. The constitution of the PDRY was drawn up during 
1970 and announced in November on the occasion of the celebration of 
the third anniversary of independence. In its implications for North- 
South relations, this constitution marked an important change. The
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Aden government ceased to call its territory by the name 'South 
Yemen'. It changed this to 'People's Democratic Republic of Yemen'. 56 
The implication of this alteration, at least as it was read in Sana'a, 
was that Aden no longer presented itself as the capital of part of 
Yemen, but rather as the capital of the whole of Yemen, one part of 
which was already under 'popular democratic 1 control: unity would not 
now come about by a fusion of the two states, but by an extension of 
Aden's system of government to the whole of Yemeni territory. The 
YAR government criticised this change as 'a grave step* and recalled 
its representatives at the Aden independence celebrations.
Parallel problems arose when the YAR's constitution was finalised 
on 28 December 1970. This based the Constitution on Islam (Article 2) 
and envisaged the establishment of a Consultative Council of 159
members, to be chosen by indirect elections, with a further 20 members
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nominated by the President. Seats for 'southern delegates' had been
kept open in the National Assembly set up by Al-'Amri in the period 
1969-1970 and this practice continued in the new Consultative Council: 
thus not only the manner of selection of the members, but also the 
implicit claim that this Council represented the whole of the Yemens 
was seen in the South as a claim by the YAR that it, as much as the 
PDRY, claimed to speak for the whole country. This latent challenge 
of the YAR to the PDRY's legitimacy was to be taken a step further 
in August 1971 when Premier Al-'Amri constituted a government that
included within it representatives of the FLOSY leadership in exile
59 
from South Yemen.
The emphasis in this first phase of inter-Yemeni relations was, 
consequently, upon relations between governments: each government 
sought for some time to find common ground with the other. But this 
focus was not exclusive. The combination of domestic and inter-
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national events, and the reaction of each to, indeed the involvement 
of each in, the internal politics of the other led to deadlock on 
unity and rising antagonism. Virtually no step towards unity were 
reached and the constitutions of the two states shifted conflict to 
a terrain on which each state sought to achieve unity by claiming to 
supplant the other. By 1971 this political and constitutional claim 
was being put into effect by the enhanced encouragement that each 
began to give to rebel forces in the other's domain. 
Phase 2; 1970-1972
Although this second period of inter-Yemeni relations was one of grow­ 
ing conflict, it began with continued negotiations between the govern­ 
ments, and mutual expressions of goodwill. Thus at the first meeting 
of the new PDRY legislature, the Supreme People's Council, in August 
1971, President Salim Rubiyya* 'All sent a message to the YAR's Con­ 
sultative Council 'stressing the unity of the Yemeni region and the 
need to create a suitable atmosphere to achieve that unity and to 
ensure the continued operations of the economic committees formed 
earlier' (i.e. in November 1970). The emphasis of the unity policy 
in both parts of Yemen had, however, shifted: first, towards greater 
attempts by each side to undermine the other; secondly, towards direct 
confrontation between the armies of the two states.
The events of 1968-9 had weakened the organised groupings of the 
radical republicans in North Yemen, but there remained a considerable 
body of opinion hostile to the 1970 settlement. The RDP, established 
in 1968, remained in existence, and it received support from the NF 
in Aden. In January 1971 a second grouping, the Yemeni Revolution­ 
ary Resistance Organisation, began guerrilla operations around the
area of Damt, in the south of the YAR, and, in the subsequent months,
6 it continued military activities on a low level with Southern support.
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Throughout 1971 and 1972 armed groups backed by Aden maintained 
operations along the frontier between the two countries. For its 
part, the YAR began to provide facilities to a number of groupings of 
South Yemeni exiles who were forming, with Saudi and other Arab 
encouragement. Thus the border conflict that had been taking place 
between the South Yemenis and the Saudi Arabians from 1968 onwards 
had now spread, by 1971, to encompass the YAR-PDRY frontier.
Events took a more serious turn in 1972. New governments formed 
in both states omitted what had till then been the significant Minis­ 
try of Yemeni Unity Affairs and on 21 February 1972 an important YAR 
tribal leader, Sheikh 'All bin Nadji al-Kadr, was killed on the PDRY
•
side of the frontier together with two other tribal leaders and 65
64 other people. The YAR authorities, in a statement issued on 11
March, claimed he had been lured over to a banquet and then murdered; 
the PDRY insisted that he had been leading an attack upon its terri­ 
tory, with 2,000 men, as a part of a 'Saudi-US plan to attack the 
PDRY and occupy Bayhan'. This incident was followed by tensions 
along the frontier involving the armies of the two states. During 
the summer two further developments helped to maintain tensions: one 
was the supply to the YAR of substantial quantities of arms by two 
states concerned to counter the PDRY, namely Saudi Arabia and Libya; 
the other was the formation of a comprehensive exile grouping in the 
YAR involving all the main factions of the South Yemeni opposition,
£ Q
the United National Front of South Yemen. Throughout 1972 Radio 
Free Yemeni South broadcast reports of UNF actions inside South Yemen. 
In September, Libya announced that it was donating to the Front five 
million dinars promised earlier in the year as aid to the PDRY.
The stage was set for the full-scale war between the two countries 
that began on 25-26 September, when irregular forces in the YAR
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attacked the PRSY, and the guerrillas backed by Aden increased their 
activities inside the YAR. The inter-state war was limited in 
duration and geographical extent. Heavy fighting ended on 2 October, 
and after further mediation a lasting cease-fire was agreed to on 19 
October. The fighting itself was confined to the border region, 
with the YAR forces advancing on the PDRY town of Dhala, and the PDRY 
forces seizing the YAR town of Qataba and shelling a number of others. 
On 6 October the YAR also occupied the island of Kamaran in the Red
Sea, a former quarantine station occupied by Britain in 1918 and
74 handed to the PDRY in 1967. (The PDRY later waived its claim to
this island.) Fighting on both sides, however, exemplified the wider 
aspects of the conflict: irregulars supported the armies of the two 
states, and the YAR forces had received substantial logistical support 
from both Saudi Arabia and Libya, the two states opposed to the 
government in Aden, while the PDRY was armed by the USSR. At the same 
time, the response of several states in the Arab world to the outbreak 
of war in South Arabia was to attempt mediation, not only because the 
war posed a direct threat to their security or strategic interests, 
but also because of the opportunities which such mediation posed for 
these states to present themselves as upholders of Arab unity. The 
Arab League mediation team that arrived in Aden on 4 October and 
reached Sana'a on 8 October included representatives of Egypt, Libya, 
Algeria, Syria, and Kuwait.
Negotiations were held in Cairo from 21 to 28 October, and through 
these two agreements were reached. The first, which the premiers of 
the two states, al 'Ayni and <Ali Nasir Muhammad, signed, covered a
• •
cease-fire. It stipulated that all troop concentrations withdraw from 
the frontier, that the borders reopen, that both sides withdraw from 
the areas occupied since 26 September, that all refugees wishing to
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return be repatriated, that all sabotage operations be stopped and 
that all military training camps for refugees be closed. The second 
was an agreement on unity, an Agreement between the Governments of the 
Two Parts of Yemen. This envisaged a single Yemeni state, with one 
flag, one presidential body, and unified legislative, executive and 
judicial authorities. Joint technical committees were to be set up 
to unify institutions for the two states: they were to complete their 
work within a year. Later Presidents al-Iryani and Salim Rubiyya* 
'Ali met in Tripoli, the Libyan capital, and, in discussion with 
Colonel Kaddafi, they signed a more detailed agreement on unity. This
*
indicated that the future Yemeni Republic would have Sana«a as its 
capital, Islam as its religion of state and Arabic as its official 
language. It would 'aim at achieving socialism", create a 'national 
democratic* system of government and a unified political organisation, 
modelled on the party then ruling Libya, the Arab Socialist Union. 
The Tripoli Agreement also envisaged the establishment of eight joint 
technical committees, dealing with: the constitution, foreign affairs 
and diplomatic and consular representation, economics and finance, 
legislative and judicial affairs, educational, cultural and informa­ 
tion affairs, health affairs, military affairs, and administration
78 
and public utilities.
While the Agreement was greeted enthusiastically by Libya and some 
other Arab countries, and led to considerable diplomatic activity 
between the two states, it remained little more than an aspiration. 
No clear timetable for the implementation was established; despite 
the Tripoli Agreement's emphasis on the need to hasten implementation 
of the Cairo Unity Agreement, Cairo's stipulation that a constitution
be drawn up within a year was not repeated, the constitutional commit-
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tee merely being urged to report 'as soon as possible'. Secondly,
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while both governments appeared to endorse the Agreements, there were 
reservations on both sides, vis-a-vis each other and vis-a-vis the 
very unity process itself. The text of the Tripoli Agreement reflec­ 
ted the influence of Kadkafi and embodied a number of political posi-• — "J~
tions that seemed to be closer to the stance of the South than of the 
North: the call for socialism, the support for the 'people of the
Arabian Gulf, and the aim to establish a political organisation
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modelled on Libya reflected this. In general the content of the
Agreement, and the outcome of the war, represented a certain victory 
for the radical nationalist camp in the Arab world over the conserva­ 
tive positions of Saudi Arabia. But for this reason it could not 
command assent within the YAR as a whole, nor be accepted by Saudi 
Arabia with equanimity. The PDRY government was also not able to 
ensure the support it might have liked: some NF members in Aden 
doubted the wisdom of attempting to find a compromise with the YAR, 
and the USSR's press, in contrast to the enthusiasm expressed in 
Peking, met the news of the Tripoli Agreement with reserve, mentioning
the measures to stop the fighting, and efforts to 'normalise rela-
81
tions 1 , but not the agreement on unity. The three postwar agree­ 
ments of 1972, the two of Cairo and the Tripoli one, therefore 
followed a cease-fire between the states, and a declaration of some 
willingness to explore co-operation between the countries. But these 
declarations marked the limits to which the 'unity process' was able 
to go at that time, rather than the start of closer relations between 
the two Yemeni states. 
Phase 3; 1972-1977
In the immediate aftermath of the 1972 war the 'unity process' 
appeared to be achieving some specific results. The cease-fire itself 
did hold, and by the end of November 1972 air and road traffic between
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the two countries had been resumed. On 2 December the YAR govern­ 
ment banned the anti-NLF United National Front of South Yemen. 83 The 
committees, envisaged under the Agreement, began meeting in December 
1972 and continued to meet with frequency into the early part of 1973.84 
But other trends were now beginning to assert themselves. Opposition 
to the Tripoli Agreement emerged into the open first in the YAR: on 
28 December 1972 prime minister Muhsin al 'Ayni was forced to resign.
*
The reason he gave for resigning was the obstruction of the unity
85 
process by the Consultative Assembly. The prime minister who
replaced him, 'Abd Allah al-Hadjri, was known to be a more conserva­ 
tive leader, who was himself critical of the negotiations with the 
South. 86
The response of the PDRY was at two levels: it continued the offi­ 
cial negotiations with the YAR government, but at the same time Aden 
continued aid to the guerrilla forces that had been operating since 
1971 against the YAR government. By March 1973 the guerrilla opposi­ 
tion was claiming that it was active in six out of nine provinces or 
liwat of the YAR, and was presenting itself as embodying a combined
national and social resistance to the policies of the al-Hadj_ri
87 government. Around the same time, forces hostile to the PDRY
government were reported to be gathering across the YAR border, and
there was increased Saudi-South Yemeni tension: leaders of both Yemeni
88 
states emphasised that the unity discussions were being threatened. .
An additional issue of dispute arising between the two states at 
this time concerned the northern frontiers of the YAR. Under the 1934 
Treaty of Ta'if between the Imam of Yemen and Saudi Arabia, the latter 
had acquired possession of the three provinces of 'Asir, Jizan and 
Najran. The South Yemeni position was that these were provinces of 
North Yemen, and hence of any future united Yemen, and that the Treaty
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of Ta'if was valid for only forty years. It was therefore the PDRY's 
view that in 1974 these three provinces should be returned to the YAR
and that it was the YAR government's responsibility to make its claim
90 
public. When YAR Premier al-Hadj_ri visited Saudi Arabia in March
1973 he did the opposite, i.e. he acknowledged Saudi Arabia's right
91 to permanent control of these three provinces. This constituted a
further issue of dispute between the two countries, leading to denun­ 
ciations by the PDRY of the YAR position. The curious logic of Yemeni 
unity found its expression in the PDRY's policy on irredentism: while 
it chided another state, the YAR, for conceding these provinces to 
Saudi Arabia, Aden was content to allow the YAR to occupy part of its 
own territory, the Kamaran Islands.
Later in 1973 unity discussions appeared to be reviving. The level 
of guerrilla activity on both sides of the frontier seemed to have 
declined, and on 4 September 1973 the two Presidents met in the con­ 
text of the Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Algiers, in the presence 
of Algerian President Houari Boumedienne. In their joint statement 
they agreed to prolong the one-year deadline originally fixed at Cairo
the year before, emphasised their continuing commitment to the unity
92 process and stressed the need to stop the encouragement of 'sabotage*.
This recognised the fact that a major practical obstacle to the con­ 
tinuation of talks in the context of the joint committees was 
guerrilla activity in both states. The Algiers statement led to 
renewed meetings of the joint committees, and on 10 November 1973
President Salim Rubiyya< 'All Visited Sana'a, the first visit by one
93 Yemeni head of state to the capital of the other. A year after the
Tripoli Agreement it therefore seemed that, despite the delays and 
the political divisions within both states, the minimal points of the 
1972 peace agreements had been reached: the two states were not at
L59
war or near it, they had withdrawn support for the guerrillas in 
each other's states, they had weathered the initial criticism of 
their reluctant patrons in Moscow and Riyadh, and the process of 
inter-governmental discussion was continuing.
In the early part of 1974 there were new discussions between the 
committees but there was neither substantial progress nor setback in 
the unity negotiations. But in June the process suffered an apparent 
reverse. On 13 June 1974 there was a coup d'etat in the YAR in which 
al-Iryani, a known champion of unity, was replaced by a new military 
Command Council under Colonel Ibrahim al-Hamdi. The Command Council
»
reaffirmed the YAR's commitment to unity in its first pronouncements, 
but this assertion was offset by strong affirmations of support for 
Saudi Arabia. While the response of the PDRY authorities was initi­ 
ally neutral, and they reaffirmed their commitment to the unity pro­ 
cess, their private view was at first that al-Hamdi was supported by
•
Saudi Arabia and that his acquisition of power meant an end to pro-
94 gress on unity. However, for the next two years the committees
continued their deliberations and agreements were reached by the
Economic and Financial Committee in February 1975 and by the Military
95 Committee in the summer on the border. Guerrilla harassment of
each state had apparently ceased, and during 1976 YAR ministers began 
to talk with more emphasis on unity; this was in relation to greater 
economic and tourism collaboration, rather than the wider political 
unity envisaged in 1972.
The course of the unity issue was at this stage increasingly deter­ 
mined not by the state of relations between the two Yemeni states, but 
by the divisions within them, and in particular those within the YAR. 
While the underlying conflict inside the PDRY leadership, between 
President Salim Rubiyya* 'Ali and Secretary-General 'Abd al-Fattah
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Isma'il was continuing, this was contained at this time: the President 
was apparently more in favour of the unity policy than the Secretary- 
General, and he saw in the possibility of an alliance with the North 
a means of balancing the influence of his rivals in the PDRY. But 
this conflict was not as influential a factor as the situation in the 
YAR. Here al-Hamdi was preoccupied with establishing his authority: 
after coming to power in 1974, apparently with some Saudi support, the 
new President then proceeded to work towards establishing greater 
central government control over the pro-Saudi tribes and in so doing
QX
lessening the political influence of Saudi Arabia. In such circum­ 
stances it would probably have added to his troubles had he, at this 
juncture, initiated new negotiations with the South.
Unity policy therefore became itself one part of the internal con­ 
flicts of the YAR. Elements within the YAR government began to oppose 
unity with the South, and in January 1976 the YAR Chief of Staff Ahmad
•
Husayn al-Ghashmi went so far as to say that he envisaged unity• .
97 between the YAR and Saudi Arabia. Throughout much of this period
two former FLOSY opponents of the NLF in South Yemen, 'Abd Allah al-
Asnadj and Muhammad Salim Basindawa, occupied influential positions
• —^ « •
in the YAR government. Al-Hamdi for his part sought to placate the
•
Saudis and he was helped in this by the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between Aden and Riyadh in March 1976. But he also sought
to encourage the emergence inside the YAR of political forces that
98 would assist him in his campaign to strengthen central government.
In this way the internal politics of the YAR sustained a commitment 
to unity, not so much by persisting in the inter-governmental nego­ 
tiations, as by allowing political forces allied to the PDRY to emerge 
once again within the YAR. These forces combined in early 1976 to 
form the National Democratic Front (al-DJabha al-Dimukratiyya al-
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Wataniyya).
The NDF was established on 11 February 1976 through the fusion of 
five groups that had emerged from the latter period of the civil war 
and its aftermath: the Revolutionary Democratic Party, the Organisa­ 
tion of Yemeni Resisters, the Popular Democratic Union, the Popular
99 
Vanguard Party, and the Labour Party. The first two of these were
former branches of the MAN, and therefore close to the NF in Aden. 
The third and fourth were, respectively, the YAR branches of the pro- 
Soviet communist and formerly pro-Syrian Ba'th parties, the equivalents 
of the two groups that had merged in the South. The Labour Party, 
founded in 1969, was itself a coalition of independent Marxists, 
former Ba'thists and members of the republican militias that had 
fought in the conflicts of the 1967-8 period. According to its 
programme, the NDF aimed to establish 'a national democratic state 1 
in the YAR, and to promote national and state control of the economy. 
It had a cautious policy on unity, calling for greater co-operation 
between the YAR and the PDRY, but it was explicit in condemning Saudi 
influence in the YAR, and in supporting the PFLO in Oman as well as 
the opposition in the Gulf region. The NDF programme made no men­ 
tion of 'socialism', or of the international influence of the USSR, 
although this was implied in the final paragraph, which called for a 
strengthening of relations between the YAR and the 'socialist coun­ 
tries'. 102 The merging of five radical groups within the YAR into a 
single National Democratic Front would seem to have been itself faci­ 
litated by the unification in the PDRY of the three political consti­ 
tuents of the UPONF at the Sixth Congress of the NF, in the previous 
October. In essence, the NDF's programme was a transposition to the 
YAR, in milder form, of the political programme adopted some months 
earlier by the UPONF in the South.
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The emergence of the NDF provided al-Hamdi with a Lever with which
*
to strengthen his own position within the YAR and it was presented as 
an index of greater willingness on Sana'a's part to find common ground 
with the PDRY. In 1977, this enabled a relaunching of the discussions 
at the highest governmental level that had more or less ended with the 
June 1974 coup. On 15-16 February 1977 the two Presidents met in the 
border YAR town of Qataba and agreed to establish a Ministerial Coun­ 
cil that would meet every six months, and implement the 1972 unity 
agreement. It would include the two Presidents and officials 
responsible for defence, the economy, trade, planning and foreign 
affairs. A month later, on 22-23 March, the Presidents of the YAR,
PDRY, Sudan and Somalia met in Ta'iz to discuss the growing crisis in
104 
the Red Sea area. The common declaration issued, which called for
peace and non-interference by outside powers, was important for the 
two Yemeni states in that it established their joint desire to main­ 
tain a foreign policy independent of these external powers. Neither 
Saudi Arabia nor the USSR endorsed the Ta'iz statement. This pattern 
of meetings was repeated later in the year when on 13-14 August the 
two Presidents met again, in Sana'a, and the officials repeated the 
positions of March on the need for peace in the Red Sea.
However, the pressures on the YAR President proved to be too great. 
While no concrete steps towards unification of the two states had 
taken place, he had created hostility amongst conservative forces in 
the YAR by two policies that pertained to the unity issue: first, the 
tolerance of the NDF from 1976 onwards, and the more general streng­ 
thening of the central government against the tribes; secondly, the 
establishment of what appeared to be a more co-ordinated Yemeni 
foreign policy in response to the crisis in the Horn of Africa. In 
his speech on the anniversary of the September 1962 revolution
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he alluded to the unexpected degree of agreement he had reached in 
the February meeting with Salim Rubiyya* «Ali. 106 On the night of 
11-12 October 1977, two days before he was due to leave for his first 
official visit to Aden, indeed the first by any YAR head of state to 
the South, al-Hamdi was assassinated. He was apparently a victim 
of the tensions which his unity policy had occasioned, and with him 
died the hopes of a cautious but sustained unity policy that had been 
maintained by al-Iryani and al-Hamdi himself since the 1972 Tripoli
•
Agreement.
Phase 4; 1977-1979
The death of al-Hamdi initiated a new period of tension between the
•
two Yemeni states. Aden denounced the YAR President's murder and
108implied that Saudi Arabia was responsible for it. The new Presi­ 
dent al-Gha_shmi declared that he remained committed to unity, and the
109 PDRY appeared to believe that negotiations on unity could continue.
But whereas Aden had trusted al-Hamdi in part because of his internal
•
policies, so now the YAR President appeared in a hostile light as he 
proceeded to reverse the domestic policies of al-Hamdi: the northern 
tribes were conciliated, while in May 1978 a revolt by officers 
formerly loyal to al-Hamdi, under Colonel 'Abd Allah 'Abd al-'Alim,
•
was crushed by al-Gha£hmi's forces. The rebels retreated to Aden. 
Thus by the middle of 1978 not only had the inter-governmental unity 
process been frozen, but the conflictual interaction of unity and 
political conflict within the two Yemeni states had been revived, in 
a manner not seen since the first part of 1973.
Events once again took a more dramatic turn. As tensions rose 
between the two states, the political situation in the PDRY came to 
a crisis point. In the early part of 1978 the powers of President 
Salim Rubiyya* 'All were further reduced, and one of the factors that
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appears to have contributed to his demise was the failure of his 
policy of accommodation with the YAR. Then a dual crisis occurred: 
in circumstances that have not been adequately explained, President 
al-Ghashmi of the YAR was killed by a bomb on 24 June, while two days 
later Salim Rubiyya' «Ali lost his life, along with a number of his 
followers, in the attempted coup d'etat in Aden. The YAR authorities 
blamed the PDRY for sending a bomb to al-Ghasihmi disguised as a 
present from the Southern to the Northern President. The majority 
faction in the PDRY accused Salim Rubiyya' 'All of having engineered 
the explosion, both to avenge the death of al-Hamdi, and to provoke
•
a crisis in the YAR from which he could possibly have benefited. 
Whatever the precise truth, and the degree of linkage between the two 
events, the death of the two Presidents within two days of each other 
was a striking indication of the sensitivity of the politics of those 
states to the pressures of the other, and the degree to which internal, 
inter-Yemeni and wider foreign policy issues intertwined particularly 
through the Yemeni unity question itself.
In response to the death of al-Ghash_mi Saudi Arabia took measures 
within the Arab League to isolate the PDRY: thus the inter-Yemeni con­ 
flict rapidly acquired a wider, Arab, dimension. The PDRY's partici­ 
pation in the Ethiopian war effort against Somalia earlier in the year 
and later against the Eritrean guerrillas also served to antagonise 
Arab sentiment. Aden's response was to support the opposition within 
the YAR that had been in conflict with the government from October
1977 onwards: the NDF expanded guerrilla activity in the southern and 
central regions, and acquired radio facilities in Aden. In October
1978 there was a nearly successful coup against the new YAR President 
'All 'Abd Allah Salih, after which the defeated conspirators, Nasir-
• •
ists, Ba'thists and followers of al-Hamdi, led by Lieutenant-Colonel
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Mudj[ahid al-Kuhhaii, fled to Aden. There, together with the rebels 
who had gone to Aden in the previous May, they formed the 13th June 
Front: in January 1979 this Front joined the NDF. 115
Relations between the two Yemeni states were now at a consistently 
worse level than at any time since 1972. The YSP Congress of October 
1978 was outspoken in its support for the opposition in the YAR, and 
was addressed by NDF leader Sultan Ahmad Oroar. At this time a
•
force of Northern tribesmen was welcomed in the streets of Aden.
Guerrilla resistance in the YAR reached its peak in October-December
118 
1978. But, on this occasion, although the PDRY was diplomatically
on the defensive, it appeared to have the advantage in the South 
Arabian arena itself. Although they had acquired their own radio 
station after the June crises, South Yemen Freedom Radio, the exile 
forces opposed to Aden, still grouped to some degree in the YAR, were 
far weaker than in 1972; Libya was supporting Aden rather than Sana'a; 
and the PDRY's armed forces were now a better trained and armed force 
than those of the YAR. In this situation, with the YAR government 
apparently weak, the NDF gained ground in the rural districts. In
February 1979 fighting broke out between the regular armies of both
119 sides. The dynamic of diplomatic conflict between the states and
social conflict within each now led to a direct inter-state war on the 
1972 pattern, but now it was the South which took the initiative, 
claiming that the situation in the YAR was close to being 'a corapre-: 
hensive social revolution 1 . Fighting lasted from 24 February to 
3 March, and NDF forces, backed by the regular forces of the PDRY, 
occupied Qataba and a number of other towns in the southern region. 
At one point it appeared that the PDRY forces would be in a position 
to march on Ta'iz, the YAR's second city, and thereby directly chal­ 
lenge the YAR government. But after the 16 March cease-fire agreement
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both sides withdrew forces from each other's territories. This paved
the way for a meeting of the two Presidents in Kuwait on 28-30 March.
171 At Kuwait, a new agreement on unity was signed.
The second inter-Yemeni war was in some respects similar to the 
first: a relatively short border conflict, involving both irregular 
and regular forces, and brought to an end through Arab League diplo­ 
macy. The differences were, however, also considerable. As mentioned, 
the preceding period had been one of considerable NDF activity in the 
southern part of the YAR and it would appear that this time it was the 
PDRY which pushed the conflict towards, direct war: the Aden leadership 
apparently hoped that it could in this way strike at the government 
of 'Ali 'Abd Allah Salih. The precarious state of the new YAR regime,
* *
and the incidence of military coups in 1978 itself, may have streng-
122thened this view within the NDF. The second war therefore repre­ 
sented, as did the first, an attempt by one state to achieve unity by 
the deployment of its own forces in a direct assault upon the other. 
But this time it was the PDRY which was seeking to do so. The other 
important difference between the two wars was in the nature of the 
international response: on this occasion both Arab and world powers 
responded vigorously and openly to what was, in military terms, a 
subaltern affair. The second inter-Yemeni war was far more inter­ 
nationalised than the first, and while Aden had enjoyed some diploma­ 
tic advantage prior to the war this no longer applied. Saudi Arabia 
was joined by Egypt, Syria and Iraq, formerly allies of Aden's, in 
putting pressure on the PDRY not to advance on Ta'iz and to agree to 
a cease-fire. Syria and Iraq both told Aden it could not 'export 
revolution 1 to the YAR. The USA also took a part in the conflict: 
Carter ordered a US naval task-force to the Red Sea and on 9 March 
announced an emergency airlift of $390 millions worth of arms to
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124 support the YAR army. The US government indicated that it was not
prepared to allow the PDRY to win. 125 Conflict between the Yemens 
was, therefore, now invested with a strategic and symbolic importance 
at the Arab and world levels that had not previously been the case; 
it was, in part, this enhanced significance that prevented what might
1 9 Aotherwise have been a decisive PDRY advance to capture Ta'iz. This 
would have enabled the South to establish a form of 'unity' in 
alliance with the NDF over the part of the YAR they both held.
The meeting of the two Yemeni Presidents, 'All 'Abd Allah Salih
• •
and 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, in Kuwait on 28-30 March was the first
•
between the heads of state of the two Yemens since Rubiyya* 'All and 
al-Hamdi had met in Sana'a in August 1977: both their predecessors
•
were now dead, and the new incumbents seemed improbable candidates 
for reconciliation. The President of the YAR was a semi-literate army 
officer, reputed to be the murderer of al-Hamdi, who had shown himself
•
127 a determined opponent of the pro-Aden forces inside the YAR. 'Abd
al-Fattah Isma'il, himself an emigrant from the YAR, was a strong
*
believer in Aden's alliance with the USSR and did not express, in his 
public statements, the support for unity which Salim Rubiyya' 'Ali 
had voiced. Nevertheless the two Presidents issued a Joint Statement 
on Unity which reaffirmed the Cairo and Tripoli Agreements of 1972 and 
which provided a new means of implementing the goal of unity: this was 
to set up a Constitutional Committee that would draft a constitution 
for the united state within four months. This constitution would then 
be ratified by the legislatures of both states. Whereas in the 
Tripoli Agreement of 1972 responsibility for implementation had been 
placed with the eight specialist committees, Clause 5 of the new 
agreement stipulated that it was now to be the task of the two Presi­ 
dents themselves to ensure that this agreement was to be accomplished
168
128 within the stipulated time.
Whatever its long-term practicability, the Kuwait Agreement did 
have, like its antecedents, certain immediate consequences. Fighting
between the armies of the two states had ceased, and the borders
129 reopened. In a significant conciliatory move, the YAR President
reorganised his cabinet and dismissed the former FLOSY leaders who 
had been members of several Northern governments since 1972. Later, 
during September, in an even more surprising move, «Ali 'Abd Allah 
Salih's government began receiving new military supplies from the
• •
USSR, thereby in effect reducing the importance of the military co-
13 operation agreement which Carter had so publicly accelerated in March.
Yet, while relations between the two governments therefore improved, 
the underlying conflicts endured: during 1979 the NDF remained a sig­ 
nificant and active force in the YAR, and the inter-governmental nego­ 
tiations did not proceed at the rapid pace envisaged in the Kuwait 
Agreement. A repeat of the ambiguous aftermath of 1972 seemed to be 
likely.
Phase 5; 1979-1982
If the immediate postwar situation of 1979 resembled that of 1972 in 
certain key respects - rapid proclamation of unity agreement and cease­ 
fire, followed by continued guerrilla resistance in the YAR and slow 
implementation - it was nonetheless distinct from its predecessor in 
a number of respects. The YAR had launched the 1972 war, and been 
blocked, and it was now the turn of the PDRY to face the consequences 
of having its strategy frustrated. The relative diplomatic strengths 
of the two states reflected this: although the PDRY now had diplomatic 
relations with Saudi Arabia, these had been frozen after the June 1978 
crisis, and influential external states, particularly Iraq and Syria, 
that might in other circumstances have backed the PDRY, were now keen
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to consolidate the unity process in order to check the PDRY's influ­ 
ence, as well as counter-balance Egyptian and Saudi influence. The 
internal situations of the two Republics were also different. The 
anti-PDRY forces based in the North were weaker than in 1972-1973, 
and the pro-Aden forces of the NDF constituted a major problem for 
the Sana'a government. But the NDF had also to face the consequences 
of the war's outcome, and, while it maintained its organisational and 
military presence in the countryside of the southern and central YAR, 
it now had to engage in the political arena and bargain for power 
with the centre. Aden's pursuit of 'unity 1 in negotiations with 
President <Ali 'Abd Allah Salih was matched by sustained and evident
• •
support by the PDRY for the YAR President's radical opponents in the 
NDF; but, despite this support and the NDF's strength on the ground, 
the balance of advantage had begun to shift away from Aden and its 
allies from the March 1979 war onwards.
The ability of both governments to pursue the Kuwait Agreement was, 
initially, inhibited by domestic difficulties which each encountered. 
The YAR President, while able to conciliate the NDF by negotiations 
with the South, ran the risk of antagonising the pro-Saudi tribal 
forces of the YAR north by so doing, and Saudi threats to suspend aid 
to the YAR in 1979 indicated where Riyadh's priorities lay. The 
unexpected return in late 1979 of the YAR to its traditional policy 
of purchasing weapons from the USSR, and the drastic reduction in 
implementation of the arms agreement negotiated with the USA and Saudi 
Arabia during the February war, also constituted issues of dispute 
between the YAR and Saudi Arabia. Anxious as he was to consolidate 
power at the centre, and to out-manoeuvre the NDF, 'Ali 'Abd Allah 
Salih was nonetheless initially seriously constrained by the weakness
• •
of his own government internally and Saudi suspicion of the unity
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process. He also faced the continued challenge of the NDF: not until 
he had contained it, and built a stronger army, did he feel confident 
to pursue unity discussions with the South.
Inside the PDRY there was no overt, organised, anti-YSP opposition, 
and while the USSR was not enthusiastic about the unity discussions, 
it did not exert the leverage over PDRY finances and society on this 
matter which Saudi Arabia did in the YAR. There was, however, another 
factor within the PDRY which complicated the unity discussions, namely 
the suppressed but still vital conflict within the PDRY's state and 
party between officials of Northern and Southern origins. How far 
this really did constitute a line of cleavage, and how far it was only 
rumoured to do so, cannot be ascertained. But by the late 1970s the 
question of origin had become a significant issue in PDRY politics, 
with the North-South issue forming part of the wider factional dispute
that reached its peaks in the attempted coup of Salim Rubiyya' 'All
- - 133 in 1978 and the removal of <Abd al-Fattah Isma'il in 1980. This
•
constellation of issues came about in two ways: first, the economic 
hardships and diplomatic isolation of the PDRY were blamed by some 
Southerners on the fact that their country was ruled by a government 
that included many emigrants from the North. The replacement of Salim 
Rubiyya' 'All, a Southerner, by 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, a Northerner,
contributed to this, and the decision to advance in the 1979 war
134 occasioned criticism from within the army. At the same time, those
in the PDRY from the North were much less willing to reach concili­ 
ation with the existing government there: their representatives, both 
in the PDRY state and party, and through the NDF, wanted to replace 
or at least significantly alter the policies of the YAR government. 
The Southerners apparently inclined towards a more moderate approach, 
and to reining in the NDF as far as this was practicable.
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An important further precondition for implementing the Kuwait 
Agreement was the establishment of a minimal degree of trust: 'All 
'Abd Allah Sal in was, after all, the man who was believed to have
• *
killed al-Hamdi in 1977, and whom supporters of the South tried to 
kill in October 1978. He and the PDRY had been at war in February 
1979. The PDRY government had, since 1977-8, been supporting a wide­ 
spread guerrilla movement in the YAR itself. It was therefore neces- 
ary that each President should feel confident about pursuing the talks. 
'Ali 'Abd Allah Salih had to some extent mended his fences with the
* •
Saudis by 1980, and the replacement of 'Abd al-Fattah Istna'il by 'All
•
Nasir Muhammad in April 1980 acted as a solvent on the PDRY side.
• *
Soon afterwards, YAR Premier 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Abd al-Ghani had visited 
Aden and a joint communique' published on 6 May announced a decision 
to found joint economic projects, in the fields of industry, minerals, 
land and maritime transport, and to co-ordinate national development 
plans. When President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad visited the YAR in June
• •
1980 these commitments were embodied in a series of economic and 
cultural agreements between the two sides. In particular, it was 
decided to set up joint companies in the fields of maritime transport, 
overland transport and tourism. The communique talked of greater 
economic integration - of co-ordinating development plans, discussions 
on monetary and banking union, increased inter-Yemeni trade, and free­ 
dom of travel between the two countries.
Progress in inter-governmental relations was, however, limited by 
the continued conflict between the YAR government and the NDF. After 
substantial fighting in late 1979, the two parties to the dispute 
reached an agreement on 31 January 1980. This allowed the NDF some 
political freedom in the YAR, in return for an ending of armed con­ 
flict and the closing of its radio facilities in Aden. The January
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1980 agreement was welcomed by the PDRY and contributed to the
• 1 *^ft
improved relations between the two states. There were, however, 
those within the YAR government who opposed any such compromise with 
the NDF, and the Front was, for its part, seeking to consolidate its 
position on the ground to ensure that it could not be compelled to 
make concessions by pressure from the PDRY. The result was that, 
despite the January 1980 agreement and improved PDRY-YAR relations, 
in the latter part of 1980 fighting flared again and continued till 
the spring of 1982. The YAR government gained the upper hand and in 
April 1982 the NDF was forced to suspend guerrilla opposition. It 
had to withdraw its roughly two thousand fighters to the PDRY in 
return for promises of limited political freedom of action in the 
YAR. 139
The renewed fighting in 1980-1982 between the YAR government and 
the NDF, and the refusal of the Sana'a government to accept compromise 
with the Front, meant that progress in relations between the two 
states was slow. New agreements were reached only in October 1981, 
after the two Presidents met in Kuwait and when, in the next month, 
«Ali 'Abd Allah Salih agreed for the first time to visit Aden. It
• •
was reported at the time that the YAR President then demanded and
140 
received assurances about reduced PDRY backing for the NDF. This
visit by President 'All 'Abd Allah Salih to Aden culminated in the •^ . «
signing of a new YAR-PDRY agreement, which took the discussions on
141 
unity further than they had ever previously gone. This envisaged
the establishment of a Yemeni Council (in Arabic al-Madj_lis_ al-Yamani 
al-'Ala) chaired by the two Presidents. It was to meet every six 
months on a regular basis, supervise the work of the unity committees 
and have a Joint Ministerial Committee comprising the premiers, 
foreign ministers, interior ministers, supply and planning, education
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ministers and the chiefs of staff of the two sides. A Secretariat, 
based in Sana'a, with an office in Aden, was to handle the administra­ 
tive work of the Council. The agreement also envisaged the continu­ 
ation of economic, cultural and foreign policy co-ordination between 
the two states. The text of a new constitution, in 136 clauses, was
I/O
also, it was reported, drawn up. The issue of the NDF was not 
mentioned, but when 'All Nasir Muhammad visited the YAR in May 1982,
» •
at a time when the NDF was ending its guerrilla actions, the press 
statement alluded to this: it stated that the two sides
succeeded in coming to an agreement to overcome the instability 
and the difficulties that obstruct the realisation of the aspira­ 
tions of our people in the two parts of the homeland for a stable 
and peaceful life leading to the reunification of our country. •*
In effect, the PDRY had to accept that the North Yemeni government 
was, for the time being at least, the sole viable interlocutor within 
the YAR, and that, for this reason, the NDF could not be supported 
further. Thus ended the policy which the Southern government had 
been pursuing since independence, of simultaneous negotiation with 
Sana'a and support for the radical opposition. 
Sources of the 'Unity' Policy
This chronological account of YAR-PDRY relations may provide some 
basis for identifying underlying features of the unity policy, both 
why it apparently failed, but why it was at the same time sustained. 
The problem to be overcome, the division of the Yemens, has been 
analysed earlier in the chapter as reflecting not one, but several, 
historical factors which combined to produce the situation that pre­ 
vailed after 1967. One was the absence of a single state or adminis­ 
trative region inherited from pre-colonial times, and the prevalence 
of tribal, religious and regional differences. The second was the 
impact of the two colonialisms, Turkish and British, and the delimita-
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tions of the two administrative areas. The third was the difference 
in the social and national upheavals of the 1960s, and the different 
states that emerged from them towards the end of the decade. The 
fourth was the imposition on to the South Arabian region of wider 
rivalries, between Saudi Arabia and more radical Arab states, and 
between east and west. Each on its own would have constituted a 
substantial obstacle to unification of the two states: together these 
four factors reinforced a division that proved more effective than 
the declarations of the two states' leaders.
The same factors that sustained the division at the same time go 
some way to suggesting reasons why, despite its impracticability, the 
official call for Yemeni unity remained strong in the YAR as well as 
in the PDRY. In the first place, the assertion of a common Yemeni 
identity by political leaders served to strengthen the legitimacy of 
each state with their own populations against outside powers and 
against each other. It reinforced legitimacy against outside states,
particularly Saudi Arabia, because Sana'a and Aden could pose as the
144 champions of a local independence against richer, intrusive, states.
At the same time, this quest for legitimacy was, on occasion, competi­ 
tive: each state presented the other as being under the domination of 
an external power (Saudi Arabia or the USA in the case of the YAR, the
USSR in the case of the PDRY) and so each could suggest to its own
145 population that it was the true defender of national interests.
The second function of asserting a Yemeni identity was integrative, 
since the problem of unity was not just between these two states, as 
within each both Yemeni states faced considerable difficulties in 
binding their own societies together, in overcoming the tribal, 
regional and religious divisions within them inherited from earlier 
epochs, as well as the political divisions of the contemporary Arab
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world that were translated to them. In each state, national economies 
and modern state structures had to be developed at the time when the 
old order was ending, in 1962 in the North, in 1967 in the South. 
Assertion of a Yemeni identity therefore served to assist this process.
A third function was practical: Yemeni unity could be seen as 
bringing certain important benefits, and the proclaimed quest for 
Yemeni unity had its own limited advantages. A unified Yemen would 
have created a state of up to nine million people, the most populous 
in the Arabian Peninsula, with both a significant cultivated area and 
a considerable reserve of manpower. The limited resources, human and 
natural, of the two Yemens would to some extent have complemented each 
other. Short of full unity, moreover, the quest for unity had its 
benefits: it had the advantage of allowing limited co-operation in 
some fields - education, economics, movement of individuals between 
states. In this sense 'unity' was but an exaggerated way of denoting 
a measure of co-operation between states. At the same time it allowed 
for a consultation in foreign policy that lessened the danger of war. 
In private discussions, officials on both sides stated that the most 
important point in the Yemeni unity policy of the two states was that 
it enabled them to avoid war, and this argument was given additional
force by the implication that the two wars between the Yemeni states
, . ,. 146 
had been the result of external influence.
For all the element of co-operation, however, the call for unity . 
had another, antagonistic, dimension, in that it served as a means 
for each state to pursue its rivalry with the other. In this sense 
the national and social components of Yemeni nationalism remained 
interlocked not by compounding each other, within each state, by the 
casting of social enemies as national ones too, but in the sense that 
the two issues conflicted: each state became implicated in the
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internal conflicts of the other state by asserting the claims of 
national unity. The concept of 'non-interference* in the internal 
affairs of the other had weak salience. Throughout the period after 
1967, each state committed itself to the pursuit of 'unity': but this 
pursuit of a common goal reflected particular interests - the politi­ 
cal and social priorities of the governments in Aden and Sana'a and 
their search for allies within the other state. At one level, the 
involvement led to diplomatic negotiations with the counterpart 
governments, on areas of co-operation and compromise; but it also 
involved each in supporting the rivals of the other, in order to bring 
pressure upon them, or even overthrow them. Each Yemeni state there­ 
fore pursued unity at these two levels: at that of diplomatic negoti­ 
ation and government-to-government discussion, and that of encouraging 
upheaval in the neighbouring state that might bring a more friendly 
government to power. Consequently, if in one sense the encouragement 
of change in the other state was a product of the commitment to 
national unity, on the grounds that governments of similar outlook 
could the more easily unite, it was also the case that the commitment 
to unity provided a means of prosecuting an interrelated social and 
political conflict within both Yemens that had been in train since 
1962.
This complex combination of the social and political on one side, 
and the national on the other, may in some degree explain the history 
of relations between the two Yemens since 1967. The position held 
until independence by nationalists in the South was that since the 
division of the -two Yemens was a product of colonialist division, 
unity would become possible once the British had departed. This did 
not take place, and by 1970 both states were in open political con­ 
flict with each other. The ensuing years yielded apparently inconsis-
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tent behaviour by both sides: two wars, in 1972 and 1979, each of 
which was followed by a unity agreement; support for guerrillas 
operating in the other state while conducting negotiations with the 
other government.
Marked as it was by uncertainties, South Yemen's policy towards 
North Yemen involved, therefore, more than just conceptual slippage 
about the nature of the national entities involved, the historical 
antecedents of the two distinct states or the goals of the unity 
policy. It also involved uncertainty about the means by which this 
unity could be brought about, and the channels through which a unity 
policy could be pursued. The South's commitment to unity resulted in 
the use of at least three different political instruments, with three 
correspondingly different strategies: negotiation with the YAR govern­ 
ment, support for rebels within the YAR, and direct deployment of the 
South Yemeni state and army itself against the YAR. This variation 
of instruments was to continue throughout the period after 1967. It 
was a response to changes within the political situation in the YAR, 
but it also reflected differences of opinion within the South Yemeni 
regime, and the various pressures to which both regimes were subjected 
by outside forces, Arab and Soviet. The paradoxical combination of 
tenacity and oscillation in Yemeni policy was therefore a reflection 
not only of the definitional and historical uncertainties of this 
policy, but also of the manner in which policy on unity was the 
resultant of conflict between the two states, and within them, as 
well as of that interplay of unity with broader strategic issues that 
had affected the two Yemens since the mid-nineteenth century. The 
intersection of the unification issue with east-west conflict in the 
post-1945 period, one also evident in the cases of Germany, Korea and 
Vietnam, became part of the Yemeni unity question as well.
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Analysis of the history of the 'unity 1 issue can look at it in two 
dimensions: either as a goal-directed activity, where the aim is 
unity, in which sense the process was frustrated; or as one pursued 
for other more limited reasons, without it being necessary to achieve 
unification. In the latter sense, the pursuit of Yemeni unity, on 
both sides of the frontier, was an important, practical and in some 
measure successful component of the PDRY's foreign policy, as it was 
of the YAR's, throughout the post-1967 period. If it had not conti­ 
nued to serve some functions, the goal of unity would not have been 
maintained.
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Chapter Four
Regional Orientations: 'Solidarity' and Accommodation
The major revolutions of modern history, with the partial exception 
of the Mexican, involved the revolutionary states in alliances with 
opposition forces in, and armed conflicts with, their neighbours and 
other proximate states: France, Russia, Cuba, Vietnam, Iran all under­ 
went this experience. South Yemen too followed this path. Indeed 
one of the most remarkable aspects of the South Yemeni case was the 
extent of its revolutionary 'solidarity 1 and embattlement in the post- 
revolutionary phase, the range and persistence of its conflicts with 
other states in the Arabian Peninsula and surrounding regions over 
more than a decade. Given its exposed strategic position and its 
limited resources, in natural and human terms, the extent of its 
persistence in such conflict with its neighbours and in a revolution­ 
ary foreign policy was striking. This commitment to revolution in 
the Arabian Peninsula was not something given great prominence in the 
official documents of the pre-independence period. The 1965 Charter 
had reiterated radical Arab nationalist themes of that period, calling
for freedom from colonial rule and 'progressive Arab unity 1 , but its
2only specific commitment was to support the Palestinians. The shift
towards a more socially revolutionary position and to change in the 
Peninsula was, however, evident from independence itself, and especi­ 
ally when, after some initial optimism on the South Yemen side about 
establishing relations with Saudi Arabia, it became evident that the 
two states were in conflict. Speaking at the Fourth Congress, in 
March 1968, 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il stressed the role of the PRSY as
•
a support of revolution throughout the Arabian Peninsula. In a
major statement in May 1969 President Kahtan al-Sha'abi, whose govern-
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ment had been challenged by Saudi-backed rebels, emphasised that he 
too subscribed to this view:
As for Saudi Arabia, its attitude towards us was clear from the 
start and the attitude of our revolution to Saudi Arabia was clear. 
Winds of change will certainly blow from this revolution....The 
principle of this revolution will spread over the entire Arabian 
Peninsula.
In the same speech he affirmed the support of the PRSY for the opposi­ 
tions in North Yemen and Oman, and for the Palestinian resistance. 
At the Fifth Congress, in March 1972, 'Abd al-Fatt.ah Isma'il declared
•
that the 'success of the Congress would affect the whole Peninsula 
and would light the way for all strugglers and progressive people 1 . 
For the revolutionaries of the NF, their own revolution was a model 
for others in the Arabian Peninsula, and the security of their revolu­ 
tion depended upon the success of kindred revolutions elsewhere. As 
Aden radio declared in November 1971:
The battles being fought by the revolution of the Front for the 
Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf aim at independence for the 
people of the Gulf. The people of the PDRY believe their own 
independence to be at peril so long as pockets of colonialism 
remain in the Arabian Gulf."
This support for revolutions elsewhere involved the PDRY in the 
first instance in conflicts with the three states with whom it shared 
a land frontier: North Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Oman. In the cases of 
North Yemen and Oman this led Aden to more than a decade of intermit­ 
tent military engagements, both with the forces of the neighbouring 
state and in support of guerrillas operating in these states. As 
already noted, the North Yemeni case involved a simultaneous pursuit 
of negotiations with the incumbent governments and an advocacy of a 
policy of unity with the other state. The case of Oman was a more 
conventional case of support for a guerrilla movement in a neighbour­ 
ing state, not one overlain by the issue of 'unity', but the geograph­ 
ical location of that state on the Persian Gulf itself meant that the
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PDRY's role in aiding the Omani opposition came to affect its rela­ 
tions with many other states. This in part explains the degree of 
conflict with Saudi Arabia: while the PDRY did, until 1976, aid Saudi 
opponents of the monarchy, as the Saudis did exile opponents of the 
PDRY, the level of South Yemeni-Saudi mutual threat was at a much 
lower level of military activity than on the YAR and Oman frontiers. 
The confrontation between the PDRY and the KSA was much more directly 
a political one between two states, neither of which accepted the 
legitimacy of the other, or the other's overall orientation in foreign 
policy, than a dispute that took the form of protracted military 
conflict.
Conflict with Oman; 1967-1982
For the first fifteen years after independence South Yemen maintained 
no diplomatic relations with the neighbouring Sultanate of Oman and 
was in a state of substantial conflict with it. In certain respects 
the dispute with Oman was less serious than that with Aden's two 
other land neighbours: Saudi Arabia posed a far more serious military 
threat to South Yemen, given the weaponry at its disposal, and it 
provided shelter for significant numbers of South Yemeni refugees who 
were used by Riyadh to raid the South Yemeni frontier areas at -moments 
of tension; North Yemen posed a political problem, since it was a 
state with which Aden proclaimed its desire to unite, and whose inter­ 
nal developments were followed with great care by government and popu­ 
lation alike in the South. It was with Saudi Arabia and North Yemen 
that border wars actually broke out, and these countries, by virtue 
of their greater, proximity to the main populated regions of the PDRY 
thereby presented a potentially larger menace.
Yet the disputes with North Yemen and Saudi Arabia were, in other 
ways, of a lesser dimension than that with Oman: they were inter-
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mittent, where that with Oman was continuous, and the Omani dispute 
involved Aden in a far clearer and more persistent attempt to alter 
the system of government in a neighbouring state than was the case in 
either the YAR or Saudi Arabia. In terms of its place within the 
PDRY's foreign policy as a whole, policy towards Oman occupied a 
special position, as the greatest single commitment to encouraging 
revolution in another state undertaken by the Aden government; and 
this commitment occupied a similar place in evaluations of South 
Yemeni foreign policy by other states, regional and from further 
afield, who endorsed the stability of existing governments in the 
Arabian Peninsula. Hostility to the PDRY in the Arab world and the 
west was to a considerable extent a result of what was regarded as 
Aden's 'destabilising 1 role in Oman.
The guerrilla movement which Aden supported in Oman conducted sub­ 
stantial and sustained military activities in the southern, Dhofar,
province of the Sultanate from 1965 to 1975. Intermittent guerrilla
a 
actions were claimed until at least June 1981. The Dhofar area, of
around 30,000 square miles, and with a population of between 20,000 
and 50,000, was in many ways more part of South Arabia than Oman: its 
geography and climate were linked to those of South Arabia, and the
population spoke a variety of pre-Arabic dialects similar to those
9 spoken in the Mahra region of South Yemen and on the island of Socotra.
But from the latter part of the nineteenth century Dhofar had been 
part of the Sultanate of Oman and, while in some earlier periods the 
term 'Yemen' encompassed Dhofar, with few exceptions no modern Yemeni 
politicians claimed it as part of historic Yemen. Dhofar's distinct 
character did however provide the context in which tribal resentment 
of rule from Muscat could develop, and the proximity of South Yemen 
meant that the rebel forces in Dhofar could obtain support from across
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the frontier.
The war that began in 1965 was organised by a coalition of Dhofari 
exile groups who in 1964-5 formed a Dhofar Liberation Front. 12 This 
included both Nasserist and radical members of the MAN, and from the 
time of the First DLF Congress and the first guerrilla actions in June 
1965 the Front appealed for support from the NLF in South Yemen. 
The extent of involvement of the South Yemeni MAN with the Dhofari 
guerrillas prior to November 1967 is not known, but there must have 
been contact, and in October 1966 British forces did raid the Yemeni
border town of Hauf and arrest a number of people there in an attempt
14to stem the flow of arms to Dhofar. Once the PRSY became indepen­ 
dent in 1967 supplies and base facilities became available to the DLF 
on a more regular basis. The Dhofar revolt was not, however, a 
direct consequence of the situation in South Yemen, in the way that 
the outbreak of guerrilla warfare in South Yemen in October 1963 had 
been a result of the war in the North. The groups which formed the 
DLF in 1964-5 had come together from Dhofari exiles working in the 
Persian Gulf and other parts of the Arab world, and built their sup­ 
port inside Dhofar on the basis of the resentments and tensions that 
had existed there for decades. Prior to 1967 the fact that Dhofar 
had a common frontier with South Yemen provided a line of logistical 
support more than a source of political or military impulsion.
In the ten years of its guerrilla campaign, the Dhofari rebel move­ 
ment went through a number of organisational changes. In September 
1968, at a congress reportedly held at Hamrin in central Dhofar, the 
DLF changed its name to the People's Front for the Liberation of the 
Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG). This term included not only all of 
Oman, but also the states of Trucial Oman (later the United Arab 
Amirates), Bahrain and Qatar, and, it was sometimes suggested, Kuwait.
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The new organisation adopted political and social programmes of a 
more explicitly revolutionary character, reflecting both the influence 
of the radicalised sections of the MAN in the Majshrik and that of-—'— *
China, which in 1967 became a significant supplier of arms, training
18 
and political literature to the Front. It announced that 'organised
revolutionary violence 1 was 'the sole means' of waging its struggle, 
and declared its desire 'to work towards the unification of the revo­ 
lutionary tool of the popular masses in the Occupied Arabian Gulf as
19 
the healthy and revolutionary prelude to the unity of the area*.
This congress, presented as the second congress of the PFLOAG, was 
followed by a third, in June 1971, in the western Dhofari town of 
Rakhyut, and then in December 1971 by the fusion of the PFLOAG with
another group of former MAN members, the National Democratic Front
20
for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf. This merger pro­ 
duced a new name for the organisation - the People's Front for the 
Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (still PFLOAG) - and a prog­ 
ramme that gave more attention to political work and, alongside the 
military campaigns, to the diffusion of a 'national democratic charac­ 
ter* drawn up at the third congress. The difficulties which the 
Front then encountered in spreading its campaign to other parts of 
the Gulf led it, in 1974, to modify its goals again, and in July 1974 
PFLOAG divided into two parts - a People's Front for the Liberation 
of Oman, and a People's Front in Bahrain. The former was to con­ 
tinue the guerrilla struggle in Oman, the latter to persist in that 
underground political work in Bahrain which MAN and later PFLOAG 
members had undertaken since the latter part of the 1950s. With the
virtual defeat of the guerrillas in 1975 PFLO continued as an organ-
23 isation based primarily in exile. At its congress in 1982 the PFLO
sought to develop modified political positions that corresponded to
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the new, and weaker, situation in which it found itself. This 
involved greater stress on political as opposed to military activi­ 
ties, and on the need to build a broad alliance of all nationalist 
forces within Oman, a United Omani National Front. 2
This political evolution of the guerrilla movement was a reflection, 
in part, of the changes in the military situation in Dhofar itself. 
The first two years of the guerrilla movement (1965-1967) had involved 
mainly hit and run actions in central Dhofar. But with the imminence 
of independence in South Yemen the Sultan's Armed Forces tried to 
establish positions in the western part of Dhofar, near the frontier,
in order to coun'ter what was expected to be greater assistance from
25 the NLF. This pre-emptive policy did not, however, succeed, and in
August 1969 the last of the SAF positions in western Dhofar had fallen
? (S 
to the guerrillas. The focus of fighting then shifted to central
and eastern Dhofar and by the middle of 1970 the government forces 
had lost control of all of Dhofar except for the capital, Salala, and 
the Jurbaib plain surrounding it. At this point, in July 1970, the
reigning Sultan Said bin Taimur was deposed in a military coup, with
27 
British support, and his son Qabus became Sultan. Sultan Qabus,
using oil revenues that had first become available in 1967, and promis­ 
ing social reform to the population, reorganised the army and began, 
in 1971, to take the offensive against the guerrillas. In 1972 SAF 
reestablished positions in western Dhofar, and in 1973 PFLOAG shell­ 
ing of the Salala air base ceased. In November and December 1973 
several thousand Iranian troops were deployed by the Shah in support 
of Sultan Qabus. 28 A set of three defensive lines was then construc­ 
ted on an axis running from the desert to the sea - Hornbeam, in early 
1974, Hammer, in December 1974, and Damavand, in January 1975 - each 
one further west than the other. Their function was to inhibit
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guerrilla supplies from reaching the Dhofari interior from South 
Yemen. In October and November 1975 the last remaining PFLO forces
in western Dhofar were defeated, and, with a few insignificant excep-
29 
tions, the remaining guerrillas withdrew to South Yemeni territory.
While sporadic operations continued, PFLO had ceased from late 1975 
to be a significant military force inside Dhofar.
The PDRY played an important role in this guerrilla war, and the 
consequences of this policy were to endure long after significant 
fighting had ended in Dhofar. In the first place, South Yemen pro­ 
vided the guerrillas with military aid and base facilities. While 
the first weapons used by the DLF had come overland from the Gulf, or 
from supplies available as a result of the civil war in North Yemen, 
or were captured from the SAF, from 1967 onwards the PRSY aided the 
guerrillas directly, as well as serving as a transit area for supplies 
coming from other sources - first China and later Russia and Libya. 
After independence, PFLOAG was granted many facilities in the PDRY. 
The guerrilla base and training camps were on South Yemeni territory,
and the guerrillas also organised refugee camps, schools and hospitals
31 in the border region. The Front office in Aden served as a centre
for political and propaganda work directed at the outside world: and
32 
the guerrillas were given time on Aden radio for broadcasts to Oman.
Successive South Yemeni government statements and Front congresses 
repeated support for the guerrillas in Dhofar, and Aden also provided 
significant diplomatic support to the guerrillas, in the Arab League 
and elsewhere. Thus South Yemeni delegations visiting other countries 
made a point of urging their hosts to support the Front, and they on 
occasion took delegates from Oman with them as part of their own dele­ 
gation. South Yemen also sought to give diplomatic backing to the 
PFLOAG campaigns in 1971 that aimed to keep Oman, Bahrain, Qatar and
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the Amirates from receiving recognition from international bodies, 
such as the UN and the Arab League. 33 Until 1982 therefore the 
PDRY's support for the Omani guerrillas was overt, sustained, and 
comprehensive.
This commitment to the Omani guerrillas involved South Yemen in a 
number of costs additional to that of the actual aid given to the 
Front. First among these was the tense military situation along the 
frontier between Dhofar and the eastern frontier region of the PDRY, 
which on several occasions led to incidents between the armed forces 
of the two states. The first of these came soon after independence
in early February 1968 when South Yemen claimed that Oman was 'massing*
34 troops on the frontier. There were no reports of actual fighting
on this occasion, however, and with the gradual retreat of SAF forces 
from western Dhofar, with the exception of positions in the desert 
north of the populated mountains, border tensions on land declined. 
But according to PDRY sources, 'British 1 , i.e. SOAF, planes were from
1970 carrying out flights over PDRY airspace: in the period between
35 June 1970 and May 1972 these flights amounted to a total of 119.
In 1972, moreover, conflict on land and sea recurred, as a consequence 
of the SAF campaign to re-establish its presence in western Dhofar in 
what was termed 'Operation Simba 1 . The PDRY account is that in April 
1972 British ships violated South Yemeni territorial waters in the 
region of the frontier, and that on 4 May Omani land and air forces 
attacked the Wadi Habrut district, a PDRY position north of the moun­ 
tains. While SOAF planes hit positions inside the PDRY, the Omani 
fort on the eastern side of the frontier was destroyed by PDRY forces 
in response. According to Omani sources, South Yemenis participated 
in a cross-border attack at Habrut on 5 and 6 May. Later in May 
1972, at a point nearer the coast, fighting between SAF and PFLOAG
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forces was followed by SOAF bombing attacks on the village of Hauf 
itself, inside the PDRY. A number of offices and facilities belonging 
to PFLOAG were hit in these air attacks. 38
This outbreak remained isolated, but it initiated a new period of 
Oman-PDRY conflict. Beginning in 1972 South Yemeni-based artillery
using 85 mm Soviet guns with a range of several miles continued to
39hit SAP positions inside Dhofar, while the ground fighting was con­ 
centrated in the central and eastern parts of Dhofar. PFLOAG sources 
alleged that this was connected to events nearer the PDRY in that an 
offensive against their positions in eastern Dhofar in early September 
1972 coincided with the launching of the first inter-Yemeni war. 
There were also repeated statements by both PFLOAG and PDRY officials 
to the effect that Saudi Arabia was stationing forces on its frontier
with the PDRY with a view to pushing through to the sea, thus cutting
41 Dhofar off from the western part of the PDRY. In November 1973 Oman
alleged that South Yemeni troops and an aircraft had been in action
42 in Dhofar, a charge Aden denied.
The final occasion when serious conflict occurred on the Oman-PDRY 
frontier was in the latter part of 1975 when fighting spilled over the 
frontier as a result of the SAF offensive in western Dhofar that in 
effect ended the war. Between 17 and 21 November 1975 SAF artillery
attacked PDRY guns at Hauf and Jaadib, and SAF planes hit PFLO and
43 PDRY government positions at Hauf on 17 October. PDRY shelling of
44 Omani positions continued until 8 March 1976. Soon afterwards a de
facto cease-fire came into operation on the Omani-PDRY frontier. This 
coincided with the establishment of diplomatic relations between Saudi 
Arabia and the PDRY, on 9 March, and it was widely reported, in 
unofficial coverage, that such a cease-fire was a condition of Saudi 
recognition of the PDRY. Significant military assistance across the
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frontier did end, and, while some isolated individuals from PFLO 
remained within Oman, the remaining forces inside the PDRY had no 
further regular contact with them. The cease-fire held. PDRY sources 
indicated that the Saudis had at first made it a condition of their 
recognition that all PDRY support to the PFLO ceased. 46 This did not 
occur. PDRY political support for the PFLO was maintained: until 1982 
the Front continued to maintain offices, camps and schools in the PDRY,
as well as to enjoy the diplomatic and radio facilities which it had
47 previously been allocated. The commitment to the Omani guerrillas
was therefore substantial, costly and prolonged: but it also had clear 
limits.
The PDRY backed the PFLOAG but was only rarely involved in waging 
the war on Omani territory. The one occasion when PDRY forces did 
cross the frontier in any significant numbers as PDRY units, i.e. on 
their own, was in the May 1972 clash at Habrut. This was, however, 
a case of a direct conflict between the forces of the two states, an 
isolated incident, removed from the main theatre of operations. In 
late 1975 PDRY forces did, for the only time, fight unannounced along­ 
side the guerrillas. The PDRY did, however, play an important 
backup role for the guerrillas in at least four other respects: as 
supplier of arras, as guardian of the PFLOAG's rear positions, as 
provider of long-range artillery support for operations inside western 
Dhofar, and as periodic supplier of militia forces for short-term 
operations inside Oman itself. The cost to the PDRY was, however, far 
greater than the diversion of forces and funds to this border conflict 
in the far east of the country, since the PDRY paid a major diplomatic 
cost in overtly and consistently aiding the Omani guerrillas through­ 
out the period of their war. This support alarmed the oil-producing 
states of the Gulf: the Dhofar war was a threat to them and they
197
further exaggerated its significance for their own reasons, as the 
PDRY did for its, for good measure. It certainly postponed the speed 
with which relations could be established with these states. It also 
increased the diplomatic isolation of the PDRY within the Arab world 
as a whole: Aden's attempts in 1971 to prevent the entry of Oman into 
the Arab League and the UN were failures, and showed that it had no 
support within the international community on this matter, even from 
the Soviet bloc. Such isolation was, moreover, something which the 
Sultanate, after 1970, actively sought to encourage. The degree of 
isolation which the PDRY, in supporting the Omani guerrillas, under­ 
went can be gauged from the tone of the appeal which PFLO itself 
directed to the Arab states during the final Omani government offen­ 
sive in late 1975:
We have addressed ourselves to our Arab brothers by every avail­ 
able means of communication with facts and logic, providing them 
with proof and evidence of our awareness of the dangerous situ­ 
ation in this region. We appealed to them in the name of Arabism 
and humanity, but the brothers were deaf, dumb and blind, unable 
to comprehend anything. Yet here we have the invaders again 
escalating their crimes against our people.
Not only were the PDRY's relations with conservative Arab states 
of the Peninsula affected, but so too were Aden's relations with the 
then emergent power of the Persian Gulf, Iran. Iran never sent an embassy 
to Aden and the Shah despatched his forces to Oman with the express 
purpose of countering South Yemen's influence; the result was that 
from 1973 onwards, until the Iranian troops were withdrawn at the time 
of the Iranian revolution, Iranian planes and forces were deployed 
near the South Yemeni border, and on one occasion, in November 1976, 
an Iranian plane was shot down over South Yemeni territory. The 
issue of Dhofar also played an important part in keeping relations 
with the west at a low level: Britain was not willing to improve rela­ 
tions, and the USA was not interested in re-establishing them, as long
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as the PDRY's hostility to the Sultanate continued.
The cost which the PDRY was prepared to pay for its commitment to 
the Omani guerrillas was striking enough during the years when the 
guerrilla movement was itself functioning within Dhofar. Aden changed 
its policy as a result of changes on the ground in Oman, not vice- 
versa. It is unlikely that the agreement on establishing diplomatic 
relations with Saudi Arabia would have been possible had the guerril­ 
las not already been defeated: there is no indication that the PDRY 
altered its policy towards the PFLO, by reducing support, and so 
hastened the defeat of November 1975, but it was this result on the
ground that enabled the establishment of Aden-Riyadh diplomatic rela-
52 tions in March 1976. However, even after the effective end of the
guerrilla war the PDRY continued overtly to support the PFLO for a 
further six years. This was evident from the fact that until 1982 
the Front maintained its office publicly in Aden, its facilities in 
the area near the Omani frontier, and its time on Aden radio. Well
after March 1976 PDRY officials time and again reiterated their sup-
53 port for the PFLO. A modification was noted in the formulations of
the 1978 YSP Congress, which did not mention the Omani guerrilla 
organisation by name in its resolutions as previous Congresses had 
done; but 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il did mention the PFLO in his political
*
report and a PFLO message of support was reported at the 1980 Con­ 
gress. Any shifts of nuance were not matched by an ending of the 
support and public coverage which the PFLO received in PDRY government 
and press materials in the late 1970s.
After the Dhofar war ended, a gradual shift in PDRY positions on 
Oman itself, as distinct from the Front, was, however, noticeable. 
Mediation between the PDRY and Omani governments had been attempted 
by a number of Arab governments from the early 1970s onwards. From
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1971, both governments sat in the Arab League, and in May 1974, after 
a meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers in Tunis, an Arab League delega­ 
tion was despatched to mediate between the two countries. This dele­ 
gation comprised the Arab League Secretary-General, Mahmud Riad, and 
representatives of Tunisia, Algeria, Kuwait, Egypt and Syria. The 
factor which occasioned this diplomatic initiative was the introduc­ 
tion of large numbers of Iranian troops into Dhofar in the previous 
December. This Arab League mission was not, however, successful. 
Its terms of reference were that it should mediate between the govern­ 
ments of Oman and the PDRY. But while the Omani government received 
the mission, the PDRY refused, on the grounds that it was not involved 
in the dispute. The position of the PDRY was developed in the 
statements of the PFLOAG, which argued too that there was no dispute 
between the governments of the two states, South Yemen and Oman. 
Rather the conflict was one between two forces within Oman itself, 
the legitimate representatives of the Omani people on one side, the 
PFLOAG, and two foreign occupying forces, Britain and Oman, together 
with their client regime, that of Sultan Qabus, on the other. As 
a PFLOAG statement put it:
We reject the allegation that Democratic Yemen is a party to the 
dispute now going on in Oman between our people and the foreign 
invaders. Our people liberated much of the territory inside the 
southern region of Oman in the first years of the revolution, and 
the military operations which are launched against the British 
bases in Salalah are only launched from these liberated areas....
The People's Front has on several occasions and in its national 
democratic programme stated the just demand of our people that the 
colonialist occupation, all foreign interference and all military 
bases which threatened the security of our people and the Arab 
nation should be ended....
Instead of forming a fact-finding commission, the Arab League 
was in duty bound to ask Qabus to expel the Iranians and the 
British, and to abolish all military bases. 58
The Front not only insisted that the Arab League adopt these positions, 
but also invited the League to send a fact-finding mission to the
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guerrilla areas. It rejected any mediation between itself and the
Qabus government, and it called for the expulsion of Oman from the
59 
Arab League. As a result, the 1974 mediation effort ended in
failure, and an attempt to revive the mission in March 1975 was also
. . 60 inconclusive.
A number of individual Arabian Peninsula countries had also been 
trying from 1973 onwards to mediate between Aden and Muscat. Kuwait 
sought to use its diplomatic links with Aden and its provision of aid 
to modify Aden's stance, but at first this Kuwaiti initiative only led 
in 1974 to a strain in Omani-Kuwait relations, and it had no apparent 
impact on PDRY policy. In November 1974 the PDRY restated its refusal 
to have diplomatic relations with Oman. Saudi Arabian attempts to 
get a change in PDRY policy were more successful in that they brought 
about a border truce; but they too failed to produce any movement 
towards diplomatic relations and Saudi influence on South Yemen dec­ 
lined again in 1977 as a result of the overall deterioration in rela­ 
tions between the two states. In the latter part of the 1970s, PDRY- 
Oman relations remained peaceful but frozen, and both sides continued 
to criticise the other for its alliances with third parties - the 
Omanis denouncing the PDRY for its alliance with the USSR and drawing 
international attention to Soviet military facilities there (the 
extent of which they often exaggerated), the PDRY criticising Oman 
for granting military facilities to the USA. When Oman supported 
Egypt's policy of signing a peace treaty with Israel in 1978-9 this 
brought a further element to the dispute between the countries.
The very persistence of conflict between the two states neverthe­ 
less involved South Yemen in an unstated adjustment of its policy 
towards Oman. One of the first PDRY statements to be made on rela­ 
tions with Oman after the effective defeat of the guerrillas was made
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in 1977. Hitherto the official Adeni position was one of supporting
the vietory of the Front, a position affirmed at the October 1975
fi7 Unification Conference. Under the influence of the attempts by
Saudi Arabia and others to mediate, from 1976 onwards, Aden altered 
its stance to one of laying down conditions for recognising the Omani 
state. Thus it enunciated a new set of principles, which marked an 
initial departure from one of simple support for a PFLO victory. At 
a meeting to commemorate the twelfth anniversary of the start of the 
guerrilla movement in Oman, <Abd al-Fattah Isma'il denied that there
•
was negotiation with Oman, stating that
the PDRY adheres to its position in support of the Omani revolu­ 
tion....The starting-point of any political settlement in Oman is 
the complete withdrawal of the Iranian forces, the liquidation of 
the military bases, and freedom for the Omanis to determine their 
own destiny.63
This represented a modification of Aden's position in two respects: 
first, it was insisting not on the replacement of the Sultan by the 
PFLO, but on some less clearly defined democratisation of the regime; 
secondly, it introduced specific foreign policy conditions into the 
negotiation procedure, rather than the more absolute one of supporting 
a complete change of regime. The position of the PDRY in 1977 was 
still, however, that no negotiation with the Sultanate was then 
possible. Nonetheless, by the late 1970s Aden had begun to talk of 
negotiation with Muscat, albeit on conditions that were then not 
capable of being met. In 1979, the PDRY posed three conditions for 
improving relations with Oman: that it end all facilities for foreign 
forces, that it cease hostile actions along the common frontier of the
two states, and that it 'return to the Arab fold 1 , i.e. renounce its
64 support for Egypt and the Camp David agreement. In June 1980 'Ali
Nasir Muhammad said that mediation depended 'on the return of the
• •
Sultanate to the Arab ranks opposed to the parties to Camp David'.
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These conditions appeared to be ones that Oman would not meet, and to 
signify a continuation of the cold war between the two countries. 
But the 1979/1980 PDRY conditions were significant by omission: they 
did not, by that time, make any mention of the PFLO as a party to the 
dispute. The ending of the guerrilla war had not produced an agree­ 
ment between Oman and the PDRY, nor had it ended PDRY backing for the 
PFLO. But it did produce a shift in the underlying PDRY position, 
from presenting the PFLO as the legitimate government to posing 
demands directly to the Muscat government. This was a change that 
made it easier, at a later stage, for Aden and Muscat to come to an 
agreement. The defeat of the guerrillas in 1975 therefore had its 
consequences on the PDRY position, albeit in these partial shifts - 
first the frontier cease-fire, then the modification of diplomatic 
position.
A series of new elements were now introduced into the conflict in 
the period 1979-1981, and by July 1980 the PDRY was prepared to say 
that it had agreed to mediation with Oman. On the one hand, PDRY 
criticism of Oman increased, as the Muscat government went further 
than previously in granting use of military facilities to the USA and 
developing an alliance with Egypt. A bases access agreement was signed 
with the USA in April 1980 and, from 1981 onwards, Oman held joint 
manoeuvres with the USA on Omani territory. In practice, this 
brought US forces in significant numbers to within a few miles of the 
South Yemeni frontier for the first time and US equipment was reported 
to have been stationed at Thamrit, a base about fifty miles from South
£ Q
Yemen, as well as at other Omani bases. Consequently, in 1981, 
relations between the two states seemed, if anything, to have deteri­ 
orated: in March, June and December 1981 there was tension and minor 
conflict along the frontier. In this period South Yemeni statements
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repeatedly denounced the US presence in Oman. But as early as June 
1981 a PDRY statement enunciated two points that could provide the 
basis for an agreement: (a) the PDRY accepted mediation efforts by 
Kuwait and the UAA; (b) 'Democratic Yemen had, 1 it was stated, 'always 
been eager for Arab solidarity against the Arab nation's principal 
enemies, imperialism and Zionism. Yemen had been calling for priority 
to be given to pan-Arab issues over secondary issues. 1 The PDRY now 
put the blame for the failure of mediation on to the Sultanate.
In June 1982 Kuwait arranged for a meeting between Deputy Foreign 
Ministers of the two states. While many previous unannounced meetings 
had been rumoured, this would have been the first public bilateral 
meeting of representatives of the two neighbouring countries. This
meeting did not take place, in part because the PDRY side did not
72 
accept the status of the Omani representative. But on 3-7 July
talks did take place in Kuwait between the directors of the Arab world 
departments of the two Foreign Ministers and preliminary agreement was 
reached on four topics for discussion: (1) non-interference in the 
internal affairs of the other, and respect for sovereignty in discuss­ 
ing the border issue; (2) the question of a foreign presence and 
military bases in each other's countries; (3) a halt to media cam­ 
paigns against each other; (4) an exchange of diplomatic representa­ 
tion. After further negotiations, an agreement was signed on 27 
October 1982 between the Foreign Ministers of the two countries,
allowing for the settling of remaining issues between them, and a
74 
future exchange of diplomatic representatives. This agreement was
known as the Kuwait Agreement of Principles; it led to a closure of 
the radio facility in the PDRY used by the PFLO, on 6 November 1982, 
the day the PDRY ratified the agreement, and to an end to overt PDRY 
government criticism of Oman.
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Official PDRY statements justified the agreement with Oman by 
reference to the need for Arab unity in the face of the Israeli 
threat. Thus a statement on 26 October declared that
normalising relations between the PDRY and the Sultanate of Oman 
is one of the PDRY's goals in securing the stability of the region 
and avoiding the hostile dangers that threaten our peoples as a 
result of the growing imperialist military presence and the US and 
Israeli plots against our Arab peoples.^6
Subsequently the PDRY Foreign Minister was reported to have declared 
'that his country had the right to do what was commensurate with its 
welfare and the welfare of the region's states and that there was 
nothing contradictory in that'. PDRY statements stressed the impor­ 
tance of 'security and stability 1 in the region, and the need for Arab 
unity in the face of the dangers posed to the Arab world by Israel and 
the USA. 78
The Kuwait Agreement of Principles assented to by the Foreign 
Ministers of the two states, and later ratified by both governments, 
certainly brought some benefits to the PDRY government: it ended a 
state of military alert on the eastern frontier, opened the frontier 
to trade and migration that had been in existence for centuries but 
which had been virtually blocked since 1968, and relieved Aden of a 
political commitment that no longer made the sense which it had, both 
practically and morally, when the guerrillas were a significant force 
within Oman itself. Most importantly of all, perhaps, the PDRY gained 
diplomatically, by ending a conflict that had antagonised other Arab 
states, including, in particular, the Arab oil-producers whose 
economic assistance Aden required.
On the other hand, the Kuwait Agreement represented a setback for 
Aden's long-standing policy towards Oman and continued to underline 
the limits of South Yemeni influence. PDRY policy towards Oman had 
undergone a number of setbacks since independence. An initial one,
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in 1967, was the failure of the newly independent PRSY government to 
secure continued control over the Kuria Muria Islands, retroceded by 
the UK to Oman. The second, in 1971, was the failure of the PDRY to 
win backing for its stance on recognition of Oman, to prevent the 
entry of Oman into the Arab League and the UN, and to win support 
from any other states for this. This failure was compounded by the 
Arab League mission's refusal to accept PDRY and PFLOAG conditions 
for mediation in 1974-5. The third was the defeat of the guerrillas
on the ground in late 1975 and the acceptance of a cease-fire in
79 
March 1976, albeit one which Aden never officially acknowledged.
Even in the negotiations of the final years of overt conflict, the 
PDRY was forced to abandon some of the conditions it had laid down. 
Thus, after the Kuwait Agreement, Oman did not terminate its support 
for Egyptian diplomacy towards Israel, and American forces continued 
to use Omani facilities. Immediately after the Oman-PDRY accord,
South Yemen criticised Oman for allowing US military manoeuvres to
ftO continue, but it did not renounce the agreement itself. Even the
reason given to justify the Kuwait Agreement, the need to co-ordinate 
Arab strategy towards Israel, was without meaning, given the great 
differences of policy that subsisted between Aden and Muscat and the 
overall inability of the Arab world to evolve a coherent, let alone 
effective, policy towards Israel at this time. The PDRY continued to 
back the PLO, and a 'rejectionist' stance hostile to Egypt, while 
Oman declared itself in favour of Arab diplomatic recognition of 
Israel.
The 1982 outcome drew attention equally to the fact that South 
Yemeni support for the guerrillas had, although overt, been granted 
within certain constraints. Two are most evident. First, Aden had 
always been careful about the degree of direct military assistance it
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gave to the Front, and it had not committed the forces it could have 
to supporting the guerrillas: it can be argued that at the height of 
the PFLOAG's power, between 1969 and 1971, a quick, substantial, inter­ 
vention by PDRY regular forces in support of the guerrillas would have 
given victory to the latter in Dhofar. But the diplomatic consequen­ 
ces of this, and the possibility that other outside forces would then 
have intervened on the side of the Sultanate, may have prevented the 
PDRY from ever maximising its support for the rebels. South Yemen 
never committed its own forces in a major cross-frontier intervention 
in Oman as it did in 1979 in North Yemen, and the lesson of North 
Yemen, in 1979, only confirmed the need for such prudence. The second 
limit was political. The Aden government had long sought to provide 
political support to the guerrillas: but its own experiences with 
Egypt during the 1963-1967 guerrilla war against the British in South
Arabia had made the NF leaders cautious about seeking to inflect other
82 guerrilla leaderships. Yet, despite the policy of non-interference
in the guerrillas' activities, it seems that from the early 1970s 
onwards the PDRY government was disturbed by some aspects of PFLOAG 
policy: the lack of activity in the cities of northern Oman and Dhofar, 
the factionalism within the leadership, the incidence of harsh treat­ 
ment of the population under guerrilla control, and, later, the exag-
83 geration of the Front's military strength. PDRY stress in 1971 and
1972 on the need for broad alliances in the Gulf was a reflection of. 
Aden's sense that PFLOAG was too sectarian. Between 1968 and 1971, 
PFLOAG also went much further than the NF in adopting pro-Chinese
political positions. It was only in 1971 that the first PFLOAG
85delegation visited the USSR. Neither of these factors - the rest­ 
raint in military support for the Front, the political disagreements 
between them - led to any overt breach between the two. The defeat
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of the guerrillas in 1975 does not seem to have reflected any shift 
in PDRY policy, any reduction in Aden's support, and Aden continued 
to pay a considerable price for years to come for its backing to PFLO. 
But at no point was the PDRY government willing to risk the survival 
of its own state, by becoming involved in an outright war with Oman 
that would have run the risk of bringing in other states to support 
the Sultanate.
Despite these limits, however, the commitment to an overthrow of 
the government in Oman was a sustained and open one, and was termin­ 
ated only some years after the Omani guerrillas themselves had been 
defeated on the ground. It involved the South Yemeni state in con­ 
siderable foreign policy costs during the decade and a half after 
independence, and did much to produce that wider confrontation between 
South Yemen and the other states of the Peninsula and the Persian Gulf, 
as well as between Aden and the west, that was to confirm the isola­ 
tion of the South Yemeni government. It is, therefore, worth identi­ 
fying in summary fashion those factors that may have led Aden to make 
such a long, expensive and improbable gamble upon the overthrow of 
the Sultanate of Oman, the underlying sources of this 'solidarity 1 . 
First, South Yemen had a state interest in prosecuting the conflict 
with the government of Oman. There was the issue of the disputed 
frontier, and of the Kuria Muria Islands in particular, which would 
have been more likely to find successful resolution in the event of 
a guerrilla victory. (It is worth noting, however, that when ques­ 
tioned on the matter of the islands in 1970, PFLOAG leaders would not 
be specific.) South Yemen also had an interest in winning an ally in 
a neighbouring state with which it could have beneficial economic 
relations, and towards whom, if the guerrillas did succeed, it would 
no longer have to adopt an adversary posture. Secondly, as a regime
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itself committed to revolution, South Yemen derived benefits from 
being perceived as encouraging this process elsewhere. These included 
benefits within South Yemen itself, where the process of internal 
radicalism was presented as cognate with the radicalism of foreign 
policy. Indeed, while this linkage involved South Yemen in additional 
deprivations that made the process of internal transformation more 
difficult and while not a few South Yemenis complained privately about
this policy, the authorities overseeing this process tried to derive
A6 
additional legitimacy from it. Thirdly, the NF's support for the
PFLOAG in Oman was part of a wider continuity in MAN organisational 
commitment that predated the independence of South Yemen, and which 
also involved ties to the Palestinian and other groups that had once 
comprised the MAN. It was part of the self-image of the NF leadership 
that it should remain loyal to the PFLOAG for these historical reasons, 
and it was also a part of the support which South Yemen won from 
radical sections of the Palestinian movement that it should continue 
backing for PFLOAG. Despite the fact that these other ex-MAN forces 
were not in power, and hence in a weaker political situation than the 
NF, such was the need of South Yemen for allies within the Arab world 
that the backing of these guerrilla groups within the Palestinian 
e'migre' communities was important to it. Unfortunately for South Yemen 
the MAN connection introduced an extra element of factionalism into 
the Omani movement, one that may have confirmed the Front's isolation 
in the Gulf as a whole. Fourthly, the commitment to the Omani guer­ 
rillas had certain benefits beyond the Arab world itself. In the 
initial post-1967 years, China supported the Omani guerrillas: this 
may have constituted a further encouragement to Peking to provide aid 
and political support to the PDRY. The USSR did not give political 
support to the PFLOAG on the scale that China did, but from 1971 the
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Russians sent some arms and the threat to the PDRY from Oman, and 
even more so from Iran, did encourage the USSR to give Aden military 
aid.
These four reasons in themselves appear insufficient to explain a 
commitment that was maintained by South Yemen for so long and at such 
cost. The South Yemeni support for Oman can only be fully accounted 
for if it is seen as a product of an additional factor, the revolu­ 
tionary ideology of the NF with its international implications as it 
developed during and after the independence struggle: this ideology 
involved both a radical nationalist element, of hostility to British, 
American and Iranian forces and bases in the Arabian Peninsula, and 
a radical social element, of opposition to Sultans, merchants, tribal 
chiefs and other groups in Arabian society considered to be exploita­ 
tive. In the eyes of the NF, the political and social character of 
the Omani regime, before and after the fall of Said bin Taimur in July 
1970, resembled in several important respects that of the South 
Arabian Federation which the NF had ousted in 1967. Beyond, therefore 
the identifiable concrete benefits which suggested support for the 
Omani guerrillas, there lay a broader political commitment born of 
the dual, social and national, character of the South Yemeni revolu­ 
tion itself.
Relations with Saudi Arabia
The establishment of diplomatic relations with Oman in 1982 marked 
the greatest alteration in the PDRY's post-independence foreign policy 
in that it represented Aden's acceptance of the need for state-to- 
state relations with this most long-standing foe. But the process of 
establishing relations with a variety of states in the region had been 
in train since the early 1970s, and involved, in essence, two kinds of 
relationship. One was the negotiation of ties with conservative
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states to which the PDRY had initially been opposed. The other was 
the search for alliances - military, political and economic - with 
radical states that were either in place at the moment of South 
Yemen's independence or which emerged during the years after 1967. 
The uneven and belated progress of the first process contrasted with 
a number of advances in the second. After the first years of isola­ 
tion, South Yemen's search for reliable revolutionary allies amongst 
the radical states of the region was to provide in many respects an 
alternative or substitute for the unsuccessful encouragement of revo­ 
lution among the more conservative and vulnerable components of the 
area's state system.
The impact of the South Yemeni revolution within the Arabian Penin­ 
sula as a whole, and the sustained support by Aden for the Omani 
guerrillas, led to antagonistic relations between South Yemen and most 
of the conservative monarchies of the Peninsula. A joint statement
of November 1972 was signed by the NF and organisations from Saudi
87 
Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and PFLOAG. By far the most important of
the Peninsular states in economic and military terms was Saudi Arabia, 
one of the three states, along with Oman and North Yemen, to share a 
common border with the PDRY. The difficulty which Aden posed to Saudi 
Arabia was of a quite distinct character to that posed to the two 
other neighbours, since the frontier was in desert terrain and at no 
time did the PDRY provide material support to any significant opposi­ 
tion forces within the KSA. In the early 1970s some small Saudi exile 
groups, themselves descendants of MAN cells, did have representation
O Q
in Aden, but none acquired even a radio facility and the major under­ 
ground guerrilla groupings inside Saudi Arabia that had operated in 
the aftermath of the North Yemeni revolution had been defeated by the 
time that the South became independent. During the 1970s there was
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much speculation about possible PDRY influence via the hundreds of 
thousands of North Yemeni and South Yemeni migrant workers in Saudi 
Arabia and, since a number of South Yemenis were involved, there were
attempts to link the PDRY to the insurgents who seized the Grand
89 
Mosque in Mecca in November 1979. But no evidence of any such
linkage of South Yemen to internal dissent within Saudi Arabia has 
ever been shown, and the comparative tranquillity of the KSA, combined 
with the very different geographical conditions along the frontier 
dividing the two states, precluded the kind of South Yemeni involve­ 
ment with opposition in Saudi Arabia that occurred in the cases of 
Oman and North Yemen.
South Yemen did, however, pose a certain challenge to Saudi Arabia 
in other respects. First, by its role in Oman and North Yemen, parti­ 
cularly in the latter, Aden found itself involved in an indirect con­ 
flict with Saudi Arabia: a triumph of the forces backed by South Yemen
in either of these two countries would have constituted a setback for
90 Saudi Arabia. Secondly, the political orientation of the new South
Yemeni regime was in itself a source of difficulty for the Saudis, in 
that it opposed the principles of monarchical rule and public adher­ 
ence to a traditional interpretation of Islam that were so central to 
the Saudi policy. Thirdly, the establishment of military ties between 
the PDRY and the USSR exposed Saudi Arabia to a potential threat on 
its southern flank. The KSA had since the 1940s had a military alli­ 
ance with the USA, and this developed much further in the 1960s and 
1970s as Saudi oil wealth and the rise of Arab nationalist forces in 
the Peninsula combined to increase Riyadh's demand for weapons. 
Throughout the post-independence period Saudi Arabia had superiority 
over the PDRY in military terms, because of its superior air power. 
But the growth of Soviet influence and deployment in Aden, coming as
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it did with Soviet deployments in Egypt, Iraq, Somalia, and later 
Ethiopia, then served to promote anxiety in Saudi Arabia itself.
The pre-independence period had already established certain of the 
parameters of what was later to be KSA policy towards South Yemen. 
Saudi Arabia had not recognised the legitimacy of British rule in 
South Arabia and the border between the two entities remained ill- 
defined: but in the May prior to the British withdrawal, King Feisal
visited London and attempted to persuade the Labour Government not to
90 
continue with the withdrawal policy. For their part, the NF pursued
policies that conflicted with Saudi Arabia, because of the latter's 
support for Britain in 1967 itself, because of Riyadh's involvement 
in encouraging the pro-Saudi tribal forces in North Yemen, and because 
of Saudi backing for the rulers of the South Arabian Federation.
In the post-independence period the NF seems initially to have 
believed that there was some chance of gaining Saudi recognition. 
Saudi Arabia's delegate welcomed the PRSY's admission to the UN and 
a week after independence, when most other Arab governments had recog­ 
nised the PRSY, the Foreign Minister declared: 'We hope the Saudi 
Arabian kingdom will soon recognise our young state and establish good
relations between us inspired by a spirit of neighbourliness in the
93 
interests of our two peoples and states.' However, Riyadh refused
to do this and provided refuge and facilities for many of the more 
influential refugees from the revolution in South Yemen that accom­ 
panied the British withdrawal. Saudi Arabia had, by mid-1968, organ­ 
ised the South Yemeni exiles into an active opposition and provided
them with radio facilities to broadcast to South Yemen. Open denunci-
94 
ations of Saudi Arabia by Aden began to be made in July 1968, and
Saudi statements then repeated the FLOSY charge that the NF had been
. . 95 
put into power by Britain.
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Saudi ability to influence events in South Yemen was, however, 
limited by a number of factors. First, the Saudi government was 
divided about what to do. Policy towards North Yemen had long been 
controlled by the Governor of Najran and that toward South Yemen was 
under the command of Prince Sultan, the Minister of Defence since 
1960, who directed exile raids from the base at al-Sharura. But 
King Feisal was not, it seems, fully persuaded of the chances of
success of their plan, and as a result the campaign was conducted in
97spasmodic manner. Secondly, the exiles themselves were not a coher­ 
ent fighting force. They were recruited mainly from tribal refugees
and migrants from the YAR who were not trained or organised into a
98 coherent fighting force. Thirdly, the threats from Saudi Arabia
served a supportive role for South Yemen itself: the rulers were able 
to evoke hostility to the Saudi rulers, and the threat from Saudi 
Arabia, and behind it the US presence in the Kingdom, served as an 
argument for requesting greater military assistance from the USSR.
In 1968 and 1969 there were a number of clashes along the frontier 
between the two states, both in the Fourth Governorate, formerly 
Beihan, and in the more deserted northern regions of the Fifth Gover­ 
norate, or Hadramaut. These involved only South Yemeni exiles and
99PRSY government forces. In November 1969, however, clashes escala­ 
ted into a direct conflict between the forces of the two states when 
on 26 November PDRY forces occupied a Saudi border post in the al- 
Wadiah area, about four hundred miles north-east of Aden. Between 
eight and ten days of fighting then took place, but superior Saudi 
air power was used to push the Yemenis back. This conflict reflec­ 
ted a deeper dispute between the two states. The al-Wadiah area had 
in the past been part of the Qa'iti Sultanate: as such it was con­ 
sidered by the South Yemenis to be part of one of the Eastern Protec-
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torates and so of their national territory inherited from the pre-
102 1967 period. A dispute between Saudi Arabia and Britain had
occurred there in 1954-1955. The Saudis, on the other hand, saw al- 
Wadiah as part of their legitimate territory and as a frontier in the 
confrontation with the PDRY: following the Wadiah clash, large-scale 
military construction and deployment of forces took place at al- 
Sharura, a position lying a few miles behind al-Wadiah.
For the next five years, border clashes and acts of sabotage organ­ 
ised with Saudi support took place within South Yemen. 'Radio Free 
Yemeni South' continued its broadcasts against the NF. The main arena 
of the conflict was, however, North Yemen and the barometer of Saudi- 
South Yemeni relations and radio comment fluctuated in accordance with 
the degree of threat which South Yemeni policies were believed to pose 
in Riyadh. The 1969 al-Wadiah clash, a border incident on 20 March 
1973 and South Yemeni policies generally in the Peninsula were, how­ 
ever, used within the USA as arguments in favour of supplying arms to 
Riyadh despite the opposition of the pro-Israeli lobby. However, 
by 1974 a gradual shift in policy could be detected on both sides. 
The failure of both the direct cross-border raids from the K.SA and of 
the larger offensive, to which Saudi Arabia contributed, in the first 
inter-Yemeni war of 1972 appear to have led to a change of perspective 
in Riyadh. Preliminary negotiations seem to have involved the presen­ 
tation of quite clear conditions on both sides: the Saudis demanded 
an end to support for the guerrillas in Oman, an end to PDRY attacks 
upon the Saudi monarch, and the return to South Yemen of those exiled 
in 1967, together with the restitution of their property. On their 
side, the South Yemenis asked for the closing down of the Saudi-backed 
radio station, the establishment of economic links between the two 
states, and the integration into the K.SA of those exiles that would
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not accept the new regime in the PDRY. Later accounts of the 
negotiations gave details of additional issues that the Saudis are 
believed to have brought up: an end to Soviet military, political and 
economic influence in the PDRY, and the ending of state control of 
the South Yemeni economy.
On the South Yemeni side, there was also a change of perspective 
as a result of increased anxiety following the arrival of Iranian 
combat forces in Dhofar in December 1973. In December 1972, after 
the inter-Yemeni war and the conclusion of the unity agreement with 
the YAR, President Salim Rubiyya* 'Ali had made a strong denunciation 
of 'the Saudi reactionaries and their masters, the American imperial­ 
ists'. He alleged that Saudi Arabia was planning to divide the 
PDRY by invading Hadramaut and pushing through to the Indian Ocean, 
to seize the port at Mukalla. This would have led to the establish­ 
ment of a Greater Hadramaut State. This charge was repeated by PDRY 
leaders during 1973, when a number of substantial border clashes took 
place on the Saudi-PDRY frontier, between South Yemeni exiles and PDRY
government forces and in March the KSA accused South Yemen of again
1 OR 
attacking al-Wadiah. In 1974, however, the Aden leadership began
to alter its position. During a visit to Cairo in September 1974
President Salim Rubiyya* 'Ali stated: 'We are trying on our part to
establish relations with whoever respects our independence and our
national sovereignty and believes in non-interference by states, irres-
109 
pective of their dissimilar regimes, in our internal affairs. 1 In
the Presidential speech on the anniversary of independence he was more 
specific:
All I want from Saudi Arabia is an end to sabotage operations 
against our country, an end to the supply of weapons to the mer­ 
cenaries, the liquidation of the mercenary camps on the borders, 
and a halt to the hostile campaigns. We categorically refuse to 
be an aggressive state. There is not a shred of evidence that we
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committed an agression against Saudi Arabia, but we have much 
evidence that some Saudi officials have supplied and supported 
our enemies. ***-Q
The President's use of the phrase 'some Saudi officials' may have 
indicated an awareness that policy towards the two Yemens was tradi­ 
tionally in the hands of Prince Sultan and the Governor of Najran, 
but it was also an indication that a change of leadership in the King­ 
dom itself might ease relations between the two states. The assassin­ 
ation of King Feisal in March 1975, an event in which Aden played no 
part, may therefore have been an additional solvent in relations bet­ 
ween the KSA and South Yemen, as it was in those between the Kingdom 
and the United Arab Amirates.
The announcement of diplomatic relations, made in March 1976, spoke 
of the two states having the 'intention to establish normal relations 
between them on the basis of Arab fraternity, good-neighbourliness, 
the unity of destiny and non-interference in internal affairs'. It 
made no mention of respect for each other's territorial integrity or 
of any other specific political conditions. It was, however, 
accompanied, in practice, by agreement on each side to some of the 
demands which the other had put. The PDRY ceased propaganda activi­ 
ties against the Saudi monarch, together with support for opposition 
groups. As a result of the end of the war in Dhofar, it was possible 
for the PDRY to accept a de facto cease-fire on the Oman-South Yemeni
frontier, without this involving an end to the public support and
112 provision of facilities accorded the PFLO. The Saudis, for their
part, recognised the South Yemeni government, silenced the opposition 
radio and ended armed attacks across the frontier, and allowed for 
the establishment of economic ties between the two states. The 
latter involved the offer of economic aid totalling 70 million Saudi 
rials to the PDRY. It also led to the development of broader
217
economic ties between the two states. This thaw, together with 
the establishment of diplomatic ties, was of considerable importance 
for the PDRY. It enabled emigrants to remit money and send goods 
with less difficulty back to the PDRY, and provided the South Yemeni 
government with the ability to provide consular and transport facili­ 
ties to the emigrants for the first time. The opening of direct air 
links between the two states also enabled South Yemenis to visit 
Mecca in greater numbers than had previously been the case.
On the other hand, neither side had achieved its full complement 
of aims. The Saudis had made no apparent headway in repeating in the 
PDRY what they had earlier achieved in Egypt, Somalia and North Yemen, 
namely using the inducements of recognition and aid to alter the 
diplomatic and economic orientations of the country. In addition to 
the aid committed, which amounted to $50 millions, offers of up to 
$400 millions in Saudi aid were reportedly made. Nor had Aden's 
support for the opposition in Oman ceased. Aden, for its part, won 
offers of limited economic support from Saudi Arabia and none was 
actually delivered; and, while overt Saudi hostility to the PDRY was 
terminated, it was too early to be sure that the Riyadh government 
accepted as permanent the results of South Yemeni independence. One 
particular topic on which agreement was not reached was that of 
frontiers. As noted, the announcement on the establishment of diplo­ 
matic relations did not contain the statement, common in such declar­ 
ations, on respect for each other's territorial integrity, and it 
does not appear that either state sought to have its view prevail in 
the preliminary discussions, so great was the divergence between 
their two positions. The question of the frontier fell into two 
parts. There was, first, the problem of the Saudi-PDRY frontier, a 
boundary never properly defined and the site of the al-Wadiah clash
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of November 1969. Saudi Arabia had shown itself reluctant in rela­ 
tions with other states to define its frontiers and this had not 
impeded a general improvement of relations between them - Oman and
the Amirates being cases in point. In late 1982 discussions on the
118 
joint border were reported to have begun. The failure of the two
sides to find agreement, or even to agree to appoint a boundary com­ 
mission, may therefore have reflected a common desire to avoid a 
contentious point at this stage. But the Saudi-PDRY dispute involved 
another border question, namely that of the Saudi-YAR frontiers. For, 
given its claim to represent the whole of the Yemen, the PDRY had 
made this issue, of the frontiers between what were in practice two 
other states, a matter of concern in its own foreign policy. This 
dispute concerned something far more substantial than the desert areas 
along the Saudi-PDRY boundary: it involved the PDRY claim that three 
provinces of Saudi Arabia - Jizan, Najran and 'Asir - were Yemeni 
territory. This issue, although dormant, remained a source of PDRY
resentment against the KSA, and a further obstacle to the resolution
119 
of all outstanding differences between the two states.
These remaining incompatabilities did not take long to emerge. 
Salim Rubiyya' 'All visited Saudi Arabia in July 1977 and some improve­ 
ment in relations was noted. The joint communique spoke of the need
120 to unite Arab ranks. But by the end of 1977 relations between the
two states had deteriorated once again. As a result of the crisis in 
the Horn of Africa, Saudi aid to the PDRY was blocked, and tension 
along the common frontier grew. The PDRY held Saudi Arabia respon­ 
sible for the death of YAR President al-Hamdi. In June 1978 there
•
occurred the death of YAR President al-Gha_shmi and the leadership 
conflict inside the UPONF: the victorious faction led by 'Abd al-Fattah»
Isma'il implied that former President Salim Rubiyya' 'Ali had been
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involved in secret contacts with the Saudis and had been contemplat-
• 177 ing acceptance of the Saudi terms rejected in the 1976 agreement.
Saudi Arabia, for its part, accused Aden of having killed al-Ghashmi
and the USSR and Cuba of having organised the fall of Salim Rubiyya'
_ 123 
'Ali. Saudi Arabia encouraged a move inside the Arab League on
2 July to have the PDRY suspended from membership and to have all 
political and economic ties to it broken. This suspension, accom­ 
panied by a restarting of the propaganda war between the two states, 
lasted until the PDRY was readmitted to full membership of the League
at the Arab League meeting that followed the signing of the Israeli- 
125 Egyptian peace treaty in March 1979. But, accompanied as this
readmission was by continued conflict in North Yemen and between North 
and South Yemen, the ending of this intense period of Saudi-PDRY 
diplomatic hostility did not produce a resolution of all conflict 
between the two states. For both the PDRY and Saudi Arabia perceived 
the other as part of a menacing strategic alliance, with the USSR and 
USA respectively, and the increased military deployments of these two 
outside powers in the Peninsula at the end of the 1970s occasioned
•j n £
hostile comment from Riyadh and Aden. Both states, too, continued 
to suspect the other not only of supporting its respective clients in 
the YAR, where conflict lasted until 1982, but of backing underground 
activity within their own states. Thus Saudi officials suspected, 
and publicly alleged, a supposed PDRY role in the seizure of the Mecca 
Grand Mosque in November 1979. The PDRY in 1982 arrested and later 
sentenced a group of seventeen returned exiles who were said to have
been trained for sabotage missions by Saudi, British and US experts
127 inside Saudi Arabia.
An element of normalisation was, however, possible after the restor­ 
ation of political and economic ties in 1979. Saudi Arabia received
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a visit by President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad in June 1980 and discussions• •
128 
on a resumption of economic aid took place. The PDRY President
visited the KSA again in August 1982 for discussions on the Israeli
129 invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The underlying compromise of 1976
therefore continued to provide the structure within which the two 
states regulated their affairs. The PDRY ceased to anticipate major 
upheavals within Saudi Arabia, the KSA was compelled to accept the 
socio-economic and strategic orientations of the PDRY. Beyond these 
guidelines, however, the character of relations between Aden and 
Riyadh depended to a considerable degree not on their bilateral rela­ 
tions as such, but on the state of affairs in other states in which 
the two countries had a joint interest - North Yemen, Oman, the Horn 
of Africa.
It was the relatively more stable situation in these areas, com­ 
bined with the growth of areas of common concern, that enabled Aden 
and Riyadh to return by 1980 to the kind of basic if limited under­ 
standing that had been worked out in 1976. The balance of advantage 
and disadvantage in this accommodation was the converse of that in 
the resolution of relations between South Yemen and Oman. In relation 
to the latter, it was the PDRY which was compelled to accept the 
permanence and legitimacy of the regime in the neighbouring state. 
None of the major demands made by the PDRY in regard to Oman, either 
before or after 1976, were met. In the settlement with Saudi Arabia, 
it was the latter which was forced to accept the legitimacy of the 
PDRY. The only major 'concession 1 obtained from Aden, the termination 
of support for the Omani guerrillas, had already in practice been 
achieved by the very fact of the PFLO's defeat on the ground at the 
end of 1975. None of the other two major Saudi objectives - the 
severing of ties with the USSR, the restoration of private enterprise
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in the PDRY - were met. In the face of an apparently equal or even 
weaker neighbour, the PDRY had to give ground. In the face of the 
much stronger KSA, South Yemen to some degree prevailed. 
The Smaller Gulf States
Relations both with the Sultanate of Oman and with the KSA also bore 
on the question of Aden's relations with the other states of the 
Peninsula, the four smaller entities along the Persian Gulf, namely 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the Amirates. All four of these had work­ 
ing relations with Saudi Arabia, and after the change of Sultan of
Oman in 1970 relations between that country and Saudi Arabia developed
130 too. In May 1981 the five smaller states were to join Saudi Arabia
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in establishing the Gulf Co-operation Council. But they also had
some margin of variation in their foreign policies, a factor that 
became evident in their somewhat diverse dealings with the PDRY.
When South Yemen became independent in 1967 only Kuwait was already 
a fully independent state: it immediately recognised the PRSY. In his 
annual address a year later the Amir of Kuwait declared of the PRSY: 
'We wish this fraternal state success. We also hope that the frater­ 
nal PRSY will succeed in putting an end to the civil war which hampers 
its progress to the better life we wish it. 1 Despite Saudi hostil­ 
ity to the PRSY, the latter's support to a PFLOAG that implicitly 
included Kuwait within its concept of the 'occupied Arab Gulf, Kuwait 
appears to have believed that its interests would be best served by 
keeping diplomatic contacts with Aden open, and providing economic 
aid, of which by the end of 1980 a total of ?37 millions had been
spent. During the 1970s Kuwait was the only Peninsula state apart
134 
from the YAR to maintain regular air links with Aden. Such indeed
was the import of this contact with Aden that in 1974, in protest at 
Kuwait policy, the Omani government expelled the Kuwaiti charge
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d'affaires from Muscat. Kuwait continued to maintain ties of diplo­ 
macy, aid and communication with Aden throughout the troubled years 
of the late 1970s, and it was to play, after several failed attempts, 
an important mediating role between the PDRY and Oman. In February
1981 the Amir of Kuwait paid an official visit to Aden during which
135 the Amir endorsed the movement towards Yemeni unity.
The other three Gulf states were still British Protectorates and 
the policy of South Yemen towards these three was initially one of 
undifferentiated hostility. All were part of the 'occupied Arab Gulf 
which PFLOAG was seeking, from 1968, to liberate from British control. 
When, in 1971, Britain began to prepare to leave the remaining enti­ 
ties by the end of the year, South Yemen reacted critically. It 
asserted, as it did in the case of Oman, that the independence granted 
to rulers long supported by Britain, and to be backed by treaties 
after independence legitimating a continued British military role in 
the region, was not a genuine one. The PRSY became engaged in a 
double diplomatic campaign, designed to prevent both the three new 
Gulf entities and Oman from obtaining international recognition. Thus 
in July 1971 the PDRY Minister of Information and Culture 'Abd Allah 
al-Khamri stated that the establishment of the 'spurious Federation' 
of the Amirates 'confirms that British colonial policy has been
oppressively and forcibly trying to bring this colonialist toy into
137 being in any form'. He stated that Britain wanted, in reality, to
perpetuate the division of the area into small states. In early Sep­ 
tember 1971 the PDRY Foreign Minister Muhammad Salih 'Awlaki went on
• • • •
a tour of several Arab states - Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Syria, Iraq -
in an attempt to win their support for opposition to the entry of
138 Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and the Amirates to the Arab League. He was
reported to have stated that 'these countries were not independent
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because foreign interests dominated them 1 . At the same time the
Aden authorities publicly re-emphasised their support for PFLOAG. 
This support they justified on two grounds: that the Front wanted a 
genuine independence for the Gulf, in contrast to the 'fake 1 indepen­ 
dence being granted by Britain, and that the Front wanted to unify the
Gulf, as opposed to the fragmentation being brought about by British
140 
policy. The new cabinet of 'Ali Nasir Muhammad appealed to other
* *
Arab states to support the PDRY's stand on the revolutionary movement
141 in the Gulf.
However, the PDRY's policy evoked little support either within the 
states concerned or in the wider Middle East. The four states were 
admitted to the Arab League, and while Iraq shared some misgivings
about Oman no other Arab state backed the PDRY's position on the
142 
Sultanate. When on 30 November Iran seized three islands belonging
to the Amirates, the PDRY, in common with some other Arab states, con-
143 
demned this action, and held Britain and the USA responsible. But
again, there was little in practice that the PDRY could do, and the 
PFLOAG had no active presence in the Amirates, its only significant 
following outside of Oman being a political one in Bahrain. When the
four Persian Gulf states applied for admission to the United Nations,
144 
the PDRY alone voted against them. Thus not even amongst the
socialist states was there any support for Aden's stance and in the
UN votes the Soviet Union and its allies accepted the independence of
, ^_ 145 
the Amirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman.
During 1972 and 1973 the PDRY maintained its criticism of the four 
states of the Gulf that it had failed to keep out of the Arab League 
and the UN. In a speech on the financial difficulties facing the
PDRY in July 1972 Premier 'Ali Nasir Muhammad declared: the crisis* •
could not be solved either by the flirtations of the Amirates in
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the Gulf or by reaction, at the expense of our people in the Gulf 
and the Peninsula and that we would continue to support the Gulf's 
revolution and the revolution of the Arabian Peninsula.^ 6
However, within a few months of the 1971 entry of these states into 
the international bodies concerned some modification of the official 
NF position on them was noticeable. It was in relations with the 
three non-Omani Gulf states that the first developments were notice­ 
able. The Fifth Congress Resolutions of 1972, while endorsing the 
'armed popular revolution in the Arabian Gulf, did not restate the
position of the previous year on the illegitimacy of the smaller Gulf
147 states or mention them by name, and the spate of denunciations of
'imperialist agents' in November and December 1972 criticised only 
Saudi Arabia and Oman.
A change became explicit two years later in November 1974, in a 
speech on the seventh anniversary of South Yemen's independence: in 
it President Salim Rubiyya' 'Ali made an appeal for improved relations 
with the other Gulf states, apart from Oman:
We have excellent relations with certain Gulf states, such as 
Kuwait, which has given us much support and aid. Following Iran's 
military intervention in Oman, we had to determine who was our 
arch enemy and to destroy him....It is inevitable that we should 
negotiate and establish relations with the United Arab Amirates 
and some Gulf states. Such a relationship must be based on a 
clear-cut basis - non-interference in each other's internal 
affairs, non-aggression and mutual respect. There is no reason 
for the existence of enmity between us and the other Gulf states 
if those states preserve their independence and reject any foreign 
presence in their territory. Our duty is to struggle against the 
foreign presence in the Sultanate of Oman.
This change in PDRY policy, distinguishing Oman from the other Gulf 
states, was made possible by three developments. The one, which the 
President stated, was the Iranian intervention in Oman in December 
1973 which brought a direct threat to the borders of South Yemen. 
The second, also a result of the Iranian intervention and preceding 
the announcement of the change in South Yemeni policy, was the
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dissolution of PFLOAG, and the emergence of a guerrilla movement con­ 
fined to Oman, the PFLO, in July 1974. The entity continuing 
PFLOAG policies which did come into existence in Bahrain, the Popular 
Front in Bahrain, did not call for armed resistance, and while PFB-NF 
links were continued, the PFB did not receive any public backing from 
Aden, or radio facilities. No organisations were reported as 
existing in Qatar and the Amirates. This itself reflected the fact 
that despite its name PFLOAG existed as a guerrilla force only in 
Oman.
The PDRY had, therefore, by the end of 1974 made some concessions 
in the hope of establishing relations with three of the Gulf states 
whose legitimacy it had earlier disputed. In accordance with this 
policy, Foreign Minister Mutiyya' visited the three states in early
•
152 1975. This change of policy did not, however, lead to as rapid an
evolution of relations as might have been expected. The Amirates did 
begin, from 1975, to provide economic aid to the PDRY, and in March
1977 Sheikh Zayyid of Abu Dhabi, the President of the Amirates,
153 visited Aden. Like Kuwait, Abu Dhabi maintained some links with
Aden throughout the 1977-1979 period when Aden's links to Saudi Arabia 
were broken again. But the other two Gulf states, Bahrain and Qatar, 
were more reluctant to provide aid, and for a number of years diplo­ 
matic relations were not established with any of the three. The 
formal PDRY position was that it was South Yemen which, as the state 
which had been independent earlier, had to make the first move in 
exchanging recognition and which, as of 1977, refused to do so. As 
the South Yemeni Foreign Minister stated in 1977 of the Gulf states: 
'The British are still there. It is only oil that enables them to look
independent. In fact, they are just as artificial as they were in
J.54 1971, and there is no need for us to accord them formal recognition.
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Relations with the Amirates were finally established in 1981, but 
not with Bahrain and Qatar.
Elements of reservation would, however, appear to have operated on 
the side of the Persian Gulf states as well. They were throughout 
this period influenced by both Saudi Arabia and Iran, and they may on 
their own account have remained apprehensive about PDRY involvement 
in Oman. The Amirates had in general more leeway in determining their 
own foreign policies than Bahrain and Qatar and this was why they were 
able to go some of the way along the road taken by Kuwait in opening 
and maintaining links with Aden. It can be surmised that Aden was 
avoiding the issue of recognition, in the hope that by offering to 
extend recognition in the future it could obtain greater economic 
assistance and diplomatic concessions from these states, and possibly 
win their support for the campaign to isolate Oman. In fact, Aden did 
not win any such concessions. The Gulf states, with the exception of 
Kuwait, participated with Saudi Arabia in providing some assistance 
to the Sultanate while attempting to avoid implication in the deploy­ 
ment of Iranian troops there.
After the fall of the Shah, however, a different situation emerged, 
when the Iranian revolution was seen as a threat by the oil-producing 
Arab states of the Peninsula. After the war between Iraq and Iran 
began in September 1980, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the 
Amirates and Oman came together in May 1981 to form the Gulf Co­ 
operation Council. The GCC envisaged creation of a combined military 
force, and it was seen by Aden, as well as Tehran, as being a threat 
to its security. The PDRY therefore disagreed with the GCC, on the
grounds that it included Oman with which, at that time, Aden was in
1 Sft 
a continuing state of hostility. The GCC, however, developed a
diplomatic strategy to reduce disagrement with Aden. One of the main
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topics of discussion at its first summit was the security situation 
in the south of the Arabian Peninsula, a topic raised by Oman. 159 As 
a result, the GCC encouraged negotiation with Aden and in September 
1981, coincident with preparations for direct negotiations between 
Oman and the PDRY, discussions also took place between the GCC and 
the PDRY. These talks do not appear to have led to any specific 
agreements, but they did signify a decision on both sides to lower 
the level of tensions between the GCC and one of the two Peninsular 
states not to participate in it. These discussions, a decade after 
the issue of negotiation between South Yemen and the Gulf states 
arose, therefore marked a further step in the reconciliation of the 
PDRY with the smaller Gulf states.
Regional Involvements; the Horn of Africa, Iran, Palestine 
If in this way Aden's conflict with Saudi Arabia and Oman led to 
tensions with the other states of the Persian Gulf and, in the period 
up to 1974, to support for the spread of guerrilla war to some of the 
smaller Arab states of the Gulf, the PDRY's foreign policy also 
involved a search for allies elsewhere in the region, beyond the 
states immediately bordering the PDRY. It entailed support for guer­ 
rillas operating against the Shah of Iran, and to a tempestuous 
relationship with the rival nationalist tendency of Ba*thism, in 
power from July 1968 onwards in Iraq. The image diffused in some 
western discussion of South Yemen and Iraq as two prongs of a radical 
threat to the Peninsula contrasted with a history of recurrent anta­ 
gonism between these two competitors for radical hegemony. In 1976 
the PDRY denounced 'the fascist Ba'th Party of Iraq 1 for interference 
in the PDRY's internal affairs and Iraq's agreement a year earlier on 
an end to hostilities with Iran, and in 1979 and 1980 ambassadors 
were recalled after Iraqi embassy personnel killed an Iraqi exile in
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Aden. On the Red Sea side, the PDRY maintained a continual if
discreet interest in the affairs of the Horn of Africa: until 1974
it backed the guerrillas in the Ethiopian province of Eritrea163 and
developed a close political relationship with the military regime in
164 
Somalia. After the fall of Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie in
September 1974, Aden sought to establish an allegiance with the PMAC, 
the military regime that replaced the emperor. South Yemen's influ­ 
ence in the heartlands of the Arab world was certainly limited, by 
reason of its geographical distance and exiguous resources alike: but 
even here, South Yemen sought to develop a distinct policy of influ­ 
ence. It aided the more radical currents within the Palestinian 
resistance movement, and became increasingly critical of the policies 
pursued by the Egyptian government under Anwar al-Sadat. It also 
sought to develop close relations with those Arab states that seemed 
most opposed to Sadat, namely Libya and Syria.
In addition to these three core areas of its radical foreign policy 
- the Persian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula, the Horn of Africa, the Arab- 
Israeli complex - the PDRY also gave support, political and in some 
cases material, to revolutionary groups elsewhere in the third world: 
to the Politburo guerrillas of the Western Sahara, whose 'state',
the Saharan African Democratic Republic, Aden recognised in 1978,
166 
to exiled guerrillas from Chile and other Latin American countries,
to.some urban guerrillas from western Europe introduced by part of 
the Palestinian movement into the PDRY during the Presidency of Salim 
Rubiyya* 'All, and, prior to their assumption of power in 1975, to
I /I Q
the guerrillas operating in the three countries of Indo-china. 
Tempered over time as this wide-ranging commitment was by pressure 
and external realities alike, it constituted for some time a sustained 
defiance of the international status quo.
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The commitment to a radical policy beyond the immediate region 
underwent a distinct evolution in the decade and a half after indepen­ 
dence. In the Arabian Peninsula, and particularly in those states 
bordering the PDRY, the initial attempt to promote change or to defy 
established governments led later to some accommodation with the 
neighbouring regimes. The building of ties with Kuwait and the Amir- 
ates, the establishment of relations with Saudi Arabia in 1976, the 
signing of the Kuwait agreement with Oman in 1982, and the ongoing if 
fitful negotiations on Yemeni unity marked this process of adjustment. 
It was one that came about without major changes of the kind Aden 
envisaged in the political and social composition of the states 
involved.
By contrast, the change in the PDRY's relations with the wider 
range of regional states beyond the Peninsula tended to reflect the 
fact that substantial changes did take place within these countries. 
In other words, whereas South Yemeni foreign policy began in 1967 by 
seeking allies amongst revolutionary and other movements that had not 
yet come to power, and were in various degrees of opposition and clan- 
destinity, this orientation changed over time. This occurred, on the 
one hand, because its initiatives in the neighbouring states were 
blocked, but also because the PDRY was able to establish alliances 
with movements that had, like it, emerged from internal conflicts to 
assume state power, albeit further afield.
This process was evident in several instances. Soon after the 
independence of South Yemen, there occurred the military coup in Libya 
on 1 September 1969, in which the regime led by Colonel Kadjjafi came 
to power. Although Kaddafi was initially hostile to South Yemen - he
encouraged the North Yemeni attack on the PDRY of September 1972 and
169
even offered aid to the Sultan of Oman - he had by the mid-1970s
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become an active diplomatic supporter of the PDRY's. 170 In December 
1977 Libya, together with Syria, Iraq, the PLO and Algeria formed a 
'Rejection and Confrontation Front 1 , a group of states that opposed 
Sadat's peace initiatives. Egypt broke diplomatic relations with 
Aden on 5 December 1977 in protest. Although Iraq soon withdrew, 
and pursued a separate path, this 'Rejection Front' continued to act 
as a forum for the proposing of an alternative Arab foreign policy 
line to that of Egypt, and to the advocacy of a policy of closer 
alliance with the USSR.
The revolution in Ethiopia in 1974 brought a similar opportunity 
to the South Yemenis, albeit one that took three years to mature. 
While Aden had earlier supported the Eritrean guerrillas, by 1976 all
PDRY aid to them and to the EPRP, left civilian opponents of the PMAC,
172 had ceased. In 1977-1978 PDRY military forces played a role in
defending Ethiopia against the Somali attack: some South Yemenis were
173 
killed in that war. Close military, state, economic and party
relations between the two countries developed after that time. In
December 1979 the two states signed a Treaty of Friendship and Co-
1 1U operation; in August 1981 a Tripartite Pact between the PDRY,
Ethiopia and Libya was signed. This Pact envisaged economic sup­ 
port by Libya for the two poorer members, and military assistance 
between the member states in the event of an attack upon either by an 
oirtside power: this was particularly relevant for the two Red Sea 
states, Ethiopia and the PDRY. The Tripartite Pact also constituted 
a defiance of the conservative states of Egypt and Saudi Arabai pre­ 
dominant in the Red Sea area for some years previously, and provoked
176 
criticism from them.
The third revolution which brought the PDRY a new ally was the 
Iranian. Prior to 1979 Iran and South Yemen had had no direct
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relations. As already discussed, the PDRY had strongly opposed the 
Iranian presence in Oman and in November 1976 the PDRY had shot down 
an Iranian Phantom plane overflying its territory. 177 Aden had pro­ 
vided aid to some Iranian exiles up to 1978 and Iran had in 1976 
played host to a visit by the exiled former South Yemeni premier 
Hay_tham. Aden early on welcomed the revolution as it developed and 
the fall of the Shah in January 1979. 8 After initial requests for 
diplomatic contact from Aden had not been met, relations were estab­ 
lished on 23 April 1980 and in June 1982 the first Iranian ambassador
179 to Aden arrived. The PDRY remained neutral in the Iran-Iraq war,
180 blaming its outbreak on 'imperialist' influence, and its relations
with Tehran did not seem to be immediately affected by the deteriora­ 
tion in Soviet-Iranian relations that began in 1982. For its part, 
Iran was glad to find an interlocutor in an Arab world otherwise
largely opposed to it, and the PDRY was able to win economic support
181 from Iran, in the form of contracts to refine Iranian oil in Aden.
These three breakthroughs in regional relations - with Libya, Ethiopia 
and Iran - therefore constituted a contrast with the development in 
Arabian Peninsula relations, a contrast made possible by the upheavals 
within those countries that followed the emergence of the independent 
state in South Yemen in 1967.
One further significant area of accommodation and policy change was 
in the PDRY's relations with the Palestinian resistance. As part of 
the MAN, and as a component of the Arab nationalist milieu more gener­ 
ally, the NF came to power with a clear and radical stance on this
issue. The 1965 Charter supported the Palestinian movement, and
182 denied the legitimacy of an Israeli state. After independence the
PDRY developed policy in two additional respects. First, whereas most 
Arab states had recognised the PLO, led by al-Fath, as the main
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representative of the Palestinians, the South Yemenis gave their main 
support to two former MAN branches, the PFLP and the PDFLP. 183 The 
1964 Arab League decision to set up the PLO had been taken prior to 
the independence of the PDRY and so did not commit Aden to accepting 
its leadership. Secondly, although it did little about it, the PDRY 
also challenged the free passage of Israeli-bound shipping going 
through the Bab al-Mandeb Straits. In 1971 the PDRY permitted a 
group of PFLP guerrillas to attack an Israeli-bound tanker in the Bab 
al-Mandeb, and in the October 1973 war South Yemeni artillery on
Perim island, together with Egyptian naval units, imposed an undec-
185 lared blockade at the mouth of the Red Sea for about four weeks.
In 1974-5 there were discussions with Egypt about stationing Egyptian
1 RA
forces on Perim island but no agreement was ever reached.
All three of these particular components of the PDRY's radical 
stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict - its denial of Israel's legiti­ 
macy, its particular stance on the Palestinian resistance, and its 
stance on Israeli-bound shipping - were in time altered. In 1973 the 
PLO was allowed to open an office in Aden, and Aden then backed the
Yasir Arafat leadership within the PLO. Arafat paid his first visit
187 to South Yemen only in 1977. Given his reliance on Saudi funds,
it is unlikely he could have risked such a visit before 1976. In 
1982-1983 when Libya and Syria criticised Arafat and backed a dissi­ 
dent faction within the PLO, Aden at first continued to support
— 188 Arafat. The PDRY also came in time to adjust its policy on the
form of a final solution for the Arab-Israeli dispute. While in 
common with almost all other Arab states, with the exception of Egypt
and Oman, it refused to accept the right of an Israeli state to exist,
189 
Aden concentrated on calling only for Palestinian self-determination.
This shift, noticeable but unannounced, brought the PDRY position a
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little closer to that of the USSR, and it may be inferred that Soviet 
advice played some part in causing this adjustment in Aden's stance. 
A similar unannounced adjustment took place in the PDRY position on 
freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. After the 1973 blockade there 
were no further cases of PDRY interruption of the flow of ships to 
and from the Israeli port of Eilat, and by the time of the Kosygin
visit to Aden in September 1979, Aden was prepared to accept freedom
190 of navigation for ships from 'all adjoining states'.
In one sense, these changes were of secondary importance, in that 
South Yemen played in practice a small part in the fate of the Pales­ 
tinian movement and in the process of Arab-Israeli negotiations. The 
PDRY was too remote, and too impoverished, to exert significant influ­ 
ence: if Algeria found it so difficult to play more than a diplomatic 
role, it can be seen that South Yemen, equally distant and with much 
fewer assets, found its influence even more restricted. Aden's only 
direct impingement was via the Bab al-Mandeb, and this only took 
effect on two occasions. But the .PDRY did provide some inputs into 
the Palestinian movement - of diplomatic backing, both individually 
and as part of the Rejectionist Front, of military training facilities, 
and of refuge, for up to several hundred Palestinian fighters evacu­ 
ated to the PDRY from Beirut in September 1982. Support for the 
Palestinian cause was a central plank in the PDRY's foreign policy, 
albeit one that was, until the 1978 Congress, placed after that of 
Oman in the listing of foreign policy guidelines.
The PDRY's policy towards the Palestine issue was significant in 
the way in which- its evolution symbolised that overall adjustment in 
Aden's external relations which took place after the period of initial 
militancy. The adoption of a verbally militant and diplomatically 
isolated policy in the first years after 1967 gave way to one that was
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both more cautious and more in harmony with that of other states and 
organisations involved in the issue. The most evident, and most 
immediately relevant, of these policy adjustments was, however, not 
to be found in relation to the major international issues of the 
Middle East, in which the remote PDRY played a small part, but in 
relation to those conflicts within the Arabian Peninsula itself that 
had brought the PDRY into direct conflict with neighbouring states.
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Chapter Five
Relations with the USSR and China
On the basis of available evidence, and a number of individual inter­ 
views, it is possible to establish some of the general policy con­ 
siderations that underlay the evolution of South Yemen's relations 
with Russia and China in the post-independence period. If a degree 
of speculation must remain inevitable, some analysis of these concerns 
is nevertheless both possible and relevant.
The NF's decision to establish and develop relations with the 
socialist countries in the post-independence period was, at one level, 
a straightforward one. Both the USSR and its allies, and China, had 
given support to the nationalists in South Arabia during the indepen­ 
dence struggle, by criticising British policy and, in the case of the 
USSR at least, supplying arms through Egypt and North Yemen. As 
already noted, it is not clear how far direct links between these
states and the Front existed before independence, but one NF delega-
2 tion is known to have visited China early in 1967 and some NF-USSR
contacts already existed via Egypt and the PDU. Within the Front the 
ideologies and policies associated with the two states had acquired 
some followers, and both Soviet and Chinese versions of Marxism were 
available in translations from these countries and in publications 
acquired through the MAN networks in North Yemen and Lebanon.
Beyond their long-standing support for Arab nationalism both the
USSR and China enjoyed a particular prestige because of the support
4they had given to the YAR in the period after 1962. They were there­ 
fore regarded by many not only as allies of Arab and Yemeni national­ 
ists in the struggle against other external powers, such as Britain 
and the USA, but also as potential allies in conflict with conserva-
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tive forces within the Arabian Peninsula itself, the royalists and 
tribal leaders in the North, and, beyond them, the Saudis. In addi­ 
tion to such revolutionary affinity, the PRSY turned in November 1967 
to the socialist countries for a more immediate reason, namely the 
pressing needs of the post-independence situation. Faced with a large 
budget deficit, and with military tension along all three of its land 
borders, the new government in Aden had to move with some speed and 
decisiveness to consolidate its power. As relations with Saudi Arabia 
and with the west deteriorated, the Front was therefore encouraged to 
establish close ties with those distant supporters with whom, till 
then, it had established only tenuous contact.
Yet if the reasons for adopting this general orientation towards 
the eastern countries were clear, there were a number of uncertainties 
about how far and in what precise direction this policy should go. 
There were, first of all, divisions within the ranks of the NF itself 
on the degree of alignment to be established with the east, and how 
far the PRSY should abandon balance in relations between the two power 
blocs. Kahtan al-SSha'abi favoured pursuit of some balance, and sought
• » • ~~
until his fall in June 1969 to maintain ties to Britain, the USA and 
West Germany; but his more radical opponents did not. Their advent 
to power therefore opened the way to establishing stronger ties with 
Russia and China. But the radicals too were divided and the issue of 
relations with the east remained part of the overall conflict on 
policy with the Front throughout the post-1967 period. President 
Salim Rubiyya' 'All sought to maintain good relations with China, and 
he visited Peking in 1970 and 1974. He also sought to apply what he 
thought of as Chinese models of political mobilisation to South Yemen. 
<Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, on the other hand, was already a strong sup-
•
porter of the USSR and the period of his Presidency, from 1978 to 1980,
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was the one in which Soviet-Yemeni ties became closer. His successor,
'Ali Nasir Muhammad, did not return either to the policies of Kahtan* . ..
al-Sha'abi or Salim Rubiyya' 'All; but he did slightly lessen the 
degree of identification of the PDRY with the USSR.
For their part, the Soviet authorities had to evaluate their commit­ 
ment to South Yemen in the light of several distinct considerations. 
First, they had to assess the reliability of the NF - how far it could 
be depended upon to retain power, and how far it would follow what the 
Russians regarded as a judicious foreign policy line, one neither too 
accommodating to the west, nor so adventurous that it would provoke 
a western counter-attack. It evidently took some years before the 
Russians, who had had more than a few disappointments in the Arab 
world over the years, could feel sufficiently confident of the Aden 
authorities. Secondly, the Russians had to calculate what they could 
afford to offer: they could provide weapons for the PDRY's armed 
forces, but they could not and would not offer a firm guarantee to 
come to the PDRY's defence if it was attacked. Such a guarantee was 
given only to Warsaw Pact members, and was not even accorded to such 
allies as Cuba or Vietnam. At the same time, while the Russians were 
prepared to give some economic aid, this was neither of the quantity 
nor the quality that the PDRY expected and needed. Whatever either 
side wanted, there were consequently objective limits on what the USSR 
could provide. Thirdly, there was the overall situation in the 
Arabian Peninsula, Red Sea and Persian Gulf regions. The independence 
of the PDRY coincided with the beginnings of a more active US deploy­ 
ment in that region. The pace of Soviet military activity in the 
Indian Ocean, and more particularly in South Yemen, was to some degree 
dictated by what Moscow saw as the growth in the US presence. Exactly 
how far Soviet deployments in the PDRY were a counterpoint to US
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activities is impossible to say, since the evidence on Soviet policy 
and decision-making is not available. But the record of the Soviet 
buildup in Aden does on several occasions seem to be one of response 
to, and rivalry with, that of the USA in the adjacent countries and 
waters. As in the Indian Ocean itself, so in the Arabian Peninsula: 
while the Russians could not match US deployments with equal deploy­ 
ments of their own, they nonetheless acted to strengthen their posi­ 
tion and extend their military reach when and where the USA was also 
doing so. Each of these three considerations - the Soviet assessment 
of the PDRY regime, the capabilities of Soviet power, and the strate­ 
gic rivalry with the USA - all contributed to shaping the direction 
and pace of Soviet-South Yemen relations. 
Moscow and Aden; Initiating an Alliance
The evolution of Soviet dealings with South Yemen can be analysed in 
terms of the four Presidencies that marked post-independence politics 
in the Republic since each involved a distinct phase of Soviet-PDRY 
relations. At the moment of independence, Pravda in an article 
entitled 'Victory of the People' welcomed the departure of the British 
and gave a guardedly positive analysis of the new regime:
Imperialist propaganda, first of all British propaganda, is now 
trying to assert that Britain is voluntarily granting independence 
to South Arabia even before the set date.
Actually, the situation is otherwise. The history of Aden is 
a history of more than four centuries of struggle by the people 
of Aden against conquerors, from the Portuguese to the British. 
The independence of Aden has been won in stubborn struggle through 
the united efforts of the whole South Arabian people - the workers 
of Aden, the rebels of Dathina, Kathiri and Quaiti and the 
partisans of Radfan.
All the patriotic organisations and parties of Aden made a con­ 
tribution to the common struggle for independence: the Aden TUG, 
the NLF of the South Arabian Peninsula and the FLOSY.
Under the pressure of the national-liberation forces of South 
Arabia, which were supported by the progressive Arab countries and 
all progressive mankind, the British government adopted a forced 
decision to withdraw from South Arabia.->
Pravda went on to ascribe the NLF-FLOSY conflict to 'fanning' by
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British colonialism and quoted Kahtan al-Sha'abi and unnamed FLOSY
• • • _-i--
leaders as calling for an end to the dispute. (Other Soviet coverage 
repeated this emphasis on the need for unity among the nationalist 
groups. ) Pravda concluded with a cautious prognosis:
As for the future governmental structure of the newly independent 
country, Sha'abi noted that South Arabia will be a republic with 
all the institutions of a people's democracy, i.e. a union of 
popular forces will be created, not a 'formal capitalist democracy'.
The people of Aden, after traversing a long road of struggle, 
have won independence. But they will have to exert considerable 
efforts to defend and strengthen the independence they have won. 
Success to you, heroic people of Aden!?
The USSR recognised the PRSY two days after independence, on 2 
December 1967, and later in that month a Soviet mission arrived to
set up a Soviet embassy. The first permanent diplomatic staff arrived
g 
in February 1968 and the first Soviet ambassador, Vladimir Startsev,
9 in November. Unlike almost all other countries, the USSR did not
have to take permanent possession of an existing building, but was 
allowed to build a large new compound overlooking the sea on the 
eastern side of the Khormaksar isthmus, with no adjacent buildings, 
near to the international airport, and with extensive residential 
facilities. Discussions must have proceeded rapidly on the most 
important matter of concern to the PRSY, namely security, for within 
three months of independence, in early February 1968, a military dele­ 
gation led by Minister of Defence 'Ali al-Bid visited Moscow. No 
actual agreement was announced at that time, but on his return al-Bid 
dismissed the British technicians serving with the armed forces and 
in March the first Soviet military delegation under General Alexander 
Negrasky came to Aden for a four-day visit 'during which it studied 
the Republic's military requirements'. In August the two countries 
signed a Technical and Military Assistance Agreement, the first accord 
of any kind between the USSR and the PRSY. Further military missions
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visited the USSR in November and December. 1 ^
The USSR continued the pace of contacts with the new Republic 
despite the divisions within the South Yemeni leadership, and the 
apparent shift of power to the more moderate sections of the Front 
after March 1968. During the height of the May 1968 crisis the Soviet 
ambassador made a point of calling on the Minister of Defence to offer 
support. In June 1968 a group of Soviet ships, the first to visit 
the Indian Ocean, paid a visit to Aden and this was repeated again in 
January 1969 when a second Soviet naval visit to the area was paid. 
Throughout the latter part of 1968 delegations visited the capitals 
of the two states to discuss military, economic and cultural matters: 
the visit of Defence Minister <Awlaki resulted in the Technical and
•
Military Agreement. The first arms came in July 1968 and in January 
1969 a major consignment of Soviet military equipment arrived, com­ 
prising 'ten Mig-17 fighters, air-to-surface missiles, anti-aircraft 
guns, portable radar equipment, ammunition and spare parts'. A
Soviet military mission, reported to include fifty members, reportedly
18 
accompanied these supplies.
The first top-level South Yemeni visit to the USSR was by President 
al-Sha'abi who spent eleven days in the Soviet Union in January and 
early February 1969. During his visit an important Economic and 
Technical Assistance Agreement was signed: under it, the USSR agreed 
to help the PRSY create a modern fishing industry by building a new 
fleet, constructing a fish cannery and setting up a training and 
research centre in the PRSY. 1 The USSR agreed to train South Yemen 
personnel in the USSR, while South Yemen agreed to Soviet technical 
missions studying the waters around the PRSY. Al-Sha'abi's visit 
also led to the signing of a Scientific and Educational Agreement, 
and in subsequent years the number of Yemenis studying in the eastern
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bloc as a whole rose considerably. 20
The increasing reliance of the PRSY on the USSR for support in the 
military field, and the growth of economic and cultural ties, did not 
lead so rapidly to the consolidation of a closer overall alliance 
between the two countries. As noted, Soviet coverage of the initial 
NF governmental programme was favourable, but restrained, and the con­ 
flicts of the first post-independence Presidency were treated care­ 
fully in Moscow. Soviet commentators were sceptical about the NF's
21radicalism. The Soviet press reported on the problems facing Presi­ 
dent Kahtan al-£ha'abi, but stressed again the need for unity among
o 7
the 'patriots* in the PRSY. While the Programme of the Fourth Con­ 
gress of March 1968 was, in general, treated favourably, reports also 
pointed to problems within the NF and to the enormous social and 
political problems South Yemen faced.
With the inception of the second Presidency, that of Salim Rubiyya' 
'Ali, in June 1969, relations began to improve further. Soviet publi­ 
cations made favourable comment on what they called the 'June 1969 
Reshuffle 1 , and on the declarations of the new leadership about rela­ 
tions with the USSR and support for national liberation movements,
24 while others criticised impatient 'leftists'. The decisions taken
immediately after the 'Corrective Move' were not, however, given the 
kind of coverage in the Soviet press that would suggest Moscow was 
convinced the new leadership had really purged itself of such extrem­ 
ist tendencies. Nonetheless, an NF delegation, led by Secretary- 
General 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, attended a meeting in April 1970 on
«
the one hundredth anniversary of Lenin's birth, and in the Soviet
report the Front was classified as one of the 'national democratic
25 parties and organisations' attending the ceremonies. Two months
later, in June, <Abd al-Fattah Isma'il stated that the USSR had agreed
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to provide assistance in training party cadres and providing educa-
26 
tional courses. Another NF delegation visited the USSR in July 1970
to study training methods in the CPSU and, from December 1972 onwards, 
with the opening of a College of Socialist Sciences and of a school 
for the Ashid or Youth Union, Soviet instructors were teaching NF 
members in South Yemen on a regular basis. In December 1972 a second
no
agreement, on CPSU-PONF co-operation, was signed.
A certain improvement in Soviet-South Yemeni relations came in the 
latter part of 1970 and in the following two years. In December 1970 
Pravda reported warmly on the proclamation of the new constitution 
and the proclamation of the PDRY:
A progressive state that has taken firm anti-imperialist stands 
has sprung up on the very frontier of the mighty Anglo-American 
Persian Gulf oil 'empire'. This state has become an example for 
the peoples of Arab territories where the oil monopolies and 
their feudal vassals are still active. The Yemenis already are 
rendering the courageous partisans of the neighbouring Sultanate 
of Oman support in their struggle.2'
The report went on to say that Yemenis 'speak gratefully 1 of Soviet 
assistance, and that the USSR was involved in building irrigation dams 
in Lahej and in seven other districts. Twenty artesian wells had been 
drilled to provide water to co-operatives and state farms, and Soviet 
tractors and motor vehicles could now be seen in the streets of Aden. 
As this report indicated, the USSR had by now come to accept what 
it may earlier have thought of as South Yemen's more adventurist 
foreign policy initiatives in backing the Dhofar guerrillas, where 
Chinese influence had been strong between 1968 and early 1971. Yet 
while Soviet correspondents visited Dhofar in 1969 and 1971 and 
reported favourably on the movement there, even in this convergence 
differences remained. Soviet writers did not endorse the overall PDRY 
position on the Gulf in 1970-1971: they criticised, but did not con­ 
demn, the British policy of transferring power to the rulers of the
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three smaller states of the Gulf3 and they did not join the PDRY in
o "j
refusing to recognise these states. Whereas the South Yemenis 
talked of the 'Arab Gulf, the Russians maintained their use of the 
term 'Persian Gulf, in press reports and in USSR-PDRY communiques. 34 
Thus the Pravda correspondent who visited Dhofar in 1971 had to render 
the name of the guerrilla organisation not as it was in Arabic, the 
People's Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf, but as 
'People's Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Zones of the 
Persian Gulf. Nevertheless, while the PDRY's opposition to British 
policy in the Gulf itself remained ineffective, and hence posed no 
problems for Soviet-Yemeni relations, the USSR did from 1971 onwards 
begin giving public support to the Dhofar guerrillas following a 
PFLOAG delegation's visit to Moscow in September 1971 and permitting
O £
the transfer of Soviet arms to them via South Yemen. By 1971 a 
working basis of Soviet-Yemeni agreement therefore existed on what 
was, at that point, the most militarily active of South Yemen's three 
borders.
Further development of Moscow's relations with Aden took place 
during high-level South Yemeni visits in 1971-1972. 'Abd al-Fattah 
Isma'il attended the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the CPSU in February,
and this was followed by 'All Nasir Muhammad, then Defence Minister,• •
in April 1971, 'All Nasir Muhammad again, now Prime Minister as well
• •
as-Minister of Defence, in September 1971, and then by Salim Rubiyya-' 
'All, the President, in November 1972. The first two visits by <Ali
Nasir Muhammad appeared to concentrate on defence matters. In the
. .
April 1971 visit, he was reported to have met with Marshal Grechko, 
the Soviet Minister of Defence, Marshal Zakharov, the Chief of General 
Staff of the Armed Forces, Admiral Gorshkov, the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Navy, and Marshal Yepishev, Head of the Main Political
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Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy. 37 During the September 
1971 visit he met Alexei Kosygin, the Soviet Prime Minister, as well 
as other Soviet ministers concerned with areas of bilateral relations, 
Marshal Grechko, and the Minister of the Fishing Industry, A.A. Ishkov.38 
No agreements were reported after the first visit, but following the 
second visit, an agreement was signed on 'further development of 
economic and technical ties in the fields of irrigation, the fishing 
industry and the training of cadres'. This included construction of 
a fish cannery, whether the one already agreed to is not clear, and
creating and equipping a training centre for vocational-technical
39education. By February 1972 Tass reported that around thirty small- 
scale projects promised in the February 1969 Agreement had been com-
40 - 
pleted. President Salim Rubiyya' 'Ali's visit in November 1972 was
the occasion for the signing of a further Economic and Technical Co­ 
operation Agreement under which the USSR agreed to construct a thermal
power station for Aden, and a hospital, and to assist in geological
41 - surveys of an unspecified kind. In addition, the communique issued
on the completion of Salim Rubiyya' 'Ali's visit stated that: 'An 
agreement was also reached on the Soviet Union's continuing provision
of assistance to Democratic Yemen in strengthening the republic's
42 
defence potential.'
This rapprochement between Aden and Moscow was the result not only 
of increased Soviet confidence in the PDRY, but also of a shift in 
Aden itself. It appears that for some time after June 1969 Salim
Rubiyya' 'All had been reluctant to pay an official visit to the USSR
43 
and had, instead-, preferred to visit China in August 1970. But the
change in China's foreign policy in the region - its ending of aid to 
the Eritrean and Omani guerrillas, its improved relations with Iran, 
its support for Sudanese President Nimeiry in his conflict with the
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Communist Party in July 1971 - all contributed to altering the new
44 
President s opinion. Most important, perhaps, for both the PDRY
and the USSR, was the deterioration in conditions in the Peninsula 
itself. The USSR had, as noted, sought to balance its relations with 
the YAR and the PDRY. In a pointedly even-handed statement in 1969 
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko had stated: 'We have good 
relations with Iraq, the YAR, the PRSY and other Arab states'. A5 When 
fighting broke out between Saudi Arabia and the PRSY in November 1969 
the USSR did not take sides. By 1972, when the USSR had come more 
clearly to endorse the Adeni position, it blamed the tensions in South
Arabia not on the YAR but on 'aggressive forces' and 'imperialist
46 
plans'. An Izvestia commentary in late August discussed what it
regarded as the US policy of 'relying on reactionaries in the Arab 
world' to divide the Arab peoples and weaken their struggle against 
imperialism:
Such an unenviable role is being played by Saudi Arabia, for 
instance, which initially helped the Yemeni reactionaries in 
their struggle against the republican authorities after 1962 and 
then started fanning all kinds of discord between the Yemeni Arab 
Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.^7
The Soviet press reported the inter-Yemeni war of September 1972, but 
without openly blaming North Yemen. Soviet policy was to help the 
PDRY to survive without prejudicing other ties it had. The visit of 
President Salim Rubiyya* 'Ali in November provided an occasion for 
the USSR to endorse what it termed 'the measures that Democratic Yemen
has taken to end military operations on the border between the PDRY
49
and the YAR and the conflict between the two states'. The commun­ 
ique went on: 'The Soviet Union supports the PDRY's efforts for the 
normalisation of relations between the two Yemeni states and for ensur­ 
ing favourable conditions for the Yemeni peoples' development along
,50 
the path of national progress.
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Such convergence did not, however, mean that complete agreement 
between the two sides existed. As far as Yemeni matters were con­ 
cerned, the USSR still hoped to maintain some influence in the YAR. 
It continued to provide some military aid to the Sana'a government 
at a time when the Adeni authorities were assisting guerrilla opposi­ 
tion in the North and, in his speech welcoming Salim Rubiyya* «Ali, 
Premier Kosygin stressed that the YAR was a country 'friendly to the 
Soviet Union 1 . The USSR was also cautious about what it supported 
- 'normalisation of relations between the two Yemeni states', rather 
than Yemeni unity, the policy espoused in Aden and which was at that 
time also explicitly endorsed by China. On broader Arabian Penin­ 
sula matters some divergence was also evident. Thus the communique 
issued on the occasion of 'Ali Nasir Muhammad's second visit in 1971
• •
stated: 'the two sides exchanged opinions concerning the present 
situation in the Persian Gulf region and confirmed their solidarity
with the peoples of the Persian Gulf. It did not mention any conser-
53 vative Arab state by name, nor did it specifically endorse the
Omani guerrillas of PFLOAG as the PRC-PDRY statement of 1970 had done. 
A similar generic declaration of support was contained in the November 
1972 communique which backed 'the anti-imperialist struggles of the 
peoples of the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf against the 
intrigues of the international oil monopolies', without mentioning 
Oman or PFLOAG. These visits drew attention to a somewhat warmer 
Soviet appreciation of internal developments in the PDRY. But Soviet 
observers were aware of the conflict between Salim Rubiyya' 'Ali and 
his opponents. While they may have drawn comfort from the Fifth Con­ 
gress of 1972, with its adoption of a set of positions more consonant 
with Soviet policy, they must have been disappointed by the 'Maoist' 
mobilisations of July, the 'Seven Glorious Days' and the Maoist echo
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in Salim Rubiyya' 'All's appeals for 'self-reliance'. 55 In contrast 
to the attention given to the Fifth Congress, the 'Seven Days' 
received no coverage in the Soviet press.
Nevertheless, a greater degree of endorsement was evident. The 
October 1971 visit by 'All Nasir Muhammad was the occasion for Kosygin
• •
to state:
The Soviet Union gives support to the People's Democratic Republic 
of Yemen in its struggle to consolidate its independence. We 
shall do everything necessary so that the agreements concluded 
between our countries on co-operation will be successfully ful­ 
filled in the interests of the peoples of our countries and the 
cause of peace.56
The communique stated that the Soviet Union 'expressed its high 
appraisal of the anti-imperialist and anti-reactionary foreign policy 
course of the government of the People's Democratic Republic of 
Yemen 1 . As yet words such as 'progressive* or 'socialist' were not 
used. The statement of November 1972 went further and specified 
support for the PDRY's internal policies as well:
The Soviet side stated that the Soviet Union highly appreciates 
the activity of the National Front and the People's Democratic 
Republic of Yemen government in eliminating the onerous colonial 
legacy, constructing the national economy and carrying out pro­ 
gressive social, economic and political transformations. At the 
same time, the great importance of the fact that the National 
Front and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen base this 
activity of theirs on the support of the broad masses of people 
was emphasised.-*°
Official visits were also used by the PDRY delegations to express 
their thanks to the Soviet Union for the assistance given. While the 
Yemenis did not oblige their Soviet hosts by at any time making criti­ 
cisms, implicit or explicit, of Chinese foreign policy, and while NF 
Congresses continued to call for relations with all socialist coun­ 
tries, they did indicate that the alliance with the USSR had pride of 
place in their orientation as a whole. In October 1971 «Ali Nasir 
declared:
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people in our country are well aware of the fact that if it were 
not for the firm friendship that links our country with the 
socialist camp, headed by the Soviet Union, we would not have 
succeeded in overcoming and solving the problems that were created 
for us by colonialism and those which at present neocolonialism, 
in collaboration with reaction, is trying to create. 59
In December 1972, on a visit to attend celebrations on the occasion 
of the fiftieth anniversary of the formation of the USSR, 'All Nasir•
Muhammad hailed the USSR as 'a true friend of the Arab peoples', but 
combined this, in accordance with what was still NF policy, with a 
call for the unity of the 'world revolutionary forces', a policy for 
which he invoked the authority of Lenin.
The guidelines for close USSR-PDRY relations had therefore been 
established by the end of the fifth year of South Yemeni independence: 
agreements in the military, economic, cultural and party spheres had 
been signed and were being implemented. The PDRY and the USSR now 
shared common positions on a range of international issues which were 
regularly evoked in their joint statements - on Indo-china, southern 
Africa, Palestine. Some areas of differing emphasis remained - on 
Yemeni unity, and Oman in particular. And the Soviet characterisation 
of the stage of development of the PDRY remained cautious. The PDRY 
had not ceased to develop relations with China, but these were eviden­ 
tly not as close as those with the USSR and by 1972 divergences bet­ 
ween Aden and Peking became more evident. In addition to unstated 
Sino-Yemeni disagreements on emphasis, there was a clear public diver­ 
gence over the secession of Bangladesh in December 1971. While China 
and the great majority of Muslim states opposed the secession and 
backed Pakistan, the PDRY was the first Arab state to recognise the 
new Dacca government, a policy in common with that of India and the 
USSR. 62 Yet, despite these disagreements with Peking, a greater reso­ 
lution of the disagreements between the USSR and the PDRY, as within
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the South Yemeni government itself, was to take another six years to 
come about.
The Relationship Consolidated 
The spate of official contacts continued throughout 1973 and 1974,
with both <Ali Nasir Muhammad and «Abd al-Fattah Isma'il making visits 
• • .
in each year. Defence evidently remained of great importance. At the
end of <Ali Nasir Muhammad's visit of March 1973 the communique stated• .
that the two sides had "examined questions of strengthening the defen­ 
sive capability of the PDRY'. Similarly, the communique on the 
occasion of <Abd al-Fattah Isma'il's visit in July 1974 made mention
•
of 'measures for the future strengthening of the defence capabilities
64 s of the PDRY'. The same communique reported a new Agreement on
Technical and Economic Co-operation, the third such agreement, as well 
as a programme of cultural and scientific co-operation for 1974-1975.
The Russians took advantage of these encounters to restate their 
positive evaluation of developments within the PDRY. They slightly 
increased the degree of commitment they were able to declare for South 
Yemen, while at the same time appearing to urge the South Yemenis to 
settle their differences with their neighbours. During the September 
1974 visit of 'All Nasir Muhammad Kosygin stated that the PDRY 'can
* *
count firmly on the unfailing support of the Soviet Union in its 
efforts to carry out progressive social and economic reforms', but he 
coupled this with a plea 'to normalise the situation in the southern. 
part of the Arabian Peninsula 1 . What exactly was meant by the lat­ 
ter phrase is not clear, but it is evident from the communique that 
the Soviet and Yemeni positions on the region diverged. The statement 
merely reports: 'Opinions were also expressed on the situation in the 
Near East, particularly in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula. 
It would seem from the communique that the USSR was concerned at
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the degree to which the PDRY was exposed in that region. In June 
1974 there had been a coup in the YAR, in which Chairman al-Iryanl, 
intermittently engaged in negotiations with Aden since 1972, had been 
ousted. The new President, al-Hamdi, was still an unknown quantity. 
He was at first believed to have been put in power by Saudi Arabia 
which had been worried about the slight rapprochement of Aden and 
Sana'a. Both South Yemenis and Russians were therefore worried about 
their tenuous relations with the YAR. Kosygin's advice may also have 
concerned Saudi Arabia, and the Soviet belief that Aden should estab­ 
lish diplomatic relations with it, something which finally occurred 
in 1976.
What appears inconsistent, however, is that the emphatic Soviet 
caution on the YAR and Saudi Arabia should have coincided in the 
1974-5 period with a definite increase in Soviet support, political
£ Q
and military, for the Dhofar guerrillas. The Soviet press reported 
favourably on the August 1974 Congress of the Front, which limited 
the organisation's scope to Oman, as opposed to the 'Occupied Arab 
Gulf. This change was in harmony with Soviet policy: the USSR 
distinguished between Oman, a state very closely allied to Britain 
and the USA, and the other, somewhat more autonomous, Peninsular and 
Gulf states. The sharpening in Soviet attitudes to Oman appears to 
have been dominated by diplomatic and strategic considerations, rather 
than by the situation on the ground where guerrilla activity was 
ebbing. The Iranian intervention in 1973, and the Omani decision to 
grant base facilities to the USA, were apparently the sources of this 
greater Soviet irritation. As a result of this divergence, Soviet 
press coverage reached a crescendo in October and November 1975 at 
the very moment when the PFLO was finally being crushed. A Pravda 
report of 23 October 1975 talked of 'an armed struggle against the
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puppet monarchist regime and the colonialists' which had been going 
on for ten years. 'The Arab patriots are not alone, 1 it stated, 72 a 
point repeated a few days later in an article in the military paper 
Krasnaya Zvezda, which also reported that the PFLO was 'using the 
latest equipment for the first time, including highly efficient anti­ 
aircraft missiles'. Yet this change in Soviet policy, although 
apparently contrary to the drift of its policy on 'normalisation' 
elsewhere in the Peninsula, served to reduce still further the gap 
between itself and the PDRY. The establishment of diplomatic rela­ 
tions between South Yemen and Saudi Arabia in March 1976, a develop­ 
ment that involved a tacit agreement on a cease-fire along the South
Yemeni-Omani border, nonetheless resolved this question in practice.
74 
Soviet commentators welcomed this development. 'Normalisation'
along all three of the PDRY's frontiers was now under way.
In 1976 and 1977 the pace of official visits continued. 'Abd al- 
Fattah Isma'il attended the 25th CPSU Congress in March 1976, and
*
returned on a party mission in July 1976. Foreign Minister Muhammad
*
Salih Mutiyya' visited Moscow in May 1977, and 'Ali Nasir Muhammad 
. . • •
in July. No major new agreements were announced in 1976-1977. The 
outlines of the main areas of co-operation had been established, and 
the halt in new agreements may also have been a result of the increas­ 
ingly polarised situation within the Aden government itself, which 
made it more difficult for it to negotiate with the Russians and for. 
the latter to rely on it. The Soviet press did not, however, cease 
to declare its concern about developments in South Yemen: in April 
1977 it once again started to criticise Saudi Arabia by name, because 
of the latter's opposition to the new revolutionary government in 
Ethiopia and its attempt to use its relations with pro-Soviet govern­ 
ments in Somalia and South Yemen to wean them away from the USSR. An
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important Izvestia commentary quoted the French paper L'Aurore on 
Saudi attempts to win Somalia and South Yemen to the conservative 
camp, adding: 'The heightened interest Riyadh is showing in unifica­ 
tion trends in the two Yemens, as well as its attempts to play a role
as intermediary between certain Middle Eastern states, should be
78 viewed in this light. 1 When Mutiyya* visited the USSR in May 1977
some divergence between the two states was evident in that the Pravda
79 report spoke only of an 'exchange of opinions' on the Red Sea. The
two did, however, agree on the call to make the Red Sea a zone of
peace, as well as on the independence of Jibuti. In November 'Abd
al-Fattah Isma'il went to Moscow to attend celebrations of the sixti-
•
eth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution and at the end of 1977, 
when the PDRY joined with other radical states at the Tripoli confer­ 
ence of rejectionists to oppose Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, Pravda 
reported favourably on this and on the way in which the meeting of
rejectionist states had 'rebuffed' attempts to divide the Arab states
80 from the USSR. By then any anxieties about Saudi influence in the
PDRY must have been allayed.
In 1978 a period of even closer Soviet-South Yemeni collaboration
began. 'All Nasir Muhammad visited Moscow in February 1978 and the. •
final communique reported on a 'complete coincidence of both states' 
positions on questions of the struggle for peace and people's security, 
for universal and total disarmament and for a further relaxation of 
international tension 1 . The communique recorded the joint position 
of the two sides on the Arab-Israeli question, where they condemned 
the separate negotiations being conducted between Egypt and Israel, 
and on the Horn of Africa, where they called for a settling of the
Ethiopian-Somali conflict, then at its height, 'on the basis of good-
81 neighbourliness and anti-imperialist solidarity*. The tense inter-
264
national situation in the Middle East must therefore have figured 
prominently in these talks, but defence matters were also discussed, 
since 'Ali Nasir Muhammad visited the Soviet Ministry of Defence on 
3 February for discussion with Marshals Ustinov, the Minister of
Defence, and Ogarkov, the Chief of the USSR Armed Forces General
82 
Staff. The Soviet press, in articles accompanying the visit, gave
prominence to the economic assistance which the Soviet Union had given
o o
to the PDRY. Yet it appears that no new agreements were signed 
during this visit.
The internal crisis of June 1978 was given considerable coverage 
in the Soviet press. No mention was made of western accusations that 
the Soviet Union had played a part in instigating or determining the 
outcome of the crisis. But Saudi Arabia was accused of 'attempting 
to take advantage of the assassination of the President of the YAR to 
make unsubstantiated and false accusations against the PDRY', and on 
27 June Pravda repeated Radio Aden statements by UPONF concerning 'the 
failure of an attempted coup by former chairman of the South Yemeni 
Presidency Council, Salim Rubiyya' 'All*. Later, 'Abd al-Fattah 
Isma'il was quoted as saying that the late President had tried to 'sow
doubt about the correctness of our relations with the socialist commun-
85 
ity and above all with the Soviet Union'. With growing criticism
in the Arab world of South Yemen, Pravda, in an official commentary 
entitled 'Dangerous Interventionist Intentions', made the strongest 
statement to date of support for the PDRY:
Now that the attempted coup in the PDRY by Salim Rubiyya' 'Ali, 
the former chairman of the Presidency council, has been smashed, 
those who pushed him into that adventure are trying to achieve 
their ends by other means. According to reports, Saudi Arabia is 
actively preparing for armed intervention against the PDRY, in 
hopes of overthrowing the progressive regime, which Riyadh finds 
objectionable....
Saudi Arabia is trying to provoke an attack on South Yemen by 
the Yemeni Arab Republic in order to create a pretext for armed
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intervention against the PDRY....
What the forces of reaction and imperialism succeeded in doing 
in Zaire's Shaba province must not recur in the south of the 
Arabian Peninsula.
The sovereign People's Democratic Republic of Yemen is not 
alone. Progressive forces will not abandon her in her troubles.
Internal and external factors therefore combined to produce a situ­ 
ation in which the USSR voiced greater support for the PDRY: the 
change in South Yemeni leadership on the one hand, the greater exter­ 
nal pressure on the other, led to a new degree of Soviet commitment. 
While no binding defence agreement was known to have been reached, the 
phrase about 'not-abandoning' the PDRY implied some, albeit unspeci­ 
fied, Soviet commitment to help Aden in the event of attack. In 
October 1978 the Founding Congress of the YSP was given favourable 
coverage in the Soviet press: after listing the achievements of the 
PDRY in the fields of socio-economic reform and strengthening the 
state sector, Pravda went on:
The creation of a vanguard party in the PDRY reflects the will of 
the country's popular masses. They welcome the policy approved by 
the YSP Congress, of further development along socialist lines, 
and they favour a stronger alliance with the USSR and other social­ 
ist states. 87
For the first time, therefore, Soviet writers were reflecting the 
thesis, already articulated in South Yemen, that the PDRY was in some
measure moving towards 'socialism', that it was, in Soviet terminology,
, 88 a 'state of socialist orientation'.
Soviet coverage of the second inter-Yemeni war, of February-March 
1979, was, as in 1972, relatively restrained. Stress was laid not on
the role of the YAR government itself, but on the aggravation of the
89 conflict by Saudi Arabia and the USA. Carter's decision to send
nearly #400 millions worth of US arms to the YAR was described as an
attempt to divert the attention of the Arab countries from the
90 Egyptian-Israeli negotiations. Less mention was made of the deploy-
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merit of US ships in the region of the war, and of unpublicised US 
threats to intervene if the PDRY's forces continued to advance. Only 
the rarest mention was made of the role in the fighting, and in YAR 
politics more generally, of the left-wing guerrillas backed by South 
Yemen, the NDF. 91
With the war over, the leadership crisis in the PDRY apparently 
settled, and the USSR skilfully offering itself as supplier of arms 
to the YAR instead of the USA, a number of further major agreements
were signed between the USSR and PDRY. In June 1979 'All Nasir
•
Muhammad attended the Comecon annual meeting in Moscow and it was•
92 announced that the PDRY had joined the CMEA as an observer. Three
third world communist countries were already full members of the CMEA 
- Mongolia, Cuba and Vietnam - and the PDRY now shared observer status 
with five other pro-Soviet socialist or 'socialist oriented 1 states 
in the third world - Angola, Afghanistan, Laos, Mozambique and 
Ethiopia. Its delegations henceforward attended the annual regular 
session of the Council, held each June in different member country's 
capitals.
In September 1979 Soviet premier Alexei Kosygin visited Aden, the
93 
first visit by a top-level civilian Soviet official. A new economic
agreement was signed during his visit and it provided the occasion for 
a general restatement of Soviet and South Yemeni views on the Red Sea 
area. In October 1979 <Abd al-Fattah Isrna'il, now President of the
•
PDRY, led a delegation to the USSR, and this marked a new high point
of Soviet-South Yemeni collaboration. In a speech at the ceremonial
banquet, Soviet leader Brezhnev paid tribute to his guests:
The people of Democratic Yemen have inscribed more than one 
glorious page in the history of the national liberation movement. 
From the first guerrilla detachments in the mountains to the 
victory of the anti-imperialist uprising, the winning of indepen­ 
dence and the proclamation of a course aimed at building socialism
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- this has been the path traversed by the South Yemeni people. 
And they traversed it under the leadership of their revolutionary 
vanguard, now united in the Yemeni Socialist Party....
True to Leninist principles of foreign policy, the Soviet Union 
attaches special significance to the development and consolidation 
of relations with those countries that, like us, adhere to the 
ideals of freedom, independence and peace and take an intransigent 
attitude toward all manifestations of hegemonism.
Especially close to us are countries that are not only our 
allies in the struggle against imperialism, in the struggle for 
peace, but also think as we do and have set as their goal the 
building of a society free from the exploitation of man by man. 
These countries have no truer or more reliable friends than the 
Soviet Union and other states of the socialist commonwealth.*^
On his side, 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il expressed thanks for the assist-
*
ance given by the USSR, mentioning in particular the fields of econo-
95 mic aid, training cadres and prospecting for petroleum. On this
occasion the two sides concluded three new agreements. One was a plan 
for CPSU-YSP collaboration in the period 1980-1983, an upgrading of 
the inner-party contacts that had been in train since at least 1970. 
The second was a new protocol on economic and technical co-operation, 
the contents of which were not announced. The third, and most impor­ 
tant, was a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation, to run for twenty
96 years.
The twenty-year treaty was a significant step in Soviet-South 
Yemeni relations. Beginning with Egypt and India in 1971, such
treaties had been later signed with Iraq, Somalia, Angola, Mozambique
97and Afghanistan. In January 1979 a treaty of friendship and co­ 
operation was signed with Ethiopia and in October 1980 one was signed 
with Syria. These treaties differed from those signed with members 
of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation which involved a commitment to 
mutual aid in the event of an attack upon them in Europe, and agree­ 
ments with core members of the communist bloc in the third world, such 
as Mongolia, Cuba and Vietnam. They did not include explicit guaran­ 
tees of mutual support in the event of an attack upon one of the
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parties, as the Warsaw Pact did, or commitments to massive economic 
aid. But they did involve a commitment to close co-operation in the 
fields of foreign policy, economics, and culture, and to maintaining 
common positions on specific important areas of foreign policy.
Within the overall common characteristics of these treaties of 
friendship and co-operation, some variations were, however, noticeable. 
Thus the USSR-PDRY treaty included, as Article 5, the statement that: 
'The high contracting parties will continue to develop co-operation in 
the military field on the basis of the relevant agreements concluded
between them for the purpose of strengthening their defence capabil-
98 
ity. 1 This was a somewhat stronger statement than that on military
99 
co-operation contained in Article 10 of the USSR-Ethiopia treaty.
Similarly, the first Article of the USSR-South Yemeni treaty talked 
of 'the unbreakable friendship between the two countries', a phrase 
absent from the comparable section of the USSR-Syria treaty. What 
was most surprising about the signing of the USSR-PDRY treaty was, 
however, its timing: for some years previously the PDRY had let it be 
known that it did not intend to sign such a treaty, pointing out that 
such treaties had not in fact guaranteed the continuation of close 
relations with the USSR on the part of the country concerned. Of 
the three Arab League states which had signed such treaties Egypt had 
repudiated its treaty in 1974, Somalia had done so in 1977, and Iraq's 
relations with the USSR had deteriorated considerably in the latter 
part of the 1970s, although Baghdad did not actually repudiate the 
treaty. South Yemeni sources were later to state that the signing of 
the treaty had come as a surprise in the PDRY, and that President 
<Abd al-Fattah Isma'il had exceeded his brief in unilaterally signing
*
this agreement without prior consultation with the YSP leadership as
u i 102a whole.
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The diplomatic contacts of the period after June 1978 had certainly 
involved greater collaboration than hitherto between the PDRY and the 
USSR, and this was evident in the agreement to join the CMEA and the 
signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation. In 1979 and 
1980 substantial new economic agreements were signed and these led to 
increased Soviet aid and exports to South Yemen. There was also 
a more active military liaison, as the USSR increased its level of 
naval and air deployment in the PDRY. Admiral Gorshkov, the Chief of 
the Soviet Navy, who had visited Aden for the first known time in May 
1974, paid a subsequent visit in May 1.978. In May 1979 a major 
Soviet naval force, including helicopter-carriers and a cruiser, 
visited Aden as part of a show of force in the western Indian Ocean. 
In June 1979 General Yepishev, head of the Central Political Depart­ 
ment of the Soviet Army and Navy, visited Aden. For some time Soviet 
long-range reconnaissance aircraft, of the Ilyushin-38 and Tupolev-16 
varieties, had been operating out of Aden over the Indian Ocean and 
Persian Gulf. In October 1979 western reports spoke of a large air­ 
lift of troops, bringing two brigades or 10,000 men together with some 
armoured vehicles and artillery from bases in southern Russia on 
temporary deployment in the PDRY and Ethiopia. While the Soviet 
ability to supply the PDRY and Ethiopia by air had been evident for 
some time, and had been demonstrated during the air transport of 
supplies to Ethiopia in November and December 1977, this deployment 
of Soviet combat troops on manoeuvres in the PDRY was a new develop­ 
ment. It gave some force to the Soviet assertion that the PDRY was 
'not alone 1 and, coming but two months before the Soviet intervention 
in Afghanistan, may have in some measure offset in the minds of 
Moscow's allies the impact of the more forward American deployment in 
that region which the Carter administration was by then elaborating.
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The fall of 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, in April 1980, certainly 
marked a crisis in USSR-PDRY relations, albeit one that was subse­ 
quently overcome by both parties. The evidence available does suggest 
that complaints about the quantity and quality of Soviet economic 
assistance had played a part in weakening support within the PDRY for 
President Isma'il's approach. In particular, the Soviet failure to 
complete the al-Hizwa electricity generating plant outside Aden occa­ 
sioned Yemeni criticism. It also seems that the Soviet ambassador 
Fedotov intervened with the Central Committee of the YSP to ensure 
that 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il was allowed to leave the country, and not
•
imprisoned or, as some members of the leadership reportedly desired, 
executed. A Presidential visit to the USSR had been scheduled for the 
following month, and, after some negotiation by the PDRY to ensure 
that the delegation was properly received, President <Ali Nasir
•
1 Oft 
Muhammad did visit Moscow on 27-29 May 1980. During this visit
•
two new agreements were signed: one set up a Standing Commission on
Economic and Technical Co-operation, the other was a new agreement on
109 
constructing the thermal power station. If the former marked a
further institutionalisation of the economic links between the two 
states, the latter involved one of the sensitive issues in the USSR- 
PDRY relations. Although the USSR had agreed to construct the station 
during the Presidential visit of 1972, and official Soviet reports 
indicated that it had been completed, little work was in fact done, 
and there had been substantial power shortages in Aden towards the 
end of the 1970s. 110 These, as noted, had been blamed on the USSR, 
and had contributed to the conflict in which President 'Abd al-Fattah
«
Isma'il had fallen.
The May 1980 communique gave special emphasis to the growing ten­ 
sion in east-west relations, and condemned current US policy in the
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Middle East, one, it was said, of 'setting up a network of military 
bases and knocking together aggressive blocs 1 . 111 The communique 
also declared support both for the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, 
calling for a political solution there, and for Iran, where the 
attempt by the USA to rescue its diplomatic hostages had recently 
failed. Nothing, however, was said about the situation in South 
Arabia, beyond a general attack upon US military bases in the Persian 
Gulf, apparently an implicit reference to Oman. The silence on South 
Arabia may in part have reflected improved Soviet-YAR relations. The 
Soviet press had recently paid more attention to the question of 
inter-Yemeni relations, and Soviet arms supplies, to the tune of £600 
millions, were now being provided to the YAR, the first significant 
deliveries since 1970. An Izvestia commentary of 6 April 1980 stated 
that the USA was
doing everything it can to exaggerate the contradictions, many of 
them pure invention, between the Yemeni Arab Republic (North Yemen) 
and the PDRY (South Yemen) and is going all-out to impede the 
incipient trend toward those countries' reunification. H2
The same article argued that the US arms despatched to the YAR in 1979 
were intended to create 'a situation the US may at any time use to 
undermine Arab anti-imperialist unity or use against Riyadh*.
This belated interest in the cause of Yemeni unity, and the new 
concern for the susceptibilities of Saudi Arabia, may be explained by 
the diplomatic context of the time, in which the USSR had, after a 
decade of relative exclusion, regained some influence in the YAR, and
was even hoping that Saudi Arabia would now agree to the establishment
113 of diplomatic relations with Moscow. Expectations of such an
agreement with Saudi Arabia were not borne out, but relations with 
the YAR continued to improve and in October 1981 President 'Ali «Abd 
Allah Salih of the YAR paid an official visit to Moscow, the first by
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a YAR President since that of 'Abd Allah al-Sallal in 1964. 11A In 
the final communique, the YAR supported the Soviet call for turning 
the Red Sea and Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, and, in line with 
Soviet declarations, opposed outside bases and intervention in the 
Persian Gulf. But, in keeping with the practice observed hitherto in 
USSR-PDRY communiques, no mention was made of inter-Yemeni relations. 
The situation had, however, changed by the time of the next visit 
of <Ali Nasir Muhammad to the USSR in September 1982. Postponed from 
May 1982 because of floods in the PDRY, this visit involved one of 
the last public engagements of Soviet President Brezhnev, who met the 
PDRY President at the airport. Though no new agreements were reported 
to have been signed, the communique issued on 16 September did mark 
a shift in certain respects from that of two years before. It made 
explicit mention of the PDRY as advancing 'along the road of socialist 
orientation 1 and reported that 'the Soviet side highly assessed the 
deep socio-economic transformations carried out in Democratic Yemen' , 
Beyond stating common positions on the Middle East as a whole, and 
Lebanon in particular, the communique" also recorded that discussions 
had taken place on YAR-PDRY relations:
The South Yemen side informed the Soviet delegation of the steps 
that were being taken by the leadership of the PDRY and the Yemen 
Arab Republic to promote good-neighbourly relations between the 
two countries, and to achieve a united Yemen by peaceful means. 
The Soviet side was pleased at this development of relations 
between the PDRY and the YAR. 117
While the 1982 communique therefore made note of the unity talks bet­ 
ween the YAR and the PDRY, it did not state that the USSR itself 
favoured the idea of unity between the two states, only that it 
approved of 'the development of relations' between Aden and Sana'a. 
'Normalisation' remained the key term and when, later in the year, 
South Yemen and Oman established diplomatic relations, Soviet writers
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commented favourably on this. 118
A 'State of Socialist Orientation 1
By 1982, the evolution of Soviet-PDRY relations therefore appeared, 
after fifteen years of interrelationship, to have reached a point of 
relative stability and continuity, one that had survived both the 
rapid change of political conditions in the region surrounding the 
PDRY, and the attempt by conservative Arab states to weaken the Aden- 
Moscow bond. It had also survived the endemic factionalism within 
the PDRY itself, a factionalism that owed little to the influence and 
role of the USSR as such, but which nonetheless posed challenges and 
difficulties for the USSR in dealings with its South Yemeni ally. 
In the political sphere, Soviet evaluation of South Yemen had 
improved gradually over the years, from the first cautiously positive 
reporting after independence to the endorsement of the PDRY's 'social­ 
ist orientation 1 in 1982. Soviet evaluation of this change rested 
upon certain criteria developed in the general Soviet literature on 
third world states: the destruction of the previous ruling class, the
degree of state control of the economy, the growth of the co-opera-
119 
tives, and, above all, the spread of the vanguard party. It is
unlikely, however, that these internal criteria, although analytically 
primary, would in themselves have constituted sufficient basis for 
Soviet confidence had they not also coincided with the convergence of 
Soviet and South Yemeni foreign policies.
Yet in both these domains substantial difficulties remained and 
continued to lead to Soviet caution about the stage reached by the 
PDRY on the 'socialist oriented' path. In the initial post-indepen­ 
dence period, Soviet concern had focussed on the factionalism in South
120 
Yemen and on the 'left extremisms' of some of the NF factions.
Soviet writers also stressed the PRSY's economic problems. Then,
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during the Presidency of Salim Rubiyya' 'All, Soviet concern was 
expressed indirectly - in appeals for 'normalisation' in South Arabia, 
and in the failure of the Soviet press to report and thereby lend 
support to certain South Yemeni developments. With the fall of Salim 
Rubiyya' 'All in 1978 it became possible for the Soviet press to 
voice criticisms of the former President's policies. Thus Soviet 
analysis of the June 1978 crisis argued that Salim Rubiyya' 'All had
tried to conspire with 'imperialism 1 and weaken the ties between the
122 PDRY and the USSR. And after the YSP Congress in October 1978
Soviet commentators used the resolutions of the Congress to validate
their claims that 'left-extremist measures' in agriculture had slowed
123 the growth of production and had antagonised small traders.
Despite the correction of these 'left-extremist' mistakes, attri­ 
buted to Salim Rubiyya' 'Ali, Soviet writers still continued to paint 
a rather sombre picture of the situation in the PDRY. In an indica­ 
tion of the ideological problems still confronting the PDRY fifteen 
years after independence, the Soviet author Alexander Guskov wrote 
in 1982:
It is no secret that the prospects of the revolution depend to a 
large extent on the shaping of national self-consciousness, culti­ 
vation of a new attitude to labour, and elimination of tribalism 
and other remnants of the past and of the influence of bourgeois 
ideology. ^ 4
Or, as another Soviet commentator wrote:
Of course, there is no ground to deny the fact that, in the pro­ 
gress of socialist construction, the revolutionary authorities of 
the PDRY did not confine themselves to the solution of the prob­ 
lems linked with the overcoming of the incredible backwardness of 
the country, but also ventured to take radical measures without 
sufficient socio-economic foundations, seeking to do away with 
the socio-economic backwardness at one stroke. *-25
The same author discussed two objections that critics of the PDRY 
might raise: the continuation of a private sector, and the acceptance 
of aid from conservative Arab states. Both policies were justified,
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the author argued, at the phase of socialist orientation, provided 
the revolutionary party maintained its control of power and its over­ 
all orientation.
Another Soviet author, appraising the results of the first fifteen 
years, pointed to certain objective constraints on the PDRY's ability 
to develop the economy: the small population, the low level of 
'national-ethnic consolidation', the fall in living standards as a 
result of the closure of the canal and the British withdrawal in 1967,
and the destruction and dislocation associated with the guerrilla
127 
period itself. This appraisal singled out certain problems which
still persisted in hindering the PDRY's development: the low level of 
food production, the shortage of skilled labour and the disproportion­ 
ate amount of labour in non-productive as opposed to productive acti­ 
vity, and the 'demonstration effect' of oil-producing economies on 
the PDRY. But the author also expressed hope that some areas of the 
South Yemeni economy - fishing, oil, and foreign aid - were showing 
positive signs and he added: 'The leftist excesses of the early 1970s 
have been finally overcome.* By this he seemed to mean, in addition
to other issues, that the strong opposition to developing the port
1 ? R 
and the re-export trade had receded.
The Soviet Union did, from 1968 onwards, play a role in both shap-
129 
ing the development of the PDRY economy and in providing aid for it.
As of 1980 Soviet aid included twenty-four main projects of which ten 
had already been completed. These included water-storage dams and 
machine-repair stations, and the boring of dozens of irrigation slits. 
A report of 1980 made particular mention of three Soviet projects: 
the joint Soviet-Yemeni permanent fishing expedition, the thermal 
power station in Aden, and the fish cannery in Mukalla. It stated 
that Soviet economic aid was 'pursuing a policy of helping to develop
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the branches most important to the formation of the national economy 
and to raising the people's well-being in Democratic Yemen 1 . By the 
end of 1982 the number of Soviet-aided projects in the PDRY had 
reportedly risen to fifty, and involved co-operation in industry, 
power development, agriculture, transport, exploration for minerals,
1 ^ 1
training of Yemeni specialists, and public health. More generally, 
Soviet advisers assisted with the drawing up and implementation of 
the planning mechanisms, and with the establishment of administrative 
machinery through which the YSP directed the economy.
Yet the economic relationship between the two countries was far 
more limited than that in the military and political spheres. Soviet 
aid accounted for about one third of the total disbursed aid provided 
to the PDRY in the period 1967-1980, and was in toto around $152
millions, as compared to $84 millions from China, and another substan-
132 
tial amount from eastern European countries. Compared to the
amounts supplied to more favoured core bloc allies in the third world, 
such as Cuba, Mongolia or Vietnam in the same period, aid to the PDRY 
was very small, both absolutely and as a proportion of the total aid
1 OO
given to them. Similarly, while the volume of Soviet exports to 
the PDRY rose after independence, the 1977 total of $17.5 millions 
still accounted for only 3.2 per cent of the PDRY's total imports in
that year. 134 South Yemeni exports to the USSR stood in 1976 at
135 
$527,000, a negligible proportion of the total. These figures do.,
however, understate the degree of trade between the two countries in 
two respects. The import figures appear to omit imports of military 
goods, an important component in the overall balance of trade. And 
while earnings from exports to the USSR were extremely low, and paid 
in non-convertible currency, Soviet aid did enable the PDRY to earn 
quantities of hard currency by exporting fish to Japan and the west.
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Soviet statistics gave the annual average of PDRY earnings from 
Soviet-Yemeni co-operation in the fishing field as g5.6 millions in 
the late 1970s, or about 60 per cent of total PDRY export earnings. 136
The limitation of non-military, economic, relations between the 
PDRY and the USSR would seem to have been a result of several factors. 
In the first place, both states agreed that South Yemen should maxi­ 
mise its earnings of foreign exchange and its receipt of aid in deal­ 
ings with western or Arab states. The USSR encouraged the PDRY to 
seek trade and aid there, and, as noted, Soviet writers criticised 
those who saw this as a dangerous policy to pursue. Soviet policy in
general was that the states of socialist orientation had to rely on
137 sources other than the USSR. Secondly, despite the growth of a
strategic alliance between the PDRY and the USSR, South Yemen remained 
a 'socialist-oriented' not a socialist state, and was not therefore 
deemed to be eligible for the kinds of large aid programmes given to 
the core third world members of the bloc, such as Cuba and Vietnam. 
Soviet observers, like their British predecessors, emphasised the
meagre material base of the PDRY and the continued poverty of the
138 country.
But in addition to these considerations there were other factors 
restraining the growth of economic relations, ones that additionally 
inhibited both sides from further developing the interaction. On the 
Soviet side, there was a general reluctance, after the first enthusi­ 
astic aid programmes to India and Egypt in the early 1960s, to provide 
aid to the third world, and particularly to Arab states. This inhibi­ 
tion was to be found in Soviet officials as well as amongst the Soviet 
population. 139 Soviet aid programmes for the PDRY were certainly an 
index of Soviet interest in South Yemen, but they may also have 
aroused anxieties in the USSR about further expenditures in countries
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that were not, in the longer run, considered to be sufficiently grate­ 
ful for what they had received. Such an inhibition may also explain 
the emphasis, repeated time and again in Soviet press coverage of 
South Yemen and in the communiques and reports of PDRY delegations' 
visits to the USSR, of the 'gratitude' and 'appreciation 1 shown by 
the South Yemenis for their aid. Yet the South Yemenis also had their 
own inhibitions as a result of the realisation that developed of the 
low quality and unreliable delivery pattern of the Soviet aid pro­ 
gramme. The supplies provided in irrigation were found to be defi­ 
cient. The fishing agreement was seen by many Yemenis as exploitative 
of them. And the Soviet failure for several years to build the Aden 
thermal power station at al-Hizwa originally promised in & 1972 agree­ 
ment but unfinished a decade later brought considerable criticism of
140 
the Soviet programme as a whole.
In contrast to these restricted relations in the economic sphere, 
the FDRY and the USSR developed substantial military relations and 
the post-independence state became almost wholly reliant on arms from 
the USSR. Military delegations had been exchanged in the first three 
months of 1968, the first Soviet arms arrived in June 1968, and the 
first agreement was signed in August. Later in 1968 a South Yemeni 
military delegation spent one month visiting the USSR, a visit which
had, in the words of the Defence Minister, 'laid the foundations for
141 
stronger relations' between the two states. As early as 1969, at.
the anniversary celebrations in October, all arms in the military
142 
parade were reported to be of Soviet origin, and throughout the
1970s a process of modernisation and expansion took place. Soviet 
advisers served in the PDRY, along with Cubans and East Germans, and 
thousands of Yemeni officers, and the leading personnel in the armed 
forces, spent time in the USSR on training courses. Total evaluation
279
of the Soviet military supplies to the PDRY is impossible, given the 
restricted nature of the information available, but attempts have 
been made to establish an outline of the known flows of Soviet and 
Soviet-bloc arms to Aden in the post-independence period. 143 Similar­ 
ly, a total for the value of the arms supplied cannot be estimated, 
but for the years 1977-1980, i.e. when the USSR upgraded its relations 
with the PDRY, the value of arms provided is estimated to have come 
to $964 millions, in constant 1975 prices. 44 This figure, if accu­ 
rate, was equal to around ten times the total of the PDRY's hard 
currency exports in this period, and equal in value to between 75 per 
cent and 100 per cent of all non-military imports in the same period. 
The result of this flow was that the PDRY acquired, soon after indepen­ 
dence, a new armoury, new internal organisation for the armed forces,
145 and a new political orientation for the army.
Soviet statements usually referred to Moscow's policy of 'streng­ 
thening the defensive capabilities' of the PDRY, and it seems that 
this was considered to be the main function of Soviet arms deliveries. 
The main threat to the PDRY was believed to come from Saudi Arabia 
and the latter's receipts from the USA were far superior in quantity 
and quality to those delivered by the USSR to the PDRY. Although the 
Omani armed forces were inferior to those of the PDRY, Oman could call 
on other states in the Peninsula to support it. The armed forces of 
the YAR were also, for much of the post-1967 period, inferior to those 
of the PDRY, but in the last part of the 1970s Soviet arms supplies 
to Sana'a increased, in some degree compensating for those provided
to Aden.
The USSR's military interest in the PDRY had, however, a second 
dimension, namely that of using South Yemen in the context of the 
Soviet Union's global deployment. From 1968 onwards Soviet ships were
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permanently stationed in the Indian Ocean, and visiting fleets also 
paid periodic visits to the region. These used Aden on a regular 
basis and the Soviets purchased food and water and refuelled. They 
changed crews, brought in by plane. The USSR maintained mooring buoys 
off the island of Socotra, south of Aden. The Soviet air force also 
used Aden for overflight to destinations in Africa; this was particu­ 
larly important during the thirteen-day emergency airlift to Ethiopia 
in November and December 1977 when Soviet planes stopped at Aden to 
refuel on their way to Addis Abbeba. From 1975 onwards, the Soviet 
air force also used Aden for deploying reconnaissance planes, and 
other forms of reconnaissance, electronic and visual, may also have 
been carried out from Aden. The Soviet Union did not, however, 
deploy its own forces in the PDRY on a regular basis, as it had 
previously done in Egypt and Somalia. The loss of Egyptian bases in 
1974 and of Somali bases in 1977 may have enhanced the utility of Aden 
to the USSR, especially as the US naval and air deployment in the 
western Indian Ocean was also increased after 1973. Despite repeated 
allegations in the western press of Soviet 'bases' in the PDRY, no 
base facilities comparable to those in Egypt and Somalia were provided 
by South Yemen, and the Soviet dry dock, moved from Berbera in Somalia 
in November 1977, was later taken to Ethiopia after remaining in Aden 
for some months.
In the field of foreign relations, the USSR and the PDRY adopted 
similar positions on many questions throughout the post-independence 
period, and the two countries, together with their ruling parties and 
attached specialist bodies and committees, often declared agreement 
on the major issues of the day. On some issues in particular, the 
PDRY stood out with the USSR against the majority of other Arab states 
- support for Bangladesh in 1971, for Ethiopia in 1977, and for the
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Babrak Karmal government in Afghanistan in 1980 being outstanding
149 
instances. On others, the USSR and the PDRY endorsed the consensus
of the radical states in the Arab world: this was particularly so on 
the Palestine question, a matter that recurred prominently many times 
in communiques between the two states. Yet, despite this convergence, 
there were several issues of importance on which some disagreement 
could be noted with certainty, and others on which latent indications 
of some divergence were also present.
Two issues of divergence on international questions concerned 
Cambodia and the western Sahara: Aden recognised the opposition coali­ 
tion established by Prince Sihanouk after 1970, whereas the USSR 
refused to do so till 1975; Aden recognised the SADR in 1978, a 
step Moscow persistently refused to take. On the Arabian Peninsula 
the USSR's policy was, in some respects, more cautious than that of 
the PDRY throughout the post-1967 period. Thus, although the Soviet 
Union did on some occasions mention the issue of Yemeni unity, it laid 
much less stress on this than did the South Yemenis or, for that 
matter, the Chinese. In private, Soviet officials stated that they 
did not believe in the policy of Yemeni unity. Even more so, the 
USSR did not back the guerrillas in the YAR fighting the central 
government. At one point, during the aftermath of the 1979 war, the 
Soviet press did quote NDF guerrillas, but no official support for 
them was ever voiced, and while NDF representatives did visit the USSR 
on unannounced visits no NDF delegation, or delegation of anterior 
guerrilla groups, was ever publicly invited to the USSR. Overall 
Soviet policy remained one of support for the YAR government, and of 
trying to wean it from Saudi Arabia. Indeed, from late 1979 
onwards, the Soviet Union was, as it had been in the 1960s, supplying 
the YAR government with the weapons to crush internal dissent, this
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time from the Aden-backed guerrillas of the NDF.
Soviet policy towards the guerrillas in Dhofar was a little more 
forthcoming. The first Soviet journalists visited Dhofar in December 
1969 and a PFLOAG delegation visited Moscow in September 1971: but 
strong support was noted only at the very end of the guerrilla war. 
Even here, however, the USSR was reticent about endorsing the Front 
in Dhofar, and in dealings with the guerrillas, as with Aden, the 
Soviet press and state insisted on using the term 'Persian Gulf, to 
contrast to the usage by the radical Arabs of the neologism 'Arab 
Gulf. Its rendering of PFLOAG's name involved it in various circum­ 
locutions. Soviet commentators were also initially concerned about
154 Chinese influence among the guerrillas. Soviet policy was one of
opposition to US and British influence in Arabia, and to Iran's exter­ 
nal military role, but it remained based on the hope of establishing 
relations with all states of the region, including the Arabian monar­ 
chies. For these reasons the USSR did not join with the PDRY in 
opposition to the independence of Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab 
Amirates in December 1971, and it sought, from the early 1970s onwards, 
to encourage 'normalisation* between the PDRY and Saudi Arabia. 
Section 7 of the 1979 Treaty, which committed both parties to 'the 
settlement of international disputes by peaceful means' may have had 
particular implications in Arabia as part of a Soviet attempt to 
influence South Yemen's policy towards its neighbours.
On other regional developments a measure of divergence was also 
noticeable. Some disagreement on the Horn of Africa was evident in 
the communiques issued in May 1977. Policy also diverged on the Iran- 
Iraq war, since by 1982, during the second year of the war, the USSR 
was openly arming and favouring Iraq, while the PDRY, whose relations 
with Iraq had long been bad, had improved its relations with Iran.
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There was, in addition, an underlying disagreement on the Arab-Israeli 
question. The USSR had, from 1948, accepted the need for partition in 
Palestine, for two states to be created, one for Israelis and one for 
Palestinians. Soviet statements on the Middle East explicitly repeated 
their view that an Israeli state should remain in existence after any 
peace settlement, and that Israel was a legitimate member of all nego­ 
tiations. Soviet policy also supported the right of Israel to free 
passage through the Red Sea. On one specific aspect of this question 
Soviet and South Yemeni policy did converge even in the early post- 
independence period: neither recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinians, albeit for different reasons. 
While the PLO did not open an office in Aden until 197J, it did not 
do so in Moscow until 1981, when it was recognised by the USSR as the 
representative of the Palestinians. It was only in the joint 
communique of September 1982 that the USSR and the PDRY explicitly 
endorsed it together. Prior to this, however, Soviet influence on 
the PDRY was apparent in a shift of position on the two major areas 
of disagreement. From the YSP Congress of 1978 onwards, the PDRY 
called merely for the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied terri­ 
tories, and the establishment of a Palestinian state, and in the joint 
communique after Kosygin's visit in September 1979 the two sides 
talked of 'strict respect for the rights and interests of all the 
littoral states and non-interference in their internal affairs, as 
well as due consideration for the interests of international ship­ 
ping'. 157 This change in Yemeni policy was not, however, taken to 
the point of the- PDRY explicitly accepting the legitimacy of an 
Israeli state. In common with the other rejectionist states, the PDRY 
refused to make such a public statement, and Soviet commitments to 
this effect were not explicitly reproduced in joint statements of the
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two sides.
Soviet relations with the PDRY therefore encompassed a wide range 
of activities, and, despite the overall agreement between the two 
states, some areas of disagreement did remain. At the same time, 
however, the USSR ensured that the other countries of the Soviet bloc 
also contributed to development in the PDRY, on the basis of a divi­ 
sion of labour elaborated by the Warsaw Pact states for the third
world as a whole. Czechoslovakia provided aid in modernising the TV
158 service, Hungary in the medical field. The GDR helped draft the
1970 constitution and to establish the Ministry of State Security in
1591974. It also helped in a number of economic projects. Cuba pro­ 
vided help with training the militia, from 1973 onwards, and provided 
air force pilots during much of the same period. After <Abd al- 
Fattah's visit to Cuba in 1972, Cuba provided medical aid, and the
•
first two Cuban doctors arrived in December of that year. Cuba
also advised on the establishment of local Popular Defence Committees
1 f> ? 
and on the electoral system brought into being in 1977. Later
hundreds of South Yemeni teenagers went to study on Cuba's Isle of 
Youth. Bulgaria provided agricultural assistance, and built a large
•I f o
new hotel in Aden. While the PDRY was most closely influenced by 
Cuba, and a number of important official visits were exchanged, pub­ 
lished agreements bound the PDRY most closely to other eastern Euro­ 
pean states. Thus, after signing of the twenty-year Treaty of Friend­ 
ship and Co-operation with the USSR in November 1979, similar treaties 
were signed with the GDR (November 1979) and Czechoslovakia (September 
1981). ^^ This process of consolidating relations with eastern bloc 
states allied to the USSR went together with the strengthening of 
treaty links between the PDRY and other pro-Soviet states nearer Aden, 
namely Ethiopia and Libya. The fall of 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il in
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April 1980 did not, therefore, interrupt a process of further integ­ 
ration into the Soviet bloc that had been initiated in 1978 and had 
involved strengthening relations at the economic, military and poli­ 
tical levels. 
Relations with China
In the initial period after independence China appeared to have 
acquired a position of influence in South Yemen as great as that of 
the USSR. The Chinese press hailed the independence of the country, 
and carried favourable reports of the new government, as well as of 
the praise which South Yemenis were quoted as according China and its 
leader, Mao Tse-tung. An agreement on diplomatic relations was 
signed on 31 January 1968, and a Chinese embassy was finally opened, 
in July 1969, with one of China's most experienced Arabian experts, 
Li Chi'ang-Fen, serving as ambassador. The delay may have been
caused on the South Yemeni side - Kahtan al-Sha'abi may not have. .. ~"""—
wanted to anger the west further by opening a Chinese mission - or on 
the Chinese side - the Foreign Ministry was convulsed by the Cultural 
Revolution and all ambassadors, except that to Egypt, had been 
recalled in 1966-7. But even before this embassy opened, a. PRSY dele­ 
gation, headed by Foreign Minister Sayf al-Dali'i, had visited Peking 
in September 1968 and had signed two agreements, one on trade and one 
on economic and technical co-operation. At this stage, China offered 
the PDRY a long-term interest-free loan of $12 millions, to cover five
1 fcft
years of development projects. In August 1970 a PRSY delegation 
headed by President Salim Rubiyya* 'Ali visited China, and a further
loan of £43 millions was offered under a new Economic and Technical
169 
Agreement.
Chinese aid was directed to a number of projects in South Yemen in 
the first decade after independence: constructing a textile mill at
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al-Mansura, outside Aden, building a road along the 315 miles to 
Mukalla, constructing a hospital in the Crater district of Aden, and 
expanding the salt works in the Khormkasar district of Aden. Three 
further aid agreements were signed: in July 1972, on the occasion of 
a visit by Secretary-General 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il; 170 in November
•
1974, when President Salim Rubiyya' 'All paid a second visit to 
Peking; and in April 1978 when prime minister 'All Nasir Muhammad
• *
made an official visit. By the end of 1980 China had provided aid 
estimated at $84 millions, the largest Chinese aid programme in the 
Middle East, and one of Peking's largest anywhere in the third world.
On a number of issues, China and South Yemen saw eye to eye. China, 
like the USSR, had had relations with the YAR after 1962 and seemed 
to have derived from it a certain experience of how to conduct rela­ 
tions in the Yemens. China, even more than the USSR, apparently 
believed in being even-handed between the two Yemens, and this led it,
on a number of occasions, to give explicit support to the policy of
174 Yemeni unity. China was also able in 1970 to win PRSY support for
one of the most important issues of dispute between it and the USSR, 
namely the issue of Cambodia: the PRSY, unlike the Soviet Union, 
recognised the Royal Government of National Union of Kampuchea, headed 
by Prince Sihanouk, as opposed to the military regime of General Lon 
Nol, recognised by both the USA and the USSR. In August 1973 the 
Foreign Minister of Sihanouk's coalition visited Aden.
Despite increasing reliance on the USSR, South Yemeni leaders were 
for a long time willing to acknowledge their debt to China. Speaking 
on his 1968 visit Sayf al-Dali«i stated that China's war of liberation
• •
'offers an example for the people of all countries fighting to break 
away from imperialism and win freedom'. In 1970 Salim Rubiyya' 
'All stated:
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We, the people of South Yemen, have benefited from the advanced 
experience of the Chinese people in defeating our enemies, the 
colonialists and reactionaries, and in frustrating the aggressive 
schemes against the revolution....We are grateful to the friendly 
Government and people of the People's Republic of China for their 
material and more support to us the people of South Yemen. 1- 77
In 1972, «Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, someone generally known for his 
sympathy for the USSR, acknowledged that before independence 'China
also gave us unstinted assistance, thus enhanced our fighting capacity
i 7fl 
and inspired us to continue our struggle until victory*. In the
Seven Days demonstrations of July 1972 Salim Rubiyya' 'All echoed
179 
Chinese views on economic development.
The two sides also agreed, in the initial period, on a number of
specific issues pertaining to the region: both supported the guerril-
180 
las in Oman and Eritrea, both backed the Palestinians to the extent
181 
that they did not acknowledge the right of an Israeli state to exist,
182 
both denounced Iran and had, at first, no relations with it. Only
183 
in August 1971 did Peking and Tehran exchange diplomatic recognition.
Whereas the Soviet press used the term 'Persian Gulf, Chinese papers 
made some concession to Arab sensibilities and referred to the 'Persian 
(Arab) Gulf. Yet, from the beginning, there was also a major dis­ 
agreement, on the USSR. The Renmin Ribao editorial greeting indepen­ 
dence in November 1967 raised this point immediately: 'The British 
imperialists will not lightly give up their colonial interests....The 
US imperialists and Soviet modern revisionists too will attempt to get 
a foothold there.' 184 During the 1968 visit, Foreign Minister Chen 
Yi told his visitors that the USSR was 'colluding* with the USA and 
would betray the Arab peoples as it had Cuba in the 1962 missile 
crisis: 'In the present new international conditions the Soviet revi­ 
sionist renegade clique will surely sell out the interests of the Arab
1 Q C
people still further. 1 In 1970 Tung Pi-wu, Chinese Vice-Chairman,
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addressed Salim Rubiyya' 'All on the dangers of the 'so-called "Super­ 
powers'" and in 1974 Teng Hsiao-ping was to be found welcoming, during 
Salim Rubiyya* 'All's second visit, the 'decline' of the super-powers' 
influence. 186
There were in South Yemen some who sympathised with the Chinese 
revolution, who looked favourably on its internal system, and who 
shared some of its criticisms at least of the USSR. In 1971 President
Salim Rubiyya' 'Ali encouraged his people 'to benefit from the experi-
187 
ence and sincerity of the Chinese people' and in 1972 he advanced
a policy of 'self-reliance' for the PDRY that appeared to be influ­ 
enced by China. But despite apparent Chinese encouragement at no 
point did South Yemeni leaders lend open support to the criticisms 
which the Chinese were then making of Russia. Successive Congresses 
of the South Yemeni Front, from 1968 through to 1975, had stressed 
the need for unity in the socialist bloc, and the dangers of division. 
This message was repeated time and again by South Yemeni politicians. 
In 1968 Sayf al-Dali'i declared in Peking:
• •
All revolutionaries and progressives in the world are rising as 
one to deal with imperialism and colonialism. Since the enemy's 
making its dispositions everywhere in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America, we, progressive revolutionaries of the whole world, 
should all the more clench our fists in the face of imperialism 
and colonialism. Otherwise, we would leave openings in our ranks 
which imperialism might use to preserve its strength and carry 
out conspiracies.
The final communique stated that talks had been conducted 'in a sin-
189 
cere, frank and friendly atmosphere 1 , an indication of disagreement.
After the 'Corrective Move' of June 1969 the Chinese appear to have 
hoped that, despite its more explicit support for the USSR, the new
leadership would be sympathetic to them and Chinese leaders later
190 
stated that they 'welcomed the revolutionary measure of 22 June*.
In this initial period both sides gave support to the other on
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particular issues: China agreed to recognise the PRSY's 'sovereignty 
over all its territories and islands', an apparent reference to the 
Kuria Muria Islands, and the PRSY supported PRC entry into the UN. 191 
The fact that Salim Rubiyya* 'All chose to visit Peking, in 1970, 
before making a visit to Moscow, in 1972, must also have encouraged
the Chinese. Most surprisingly, the 1972 visit by «Abd al-Fattah
•
Isma'il involved less dissonance in public stance than the earlier
two visits, of Sayf al-Dali'i and Salim Rubiyya' 'All. The final
• •
•" 192 communique stated that it had been 'crowned with complete success*.
Yet by the early 1970s divergences between the two had already 
begun to appear. China ceased aid to the Eritrean guerrillas in 1970 
and in 1971 Haile Selassie visited Peking, at a time when the PDRY 
was still arming the Eritrean guerrillas. China supported the guerr­ 
illas in Oman between 1968 and 1971 and the 1970 communique pledged
193 
'firm support to the people's armed struggle of the PFLOAG'. As
late as June 1971 Chou En-lai was reported to have commended the PDRY
194 
for its 'support for the people's revolution' in the Gulf. But
similar support was not voiced in the 1972 communique, despite mention
195 
of it in their speeches by the South Yemeni delegation. By then
China had already begun to alter its policy on the Gulf: Peking's 
military aid to the PFLOAG ceased in 1971 and, whereas <Abd al-Fattah 
Isma'il had during his 1972 visit to Peking denounced 'conspiracies 
against the Arabism of the Gulf, a reference to Iran, in 1973 China 
gave support to Iran in its campaign against 'subversive activity' in 
the Gulf, i.e. the PFLOAG. 1 6 When Salim Rubiyya' 'All visited Peking 
in 1974 he returned to the theme in an apparent attempt to convince 
his hosts: "The PDRY supports and aids the people of Oman in their 
struggle for the realisation of their legitimate objectives, 1 he 
stated, and he referred to the fact that 'the international situation
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has become more complicated'. 197 But his host Teng Hsiao-ping did 
not mention Oman, and, as in 1972, it was not alluded to in the com­ 
munique. Four years later, in 1978, China recognised the Omani 
Sultanate, and in 1983 the Chinese Foreign Minister visited Oman, a 
tribute never paid to the PDRY.
The central issue of disagreement was, however, Soviet influence 
in the PDRY itself. As early as 1971 Chinese Premier Chou En-lai
mentioned the PDRY as one of several countries in which Soviet mili-
198 
tary influence was increasing. By contrast, Chinese officials and
press reports praised the YAR for the measures it had taken after 1970
199 
to reduce its relations with the USSR. China laid stress on
measures to reconcile relations between Peninsular states and, more 
than the USSR, singled out such developments as the YAR-PDRY unity 
agreement of 1972, the Saudi-PDRY agreement on diplomatic recognition 
of 1976, the 1982 constitutional agreement between the YAR and the 
PDRY, and the Omani-PDRY declaration of 1982 as positive developments.
It was with the June 1978 crisis that Chinese coverage of events 
in the PDRY became markedly more critical. A roundup of international 
press coverage on the June 1978 crisis commented: 'Articles and commen­ 
taries exposing Soviet intervention outright or by implication point
out that this crime is aimed at undermining security and stability in
201 
the Red Sea and Gulf regions.' The 1979 inter-Yemen war was blamed
on Soviet interference:
Differences between Arab countries, including those that have a 
historical basis, can be settled through friendly negotiations. 
But, since the Soviet Union labelled some Arab countries as 
'reactionary* and others 'progressive', their differences have 
been aggravated and have even led to the use of force. It should 
be noted that in every event which involved bloodshed, the Soviet 
Union supported one side and opposed the other....The Soviet
Union has ulterior motives for fanning up the dispute between the 
70?two countries. u 
A later report, on the March 1979 YAR-PDRY unification agreement, went
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further and provided the fullest analysis hitherto produced of how 
China viewed the situation in the PDRY. The 1972 unity agreement had, 
it said, not been realised because of Soviet sowing of dissension 
between the two Yemens. Signs of inter-Yemeni rapprochement were 
interrupted in 1978 by the death of the two Presidents: 'It was widely
known that the Soviet RGB and Cuban mercenaries were behind the two
7 0 "^
deaths, 1 it was claimed. The article argued, against all histori­ 
cal evidence, that the division between North and South Yemen was the 
result of Britain's having imposed the 1934 Treaty of Ta'if on the 
Imam, but recalled that resistance to it had continued:
The smashing of feudal and colonial rule should have provided 
favourable conditions for national unification. But as soon as 
the tiger left, the wolf - those who wanted to manipulate the 
Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf oil resources and control these 
strategically important areas - came along. Such external forces 
used a variety of guises to exploit differences and contradictions 
between tribes, religious factions and political parties. With 
arms or economic aid as bait or with ideology as a tool, they 
supported one side against the other. Fishing in troubled waters 
they tried to establish control through agents in order to stop 
Yemen's unification.204
According to this analysis the Soviet aim was not to promote Yemeni 
unity but to control the southern entrance to the Red Sea. This was 
especially the case as, so the article wrongly alleged, the main ship­ 
ping channel through the Bab al-Mandeb lay between the mainland and 
the PDRY-controlled island of Perim.
By the end of the 1970s Sino-PDRY divergences affected virtually 
the whole range of major foreign policy issues: not only did China 
support Iran and Somalia, but it endorsed Egypt's rapprochement with 
Israel. China had, by then, warmer diplomatic relations with the YAR 
and Oman than it had with the PDRY, a preference reflected in the 
higher ranking of PRC representatives visiting the YAR. From 1974 
onwards the pace of diplomatic relations between the two countries 
slackened. PDRY Foreign Minister Mutiyya' visited Peking in 1977, as
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did Premier 'Ali Nasir Muhammad in April 1978, but while the latter 
did lead to a new economic agreement these were not followed by the 
signing of joint communique's as had resulted from the PDRY leaders' 
visits of the early 1970s. A PDRY envoy despatched to explain the 
circumstances of the June 1978 events was received by the Chinese; 
but, from the evidence of Chinese press coverage, his version of 
events was not accepted.
Yet an element of restraint and continued interest was shown by 
both sides. Relations between China and South Yemen never reached 
the point of open animosity evident in the late 1970s in relations 
between China and such Soviet third world allies as Cuba, Vietnam, 
Mongolia, and Afghanistan. The PDRY press abstained from explicit 
criticisms of China, although the 1978 and 1980 YSP Congresses did 
not repeat the policy enunciated at earlier Congresses of developing 
relations with all socialist countries 'without exception*. Inside 
the PDRY itself, the Chinese experts working on aid programmes conti­ 
nued to be the object of considerable esteem and affection, despite
205 
the growing gap in international alignment of the two states. On
only one occasion, a visit to Ethiopia in 1979, did a South Yemeni 
leader, 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, openly criticise China and this inci-
*
dent was quickly contained. On their side, the Chinese were careful 
as to the form their criticism took. They did not criticise the PDRY 
leadership as such, but blamed the USSR and, to a lesser extent, Cuha 
for developments that China opposed. They pursued a similar policy 
with regard to Ethiopia. Thus the 1978 leadership crisis in the PDRY 
and the 1979 inter-Yemeni war were alleged to be the result of Soviet 
influence, and the Chinese press continued to look for signs of posi­ 
tive development in South Arabia, in the reconciliation of the PDRY 
with its three neighbours, Saudi Arabia, North Yemen and Oman - in
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1976, 1979 and 1982 respectively. Reporting on the improved YAR-PDRY 
relations of 1982 Chinese reports went out of their way to stress 
that the PRC did not endorse the activities of the NDF which had, it 
was said, 'carried out disruptive anti-government activities in some
?06
cities of North Yemen'. Chinese emphasis lay, as it had done 
throughout the post-1967 period, on improvement of relations between 
the two Yemeni states.
The growing divergence between the PDRY and the PRC arose from the 
very different situations in which they found themselves, and the 
resulting difference in the policy requirements of the two states. 
If China's main preoccupation was its conflict with the USSR, the 
PDRY was primarily concerned about its conflicts with its neighbours. 
For a certain period, from 1967 until the early 1970s, Chinese foreign 
policy also involved opposition to the west, to the USA in particular, 
and hence support for the radical causes which the PDRY also backed 
in the region. Even at this time, however, the PDRY refused to follow 
Chinese urgings all the way and criticise the USSR, because of Aden's 
need for Soviet military support in its confrontations. But, side by 
side with this disagreement, the two states, China and South Yemen, 
did have certain convergent policies from 1967 to 1971. With the 
changes in Chinese policy attendant upon the end of the Cultural Revo­ 
lution at home in 1969 and China's 1971 entry into the UN abroad, 
China ceased to support most guerrilla groups in west Asia and turned 
instead to the construction of a diplomatic alliance with all those 
Middle Eastern and third world states that were opposed to the USSR 
- South Africa, Israel and South Korea excepted. Thus Iran, Ethiopia 
and Egypt became states to which China drew closer, and as a result 
relations with Aden grew cooler. This foreign policy divergence afte 
1971 therefore compounded China's already existing inability to meet
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the PDRY's security needs and so to drive the two countries fur
ther 
apart.
This distance was not, however, the product of any specific con
­ 
flict between the two states, as was the case with, for example
, 
China's relations with Mongolia, Vietnam or Afghanistan, and it
 did 
not therefore lead to an overt breach of the kind that occurred
 bet­ 
ween China and these three neighbouring countries. It did, how
ever, 
confirm an underlying strategic reality of South Yemen's positi
on. 
The very fact that it was not a country bordering China or in t
he 
vicinity meant that China could never have provided that milita
ry 
support, in supplies and guarantees, that was available from th
e USSR. 
The PDRY was never, for military reasons above all, a candidate
 for 
alignment with China against the USSR in the international aren
a. 
But, by the same token, the PDRY's alignment with the USSR did 
not 
constitute a direct threat to the PRC, in the way that that of 
the 
three neighbouring states aligned with Moscow did. Hence China
 did 
not feel itself compelled to reach that degree of hostility and
 breach 
with Aden that it did reach in dealings with Hanoi, Kabul and U
lan 
Bator.
Moreover, despite their own differences with each other, and th
eir 
conflicting policies towards South Yemen, both the USSR and the
 PRC 
maintained some common views on the evolution of a radical stat
e in 
South Arabia. Both the USSR and the PRC established relations 
with 
Aden after some years of experience and influence in the YAR. 
This 
anterior commitment both tempered their optimism about the poss
ibili­ 
ties of change in the South, and gave them an alternative point
 of 
contact in the region, one which had, albeit in differing degre
es, to 
be balanced against support for the South. Both warmly welcom
ed the 
triumph of the NLF in November 1967, and the further radicalisa
tion
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of June 1969. Both provided comparatively large sums of economic aid 
in the most difficult years, up to 1975, when South Yemen was receiv­ 
ing support from almost no other source. Most importantly, Moscow 
and Beijing saw the PDRY as a state that had, in some degree, sought 
to break away from a predominant western-dominated pattern of inter­ 
national politics, and with which they therefore had some affinity.
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Conclusions
A visitor to South Yemen in the years immediately after independence 
would soon realise that this was an embattled republic, at once cut 
off from many of the interactions that states normally experience and 
at the same time itself committed to radical changes in other states. 
Few airlines bothered to call at Aden, in contrast to the busy passage 
of colonial times. The port was almost paralysed, and the great 
passenger liners no longer landed their droves at Steamer Point. The 
shops of Tawahi and Crater which had relied on tourism and the British 
base were depressed. Consumer goods were short. No new buildings 
were under construction and existing ones were in increasingly poor 
shape. Few lifts worked. There was no foreign private investment, 
and foreign aid from governments or multilateral agencies was minimal. 
Entry into and exit from the PDRY was difficult. A dramatic caesura 
in South Yemen's commercial and political relations with the outside 
world had taken place.
The signs of the republic's own militancy were also not hard to 
see. On the mile-long avenue of Maala, hitherto housing the families 
of British servicemen, placards hung outside the offices of guerrilla 
groups now officially welcomed in Aden - the PFLOAG, the PDFLP and 
the PFLP. Without such public display, but equally enjoying quasi- 
diplomatic status were representatives of other guerrilla and opposi­ 
tion groups - the Eritreans, North Yemenis, Iranians. A visitor to 
a hotel might find himself accosted by men claiming to have liberated 
large swathes of southern Ethiopia, or by the representatives of an 
underground grouping from Saudi Arabia. As time passed, these members 
of revolutionary movements and parties in the region around South 
Yemen were joined by the delegations from communist countries and
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associated solidarity organisations. Conferences on a wide range of 
topics related to third world development, peace, and 'anti-imperial­ 
ism 1 succeeded each other. Aden felt itself to be the promoter of a 
radical new stand in international relations: it was paying a high 
price for this commitment, one that not all of its inhabitants felt 
was worthwhile, but it was itself pursuing this path with the vigour 
and the resources at its disposal. If the preceding analysis has 
tried to describe some components of this commitment, these concluding 
remarks may indicate the broader pattern of which PDRY policies were 
an example.
The triumph of the NLF in November 1967 led South Yemen into a 
situation of conflict with its neighbours and with other states of the 
region, in a pattern of antagonism similar to that which other revolu­ 
tionary countries have experienced, from France in 1789 onwards. The 
regional conflicts epitomised the manner in which upheaval in one 
particular state has implications for the overall pattern of inter­ 
national relations. On the one hand, the very fact of a state having 
brought about significant social and political change at home can 
produce conflict in foreign relations: those who have lost power 
internally either try to regain it from exile and with the support of 
other states, or seek, from within, to encourage external intervention 
that will restore that which revolutionary change has taken from them. 
At the same time, an upheaval in one particular country can be per­ 
ceived by other states as a threat to their interests, whether through 
fear that the example of revolution within one state will be reprod­ 
uced by the population in others, or because the new revolutionary 
state is, or is believed to be, providing aid to opposition forces 
beyond its own frontiers.
For its part, the revolutionary state has political reasons for
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stressing this conflict with its neighbours: it can mobilise support 
by drawing attention to the continuing threat of 'counter-revolution 1 , 
of the possible return of those recently expropriated and overthrown. 
It can portray itself as menaced by foreign invasion and subversion, 
so that all dissent is portrayed as part of externally backed activity. 
Moreover, the privations of establishing a new order can be blamed on 
external hostility. At the same time revolutionary regimes have an 
interest in the development of comparably radical forces in other 
states, a concern that goes beyond the mere fact of neutralising or 
pre-empting those they have themselves removed from power. The very 
legitimacy of the new regime, as one that issued from a revolution, 
may be enhanced by declarations of support for radical forces else­ 
where. Most importantly, the new regime may feel that its own secur­ 
ity can best be guaranteed by the emergence in neighbouring states of 
regimes like itself, i.e. by the overthrow of foes and the establish­ 
ment of allied regimes. Thus, faced with the hostility of existing 
states, the new regime may see that further revolutions provide the 
means by which it itself can survive: military security, economic 
co-operation, political support - all can flow from the attempted 
extension of the revolutionary movement beyond the boundaries of the 
state where the revolution initially occurred.
Revolutions are almost inevitably international events and such a 
process involves a partisan statement by each group of protagonists 
of the causes of the confrontation. The revolutionary state ascribes 
the conflict to the refusal of neighbouring states and other conser­ 
vative powers to accept the consequences of the political and social 
developments within its frontiers. The external opponents of the new 
regime ascribe their hostility to the latter's insistence on 'export­ 
ing 1 revolution, on extending a process of social change, often
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involving military activity beyond its own national territory. In 
fact, both sides can be involved in a two-tiered conflict, protecting 
their internal political system and at the same time seeking to alter 
that of the other.
However, certain factors can lessen the apparent deadlock of the 
initial conflict. Revolutionary regimes have shown themselves sur­ 
prisingly resilient in resisting invasion and subversion from without, 
despite the confusion in political and military matters attendant 
upon revolutions and the often depressed economic conditions and con­ 
sequent political discontent associated with them. In time, there­ 
fore, both those expropriated in the revolution and the states alleged­ 
ly seeking to restore them to power can be compelled or at least 
encouraged to accept the permanence of revolutionary change in one 
specific country. On the other hand, the initial optimism of the 
revolutionary state about the possibility of revolutions similar to 
its own occurring in these neighbouring states may prove not to be 
well-founded. The social and political conditions in the one state 
may not be reproduced in the second. The very fact of a recent revo­ 
lution in a region will be likely to lead established states to 
introduce countervailing measures, whether these be reforms designed 
to forestall their overthrow, or increased capacities for containing 
opposition. The fact that one state shows itself, and declares 
itself, to have an interest in the overthrow of another can make such 
an overthrow that bit more difficult to attain. The revolutionary 
state may be restrained in what it can, in practice, do to assist 
revolutionary forces elsewhere by the calculation that if it becomes 
too deeply involved in unrest in another state this may provoke a 
direct state-to-state conflict in which its own survival may be placed 
at risk.
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As a result of such considerations - the survival of the revolu­ 
tionary state, on the one hand, the containment of revolution else­ 
where, on the other - it may be possible for a degree of accommodation 
between revolutionary and non-revolutionary states to occur. The 
regime arising out of the upheavals of one country remains in place, 
but the price of its acceptance by other states is a reduction or 
termination of its support for other revolutionary movements. Both 
parts of this process involve profound and very real political forces 
and policy calculations. The reasons why revolutionary states do seek 
to extend or 'export 1 their revolutions, and to offer 'solidarity* to 
others are substantial, and go beyond the realm of mere enthusiasm 
and rhetoric. The factors leading them to make later accommodations 
are equally forceful, and involve some recognition of the limits both 
of their own power, and of the forces they are supporting. The inter- 
nationalisation of revolutions and its limits go beyond the surround­ 
ing region. A revolutionary regime can seek to realign itself vis-a­ 
vis the predominant forces in international politics, to sunder or 
weaken the links that it had prior to a revolution and to establish 
new ones with states more sympathetic to, and supportive of, its goals. 
Yet such a realignment also has its limits: the bonds that tied it to 
the formerly dominant powers may not all be broken, in part because 
beneficial aspects can be retained and renegotiated. Similarly, the 
new allies may not be able to offer all that the revolutionary state 
requires, in security and economic support, and may establish bound­ 
aries to the kind of alliance that is created. The passage from one 
'bloc 1 to the other may be real enough, but not entail an absolute 
separation from one and integration with the other, as official 
presentation might suggest.
To a considerable extent, this has been the path followed by South
3LL
Yemen in the first decade and a half after independence. The major 
goal of any foreign policy, the preservation of territorial integrity 
and of the ruling regime, was successfully carried out. Despite 
repeated pressures from without, and manifold weaknesses and divisions 
within, South Yemen was not overrun by its opponents, and the NF and 
its successor organisations retained power. At the same time, a wide- 
ranging reorganisation of the country's polity, economy and society 
took place, in part to reduce the influence upon them of external 
forces deemed by the Front to be hostile. The ruling party proclaimed 
and sustained a number of policies for which it had to pay a high 
price and from which other states sought to deflect it: support for 
revolutionary groups in neighbouring and other regional states, and 
alliance with the USSR and its bloc.
This foreign policy orientation was not, however, as complete or 
sustained as initial hopes in South Yemen would have indicated. The 
lessening of external influences upon the country itself was only 
partly successful, in that the country remained critically reliant on 
imports of goods and inflows of capital for its economic prosperity 
and growth. The very location of South Yemen, in an Arabian Peninsula 
the majority of whose states were enjoying a consumer boom derived 
from oil revenues, made isolation and austerity all the more difficult 
to sustain. At the same time, the models according to which the PDRY 
did transform its society were ones that, to a considerable degree, 
reproduced those of other countries, in the Soviet bloc. The commit­ 
ment to revolution elsewhere, enduring as it was, had limited results: 
the forces supported by the PDRY in both Oman and North Yemen were 
defeated, and those initially backed in Ethiopia and Iran were them­ 
selves to fall victim to other tendencies within those countries' 
revolutions. But the upheavals in the region did provide the PDRY
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with new, albeit uncertain, interlocutors, and in the calculus of 
revolution and counter-revolution, the PDRY was able to offset its 
failure to back successful revolution against recognition and accep­ 
tance by the other states in the region. The accommodations of the 
early 1980s were therefore a reflection of an overall limitation of 
the revolutionary trend in the South Arabian region, but involved, at 
the same time, a consolidation of the post-revolutionary regime in 
the one state where the old order had been most completely overthrown.
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Appendices
Appendix 1. Text of agreement on Yemeni unity, 28 October 1972
The two Governments of the Yemen Arab Republic and the People's 
Democratic Republic of Yemen:
In the name of the one Yemeni people, and in the name of the Arab 
nation, arising from the reality of historical responsibility and 
national responsibility; in the belief that the people of Yemen and 
their land is one single entity which is indivisible and that this 
reality has confirmed itself across history, in spite of all efforts 
to strengthen separatism, create barriers and borders;
In fulfilment of the sacrifice and the struggle of the Yemeni 
people across history in eradicating the backward monarchical imamate 
system in the North of the country and imperialist domination in the 
South; being anxious to strengthen and consolidate the progressive 
national struggle in Yemen; stressing that the unity of Yemen is the 
foundation for the building of the modern Yemeni society; assuring 
democratic freedoms for all national forces which are hostile to 
imperialism and Zionism and are the foundation for the building of an 
independent national economy; to safeguard the independence and sover­ 
eignty of Yemen from any interference or external aggression; stress­ 
ing that comprehensive Yemeni unity is also the cause of inevitable 
destiny, the cause of progress, civilization and prosperity for the 
Yemeni people; being confident that the comprehensive unity of Yemen, 
in addition to its being the hope of every Yemeni throughout the land 
of Yemen, is a basic need to strengthen the pillars of political 
independence and the building of an independent national economy and 
is a national necessity because it enables Yemen to participate in the 
struggle waged by the Arab nation against the imperialist-Zionist
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alliance, and also represents an earnest measure for the realization 
of the Arab nation as a whole...
...The two Governments have agreed to set up a unified state, joining 
the parts of Yemen, North and South, and this in accordance with 
stipulations and principles set out below:
Principles and stipulations for the setting up of Yemeni Unity 
between the Yemen Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic 
of Yemen:
Article 1: Unity shall be set up between the two states of the 
Yemen Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in 
which shall be dissolved the statal personality of each one into one 
single statal personality, and the formation of a single Yemeni state.
Article 2: The new state shall have: (i) One flag and one motto; 
(ii) one capital; (iii) One presidency; (iv) One legislative, execu­ 
tive and judicial system.
Article 3: (i) The governmental system of the new state shall be 
a democratic, national republican system.
(ii) The Constitution of the union shall guarantee all general 
personal and political freedoms for all members of the public and for 
all their organizations and institutions, national, professional and 
trade unionist. All necessary measures will be undertaken to ensure 
the enjoyment of these freedoms.
(iii) The union state guarantees that all the achievements of the. 
two revolutions of September and October shall be safeguarded.
Article 4: As a first step towards the realization of the union, 
necessary measures are to be taken to hold a summit meeting for the 
two Presidents of the two States to examine necessary and immediate 
measures to complete the union, on condition that the meeting is held 
at a time determined by the two Presidents of the two Governments.
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Article 5: Each of the two Presidents shall choose his personal 
representative to supervise the work of the technical committees 
mentioned in Article No. 7.
Article 6: The Arab League shall continue to give necessary assis­ 
tance for the success of this union and in accordance with the desire 
of the two States.
Article 7: The summit meeting of the two States shall set up joint 
technical committees, with an equal number of members from representa­ 
tives of the two States, to unify the present institutions and statutes 
in each one of the two States. A period of not more than a year shall 
be defined for the completion of tasks entrusted to these committees. 
The year shall begin from the signing of this agreement.
Article 8: The technical committees shall be formed from represen­ 
tatives of the two States on a high-level and from specialists. These 
committees will be allowed to set up sub-committees to facilitate 
their work. These committees shall be:
(i) Committee for constitutional affairs, and it shall concern 
itself with drawing up a Constitution.
(ii) Committee for foreign affairs and diplomatic and consular 
representation, and it shall concern itself with the unification of 
the foreign policy of the two countries and drawing up the bases for 
the foreign policy of the new unified state.
(iii) Committee for economic and financial affairs, and it shall 
concern itself with economic matters, customs, economic development 
and a unified currency system and the budget of the state.
(iv) Committee for legislative and judicial affairs, and it shall 
concern itself with the unification of laws and the drawing up of 
unified institutions for the judiciary.
(v) Education, culture and information committee, which will be
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concerned with educational, cultural and information affairs in all 
their aspects.
(vi) The military affairs committee, which will be concerned with 
defence and the armed forces and their unification.
(vii) The health affairs committee, which will be concerned with 
medical affairs, hospitals and so forth.
(viii) Committee for administrative and public service, which will 
be concerned with the arrangement of local government, state services 
and their operations.
Article 9: After the completion of the draft Constitution by the 
constitutional affairs committee, the proposals will be forwarded to 
the appropriate legislative councils of the two States, to be approved 
in accordance with the constitutional arrangements of the two sides.
Article 10:
(i) The two Presidents of the two States, under the mandate of the 
two legislative authorities in the two parts, will arrange a referen­ 
dum for the Constitution and elections to a unified legislative 
authority for the new state in accordance with the new Constitution.
(ii) To implement this the two Presidents of the two countries will 
form a joint ministerial committee, whose membership will include the 
two Interior Ministers of the two parts, so that they can supervise 
this work, this to be effected within six months from the date the 
legislative authorities in the two States approve the draft Constitu­ 
tion. This committee will have the necessary mandate to carry out
its duties.
(iii) The Presidents of the two States will invite the Arab League 
to send representatives to participate in the work of the committee.
Article 11: The legislative councils in the two States will be 
dissolved immediately after the approval of the new draft Constitution
317 
in a popular referendum.
Article 12: When the people approve the draft Constitution, a new 
state will be proclaimed, in accordance with the Constitution.
Article 13: The rules of the new Constitution will operate immedi­ 
ately after the approval of the Constitution.
Article 14: Implementing what was contained in the statement of the 
Arab League mediation committee and complying with the rules of the 
previous articles, the two parts hereby decide on their total commit­ 
ment to these provisions and their implementation.
Article 15: Three copies were made of this document. Each side 
received a copy and the third copy will be kept at the Arab League 
headquarters.
This document was signed by representatives entrusted for the 
purpose.
Signing for the Yemen Arab Republic were: Muhsin al-Ayni, the 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Foreign Minister; and Ahmad 
Jabir Afif, the Minister of Education and Instruction.
Signing for the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, were Ali 
Nasir Muhammad, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Defence 
Minister; and Abdullah al-Khamri, member of the Central Committee and 
Minister of Information.
For the Arab mediation committee: Muhammad Salim al-Yafi, the Chair­ 
man of the Committee and Assistant Secretary General of the Arab 
League; Ibrahim al-Maz*hudi, the permanent representative of the 
People's Democratic Republic of Algeria to the Arab League; Sa'ad ad- 
Din Nuwayrat, the Ambassador of the People's Democratic Republic of 
Algeria to San'a; the permanent representative of Kuwait to the Arab 
League, Hasan Fahmi Abd al-Majid.
This agreement was signed at the headquarters of the General
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Secretariat of the Arab League on Saturday 21st of Ramadan, 1392, or 
28th October 1972.
Source: ME/4133/A/10-13, Arabic in Ahmad Jabir Afif, pp. 453-60; SWB 
translation amended in light of latter.
Appendix 2. Text of joint KSA-PDRY statement on diplomatic relations, 
10 March 1976
In the Name of God, the All Merciful, the All Compassionate. Pro­ 
ceeding from the spirit of Islamic and Arab fraternity between the two 
fraternal peoples in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the PDRY; out of 
a desire to create an atmosphere of mutual understanding to serve 
their causes and those of the Arabian Peninsula and the entire Arab 
nation; out of their concern to establish normal relations between 
them; in affirmation of the importance of safeguarding and consolidat­ 
ing relations among all the states of the region in an atmosphere of 
mutual respect for the sovereignty of every state over its territory; 
relations between the two countries were reviewed in the present cir­ 
cumstances which are marked by the Zionist aggression, by foreign 
interferences and the colonialist activities, in all shapes and forms, 
in the Arab area in general and the Arabian Peninsula in particular.
In response to the aspirations of the peoples of the two countries 
towards the best of fraternal and cordial relations and mutual co­ 
operation between them, on the one hand, and between them and their 
brothers in the Arabian Peninsula on the other hand - the aspirations 
which are consolidated by religious, historic and cultural ties and 
by the common destiny; in response to the aspirations of the two 
fraternal peoples towards progress, prosperity and peace for them­ 
selves and security and stability for the Arabian Peninsula; so that 
they may devote their efforts to opposing the Zionist aggression and
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to preventing foreign interferences which do harm to the safety and 
security of the region, they declare their intention to establish 
normal relations between them on the basis of Arab fraternity, good- 
neighbour liness, the unity of destiny and non-interference in internal 
affairs, in a manner that realizes the security and stability of the 
Arabian Peninsula and the interests of the Arab nation, away from 
foreign interference.
They also assert their two countries' determination: to have fruit­ 
ful co-operation in the economic, cultural and other fields, in a 
manner that ensures their stability and the progress and prosperity 
of their peoples; to take all the steps necessary for this; and to 
put an end to various differences between them. 
Source: ME/5156/A/8-9.
Appendix 3. Text of interview with Muhammad Salih Mutiyya', PDRY• • . •
Foreign Minister, November 1977
Q. Why is the PDRY pursuing a policy of Yemeni unity?
A. Yemen is one country. Before the advent of imperialism there was
nothing called 'South Arabia'. It was the British who divided the
area and created something called 'South Arabia'. Then nationalists
began to call this country the 'Yemeni South', and a political
struggle developed as to whether we were or were not part of the Yemen.
The nationalists stressed the 'Yemeni-ness' (al-yamaniyya) of this
country.
Q. If your goal is Yemeni unity, what kind of unity will this be?
A. We are not just one people, we also have social differences between
us. The Northerners have their own conception of unity and they tried
to impose it, using their army, in the war of September 1972. We then
came together with them in the committees set up after the Tripoli
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Conference, and we advanced our conception of unity in these commit­ 
tees. Any unity work must be under the control of the left. In the 
past, the Northern regime was stronger than us, but now we are stron­ 
ger than them. So unity has become a progressive slogan. This is 
evident from seeing who opposes unity - the Saudis do, since they fear 
that ten million Yemenis would be the strongest country in the 
Peninsula.
Q. Is unity possible without a revolution in the North? 
A. Yes, it is. There is more than one way to achieve unity. Armed 
struggle is not the only one. We can use all possible means. 
Q. There was guerrilla opposition in the North in the early 1970s. 
Why did it end?
A.. This was not a matter for us to decide. It was up to the organisa­ 
tions in the North.
Q. What is happening in the unity committees?
A. A lot of talking, but not much action. For example, the economic 
committee decided to set up a joint public sector and co-operatives, 
but these decisions were not implemented. On the other hand, a number 
of decisions have been taken which have not been made public. 
Q. Is the fact that Kamaran Island was seized by the YAR in the 1972 
war an issue between you?
A. It is not a problem. It is Yemeni. The North has it. 
Q. .What about the issue of the three provinces taken by Saudi Arabia, 
in 1934?
A. We did not discuss this with the Saudis. The problem is one for 
the YAR to take up.
Q. When did you begin discussions with Saudi Arabia on establishing 
diplomatic relations? Was the death of King Feisai in 1975 a factor? 
A. The negotiations began in 1974. King Feisai's death was not
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important - talks had begun before that.
Q. And what conditions were laid down before diplomatic relations 
could be established?
A. We do not want to antagonise the Saudis. It was they who would 
not recognise us, and it was they who stopped their attacks on us. 
They decided they wanted to discuss with us, and by the end of 1975 
the hostile radio broadcasts had ceased.
Q. But the PDRY media, which formerly attacked Saudi Arabia, have 
also stopped doing so.
A. We have made mutual concessions. Neither side is to attack the 
other.
Q. What about Oman? Was this not also a subject of negotiation 
between you and the Saudis?
A. We tell the Saudis to get the Iranians out. We are prepared to 
have relations with Oman if (a) the Iranians get out and (b) there is 
an agreement between the Popular Front and the regime. Then South 
Yemen will talk to Qabus. The Front is weak now, so Qabus could find 
agreement with it, if he was clever enough.
Q. And what about border clashes? It seems you have at least agreed 
to stop shelling across the frontier, a cease-fire agreement. 
A. There has been no cease-fire agreement on the border, since we were 
never involved. The bombardments along the frontier were the work of 
the PFLO. The Iranians had occupied strategic areas along the fron­ 
tier, and the Front then stopped its activities there. That is why 
there has been this talk of a 'cease-fire 1 . 
Q. What is the s'tate of your relations with Gulf states? 
A. Only with Kuwait do we have diplomatic relations. But we often sit 
with people from the Gulf - the Amirates are the easiest. 
Q. But in 1971 you refused to recognise these states, and now you seem
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to have changed your position.
A. We existed as an independent state before they did, and it should 
be our choice when diplomatic relations are established. We said in 
1971 that their independence was fake, and the fact is that this is 
still so. The British are still there - you can see that the moment 
you get off the plane. It is only oil that gives them the appearance 
of independence. We also have the problem of not having sufficient 
numbers of Foreign Ministry personnel, and we do not need to have 
formal recognition to deal with them.
Q. In the mid-1970s there was a. crisis in your relations with Iraq. 
Why was this?
A. The issue with Iraq was that in 1975 it proposed a Gulf Security 
Pact to Iran.
Q. Was there also the fact that the Iraqi Ba'thi tried to interfere 
in the PDRY?
A. No. The Ba'th is very weak in the PDRY. There was no interfer­ 
ence, and this was not a factor.
Q. What about Iran? Have you had any contacts with it? 
A. None, except via Saudi Arabia over the pilot shot down last year. 
Q. There appears to be some difference between your position on Israel 
and that of the USSR. The Soviet Union advocates a two state solution. 
You refuse to accept the legitimacy of an Israeli state. 
A. The USSR can adopt whatever position it wants on this issue. Our 
view on the Palestinian question is clear: we accept what the Pales­ 
tinians accept.
Q. One issue that has arisen recently is that of Perim Island. It has 
been claimed that the PDRY agreed to lease this island to Egypt. 
A. There was never such an agreement. Reports about it were lies. 
There has been no Egyptian presence on Perim, and we have not been
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paid anything for this.
Q. Are you willing to open diplomatic relations with the USA?
A. There are no problems from our side. But others may stop them.
I met Secretary of State Vance in New York recently, and he may send
a delegation here.
Q. What about the UK? Can relations with them improve?
A. The UK does not want to help us. Trade relations have grown, but
there has been no reaction on their side. They have a large embassy
here, but they seem to spend a lot of time diffusing calumnies about
us.
Q. Despite your close relations with the USSR you do not have a Treaty
of Friendship and Co-operation with them. Why?
A. We have no such treaty with the Soviet Union because we do not
think that such treaties strengthen relations. Look at what happened
in Egypt.
Q. Have you given the Soviet Union naval bases in the PDRY?
A. There are no Soviet naval bases here. They said the same things
about Somalia as they said about us. But in Somalia's case they proved
it with photographs. They have not been able to do that in our case.
Q. How are your relations with China? Are there not significant
disagreements with it?
A. There are no problems between us and China. Premier 'Ali Nasir
Muhammad is going there in April of next year. We do not discuss
•
differences of opinion with them.
Q. What is your view of the situation in Ethiopia, and in particular
on the question of Eritrea?
A. The Eritrean revolution must not be an obstacle to the Ethiopian
revolution as a whole. The Eritreans must reach some agreement with
the Ethiopians. The Eritreans must now see that they have to
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negotiate - they cannot capture Asmara. We are not against Eritrean 
independence, if the Ethiopians agree.
Q. What about Somalia? It is now at war with Ethiopia. You have 
previously had good relations with Mogadishu, and now you have good 
relations with Ethiopia. What is your policy here? 
A. Somalia cannot take a long war. They are three millions to the 
Ethiopians' thirty millions. In the end, we think the Somalis will 
negotiate if they are defeated. The Somalis want us to be with them 
only, and most Arab states take Somalia's side. But the Somalis are 
misleading the Arabs about what is happening there. We Yemenis say: 
you have to negotiate, since you are going to have to live with them 
for a long time to come. The irony is that the Somalis were favour­ 
able to Mengistu before he came to power: it was they who advised us 
and the Soviet Union to deal with him. The Somalis are now talking 
about the Western Somalia Liberation Front: but the WSLF just consists 
of external delegations. The Soraalis even arrested them all in 1973-4. 
We are concerned about the situation there, not least because there 
are Yemenis living in both Ethiopia and Somalia.
Q. Fidel Castro made a visit here to try and arrange a federation of 
states in the region. Were you included in this?
A. Castro tried to say to the Somalis that the Ethiopian revolution 
was just starting, and they should try to solve their differences in 
a peaceful war. He thought we should all try to help the revolution- 
in Ethiopia. The Ethiopians suggested a federation of Ethiopia, 
Somalia and Eritrea, but the PDRY was not included in such proposals. 
Q. Can the Russians put pressure on Somalia?
A. The Russians have not been able to hold Somalia back. We in the 
PDRY warned the Russians about this, but they gave bad advice to 
Mengistu about their ability to restrain Somalia.
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Q. Your government has been extensively criticised in the west for 
human rights violations. In 1975 you invited a delegation from 
Amnesty International to visit the PDRY: but relations between you 
and Amnesty have now ceased, and you refuse to reply to their letters. 
Why is this?
A. We gave Amnesty facilities and received them. But they began to 
interfere in political issues. So, we shall not reply to them or talk 
to them. We are a developing country and a developing revolution. 
There are threats to our revolution, and people are in prison accord­ 
ing to the law.
Appendix 4. Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between the USSR 
and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Democratic 
Republic of Yemen,
Believing that the further development and strengthening of the 
relations of friendship and all-round co-operation which have taken 
shape between them meet the fundamental national interests of the 
peoples of both countries and serve the cause of consolidating peace 
and security throughout the world;
Desiring to lend every assistance to the development of peaceful 
relations among states and fruitful international co-operation;
Determined to promote the socio-economic achievements of the 
peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's 
Democratic Republic of Yemen, and to come out in favour of unity and 
co-operation between all forces struggling for peace, national inde­ 
pendence, democracy and social progress;
Inspired by the ideals of struggle against imperialism, colonialism 
and racism in all their forms and manifestations;
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Attaching great importance to co-operation between both countries 
in working for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;
Reaffirming their adherence to the objectives and principles of 
the charter of the United Nations Organisation, including the prin­ 
ciples of respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and non­ 
interference in internal affairs;
Desiring to develop and strengthen the existing relations of 
friendship and co-operation between the two countries;
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
The high contracting parties solemnly declare their resolve to 
strengthen the unbreakable friendship between the two countries and 
steadfastly develop political relations and all-round co-operation on 
the basis of equality, respect for national sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.
ARTICLE 2
The high contracting parties will co-operate closely and comprehen­ 
sively in ensuring conditions for the safeguarding and the further 
development of the socio-economic gains of their peoples and respect 
for the sovereignty of each of them over all their natural resources.
ARTICLE 3
The high contracting parties will exert efforts for strengthening 
and expanding mutually-advantageous economic, scientific and technical 
co-operation between them. Towards this end, the parties will develop 
and deepen co-operation in the spheres of industry, agriculture, fish­ 
ing, the use of natural resources, the planning of economic develop­ 
ment and in other economic spheres, as well as in the training of 
local personnel. The parties will expand trade and navigation on the 
basis of the principles of equality, mutual advantage and most-favoured- 
nation treatment.
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ARTICLE 4
The high contracting parties will contribute to the development of 
co-operation and the exchange of experience in the fields of science, 
culture, the arts, literature, education, health, the press, radio, 
television, cinema, tourism, sports and other fields.
The sides will contribute to the development of contacts and co­ 
operation between the organs of state power, trade unions and other 
mass organisations and also to the extension of direct ties between 
industrial enterprises and cultural research institutions for the 
purpose of gaining a more profound knowledge of the life, work, 
experience and achievements of the peoples of the two countries. Both 
sides will stimulate the development of contacts between the working 
people of the two countries.
ARTICLE 5
The high contracting parties will continue to develop co-operation 
in the military field on the basis of the relevant agreements con­ 
cluded between them for the purpose of strengthening their defence 
capability.
ARTICLE 6
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects the policy of non- 
alignment pursued by the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, which 
constitutes a major factor in the development of international co­ 
operation and peaceful coexistence.
The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen respects the peaceful 
foreign policy pursued by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
which is aimed at strengthening friendship and co-operation with all
countries and peoples.
ARTICLE 7 
The high contracting parties will continue to make every effort to
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protect international peace and the security of the peoples, for 
further relaxation of international tension, for spreading detente to 
all regions of the world, for its realisation in the concrete forms 
of mutually-beneficial co-operation between states, for the settlement 
of international disputes by peaceful means in order to make the prin­ 
ciple of renouncing the use of force an effective law of international 
life, and for the elimination from international relations of all 
manifestations of the policy of hegeraonism and expansionism. The 
parties will actively promote the cause of general and complete dis­ 
armament, including nuclear disarmament, under effective international 
control.
ARTICLE 8
The high contracting parties will continue a vigorous struggle 
against imperialist encroachments in order to eradicate colonialism 
and racism in all their forms and manifestations.
The parties will co-operate with each other and with other peace- 
loving states in support of the just struggle of peoples for their 
freedom, independence, sovereignty and social progress.
ARTICLE 9
The high contracting parties will make every effort to ensure a 
lasting and just peace in the Middle East and the achievement, for 
this purpose, of a comprehensive Middle East settlement.
ARTICLE 10
The high contracting parties will contribute to the development of 
co-operation between Asian states, to the establishment of peaceful 
and good-neighbourly relations and mutual confidence between them, 
and to the creation of an effective security system in Asia through 
co-operative efforts of all states on that continent.
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ARTICLE 11
The high contracting parties will consult each other on major 
international questions directly affecting the interests of the two 
countries.
In case situations arise which threaten peace or violate inter­ 
national peace, the parties will strive to enter into contact with 
each other without delay for the purpose of co-ordinating their posi­ 
tions in the interests of removing a threat to peace or restoring 
peace.
ARTICLE 12
Each of the high contracting parties solemnly declares that it will 
not enter into military or other alliances and will not take part in 
any groupings of states or actions and undertakings directed against 
the other high contracting party.
ARTICLE 13
The high contracting parties declare that the provisions of this 
treaty do not contradict their commitments under the international 
treaties now in force and undertake not to conclude any international 
agreements incompatible with this treaty.
ARTICLE 14
Any question which may arise between the high contracting parties 
as regards the interpretation or application of any provision of this 
treaty will be settled on a bilateral basis in the spirit of friend­ 
ship, mutual respect and understanding.
ARTICLE 15 
The treaty will be in force for 20 years from the day of its
enactment.
If neither of the high contracting parties gives notice, six months 
before the expiration of this period of its wish to terminate the
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treaty, it will remain in force for another five years and will be 
prolonged each time for another five-year period unless either of the 
high contracting parties gives written notice of its intention to 
terminate it six months before the expiration of the respective five- 
year period.
ARTICLE 16
The treaty is subject to ratification and will come into force on 
the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification, which will be 
done in Aden.
Done in Moscow this 25th day of October, 1979, in duplicate, in 
the Russian and Arabic languages, both texts being equally authentic. 
Source: Soviet News, 13 November 1979.
Appendix 5. The Oman-PDRY Agreement on Normalization of Relations, 
the 'Kuwait Agreement of Principles', 15 November 1982
Out of fraternal feeling and sincere willingness to develop normal 
relations between the PDRY and the Sultanate of Oman, an extended 
meeting of experts and Ministers of Foreign Affairs was held between 
23rd October and 27th October 1982. Those who participated in the 
meeting were a delegation from the PDRY led by the Foreign Affairs 
Minister, Dr Abd al-Aziz ad-Dali, and the delegation of the Sultanate 
of Oman led by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Yusuf al- 
Alawi Abdullah. Also participating were the UAA delegation led by 
Abd ar-Rahraan aj-Jarwan, Under Secretary of the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry, and Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir as-Sabah, the Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information, who led the 
Kuwait delegation. [The meeting was held] in the light of the meeting 
between PDRY and Oman delegations in the presence of a delegation 
representing the State of Kuwait between 3rd July-7th July 1982. Many
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meetings were held to review the agenda which included the following 
items:
1. Agreeing to abstain from interference in internal affairs, and 
mutual respect for national sovereignty and the border issue.
2. The presence of foreign bases.
3. Media campaigns.
4. Exchanging diplomatic representation.
In an absolutely frank and responsible atmosphere the conferees 
discussed all the items on the agenda, bearing in mind the urgent 
need to establish good-neighbourly and co-operative relations between 
the two neighbours. From this, the following was reached.
1. The two countries are committed to establishing normal relations 
based on mutual respect, non-interference in domestic affairs and 
respect for the national sovereignty of both countries, good-neigh­ 
bourly relations and co-operation in the interests of the two 
peoples. Moreover, the two sides agreed to solve their differences 
through peaceful means and not allow any hostile act - that could 
cause stability and security to deteriorate - to emanate from the 
territory of either side.
As the two countries stress that neither has any ambitions towards 
any other territory, the two sides agreed to form a technical commit­ 
tee with the participation of Kuwait and the UAA so that all pertinent 
documents can be reviewed to reach a permanent solution to the border 
•issue between the two neighbouring countries, in accordance with the 
borders of the two countries as at 30th November 1967.
2. As for the presence of foreign bases, the two sides agreed not to 
allow any foreign forces to use their territories for aggression or 
provocation against the other country.
3. As for media campaigns, the two sides agreed to stop all media
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campaigns by radio, television and press and all official forms of 
propaganda and publication against the other.
4. Exchange of diplomatic representation. The two sides stressed the 
need to improve bilateral relations and open new [fruitful spheres] 
for co-operation. An agreement was therefore reached on the principle 
of political relations, to develop [bilateral] relations so that the 
establishment of relations can be announced after bilateral contacts.
In accordance with this, the two sides agreed to sign this agree­ 
ment and emphasized that they will be fully committed to the prin­ 
ciples mentioned when the two countries ratify them on 15th November 
1982, with the aim of turning over a new leaf in the relations 
between the two countries.
[Signed] Abd al-Aziz ad-Dali, head of the PDRY delegation and 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs; Yusuf al-Alawi Abdullah, head 
of the Oman delegation and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs; 
Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir as-Sabah, head of the Kuwait delega­ 
tion, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Infor­ 
mation; Abd ar-Rahman aj-Jarwan, head of the UAA delegation and 
Under Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. 
Kuwait, 27th October 1982. 
Source: ME/7184/A/9-10.
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Abbreviations
CDSP Current Digest of the Soviet Press
CMEA Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
DLF Dhofar Liberation Front
ELF Eritrean Liberation Front
EPLF Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPRP Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FLOSY Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen
FRG Federal Republic of Germany
GDR German Democratic Republic
KSA Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
MAN Movement of Arab Nationalists
ME Summary of World Broadcasts, Part IV, The Middle East
NDF National Democratic Front in the Yemen Arab Republic
NF National Front
NLF National Liberation Front
PDFLP People's Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PDRY People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
POP People's Democratic Party (in Saudi Arabia)
PFLO People's Front for the Liberation of Oman
PFLOAG People's Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Occupied
	Arab Gulf (1968-1971); People's Front for the Liberation of
	Oman and the Arab Gulf (1971-1974)
PFLP People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLO Palestine Liberation Organisation
PMAC Provisional Military Administrative Council
PONF Political Organisation, the National Front
PR Peking/Beiling Review
PRC People's Republic of China
PRSY People's Republic of Southern Yemen
PVP People's Vanguard Party
RAF Rote Armee Fraktion
RDP Revolutionary Democratic Party
SAA South Arabian Army
SAF Sultan's Armed Forces
SOAF Sultan of Oman's Air Force
SPD Sozialistische Partei Deutschlands
SU Summary of World Broadcasts, Part I, The Soviet Union and
	Eastern Europe
UPONF Unified Political Organisation, the National Front
YAR Yemen Arab Republic
YSP Yemeni Socialist Party
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